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Abstract 
Inquiry into the evolution of syntactic universals is hampered by severe limitations on 
the available evidence. Theories of selective function nevertheless lead to predictions of 
local optimaliiy that can be tested scientifically. This thesis refines a diagnostic, 
originally proposed by Parker and Maynard Smith (1990), for identifying selective 
functions on this basis and applies it to the evolution of two syntactic universals: ( I ) the 
distinction between open and closed lexical classes, and (2) nested constituent structure. 
In the case of the former, it is argued that the selective role of the closed class items is 
primarily to minimise the amount of redundancy in the lexicon. In the case of the latter, 
the emergence of nested phrase structure is argued to have been a by-product of 
selection for the ability to perform insertion operations on sequences - a function that 
plausibly pre-dated the emergence of modem language competence. The evidence for 
these claims is not just that these properties perform plausibly fitness-related functions, 
but that they appear to perform them in a way that is improbably optimal. 
A number of interesting findings follow when examining the selective role of 
the closed classes. In particular, case, agreement and the requirement that sentences 
have subjects are expected consequences of an optimised lexicon, the theory thereby 
relating these properties to natural selection for the first lime. It also motivates the view 
that language variation is confined to parameters associated with closed class items, in 
turn explaining why parameter confiicts fail to arise in bilingualism. 
The simplest representation of sequences that is optimised for efficient 
insertions can represent both nested constituent structure and long-distance 
dependencies in a unified way, thus suggesting that movement is intrinsic to the 
representation of constituency rather than an 'imperfection'. The basic structure of 
phrases also follows from this representation and helps to explain the interaction 
between case and theta assignment. These findings bring together a surprising array of 
phenomena, reinforcing its correctness as the representational basis of syntactic 
structures. 
The diagnostic overcomes shortcomings in the approach of Pinker and Bloom 
(1990), who argued that the appearance of ^adaptive complexity' in the design of a trait 
could be used as evidence of its selective function, but there is no reason to expect the 
refinements of natural selection to increase complexity in any given case. 
Optimality considerations are also applied in this thesis to filter theories of the 
nature of unobserved linguistic representations as well as theories of their functions. In 
this context, it is argued that, despite Chomsky's (1995) resistance to the idea, it is 
possible to motivate the guiding principles of the Minimalist Program in terms of 
evolutionary optimisation, especially i f we allow the possibility that properties of 
language were selected for non-communicative functions and that redundancy is 
sometimes costly rather than beneficial. 
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1 
Introduction 
It is one thing to ask why a language capacity evolved in the hominid line and another 
to ask why it evolved with the specific properties that it has. Why for instance, does 
modem human language have properties like those in (I)? 
1. a. case 
(e.g., the property that requires us to use he and him in different contexts) 
b. agreement 
(e.g., / am happy is acceptable but / are happy is not) 
c. displacement/movement 
(e.g., the man takes the same semantic role with respect to the event described 
by the main verb in paraphrases like The dog hit the man and The man was 
bitten despite appearing in different structural positions) 
d. binding constraints that determine when noun phrases can and cannot co-refer 
(e.g., him must refer to someone other than George in a sentence like George 
attacked him, but may co-refer with George in a sentence like George's father 
attacked him) 
These and many other properties show up again and again in all o f the worid's language 
families (Chomsky, 1986; Croft, 1990; Greenberg, 1966) and in newly emerging Creole 
languages (Bickerton, 1977; Kegl, Senghas & Coppola, 1999). Regardless of whether 
these properties are strictly universal, their ubiquity warrants an explanation in terms of 
I 
what makes ihem the most stable outcome of language development under typical 
genetic and environmental conditions and whether the emergence of these traits 
conferred a selective advantage to ancestors. Despite this, much of the work on the 
evolution of language has focussed on the selective advantage of the whole and ignored 
the parts, but it is far from obvious how functional descriptions at these different levels 
can be reconciled. 
The situation is not unlike descriptions of the function of a winter coat. As a 
whole, the main function of a winter coat is to keep its wearer warm, but we would be 
missing something by attributing the same function to its buttons, pockets and colour. 
Although the buttons wil l indirectly serve to keep the wearer warm by allowing the coat 
to be fastened shut, some consideration of the fastening function is crucial for 
explaining properties of buttons that are not shared by other parts of the coat such as the 
lining and so on. By also considering its pockets, we are forced to broaden the definition 
of the coat's function to include less obvious things like the ability to carry small items. 
As for the coat's colour, this may be designed or it may be a by-product of the materials 
used - those materials being chosen on the basis of other things like their thermal 
characteristics and cost. The individual properties of the language capacity may of 
course fall into a variety of analogous categories. 
The question of how we might inquire into the evolution of these properties is a 
formidable one, since it is far from obvious how we could test our theories. The case of 
language is particularly challenging because many of the sources of evidence that 
evolutionary biologists usually rely on are unavailable. There is, as yet, no evidence of 
properties like those listed in ( I ) in other species to form the basis of comparisons and 
very little can be inferred from the fossil record about changes in linguistic or, for that 
matter, any other kind of cognitive ability. Despite this, Botha (2003) argues that the 
main obstacle to advancing our understanding of the evolution of language is not the 
paucity of evidence as such, but ihe paucity of restrictive theory, "restrictive to the 
extent that it makes it possible to distinguish in a non-arbitrary way between entities 
that are instances of a specific kind of evolutionary event, process or product and 
entities that are not" (Botha, 2003: 115). 
One of the targets of Botha's criticisms is the approach adopted by Pinker and 
Bloom (1990), which involves making inferences about the adaptive significance of 
language by looking at whether or not it reveals any functional pressures in its design. 
Pinker and Bloom (1990: 709) argue that language reveals such pressures because it 
exhibits what they call "adaptive complexity", which they define as a property of "any 
system composed of many interacting parts where the details of the parts' structure and 
arrangement suggest design to fu l f i l l some function". They say very little about how 
adaptations could be identified systematically, but some attempts have been made 
within mainstream evolutionary biology to address exactly this question. These ideas 
have not yet filtered through into discussions of language evolution, thus providing a 
major motivation for the present work. In integrating some of these ideas, I attempt to 
establish a more rigorous and restrictive diagnostic of adaptive function based on Parker 
and Maynard Smith (1990), which, although broadly compatible with Pinker and Bloom 
(1990), dispenses with the problematic notion of 'complexity' in favour of 
considerations of 'design optimality'. 
The present work applies this diagnostic to two separate examples of syntactic 
universals. In chapter five, I use this diagnostic to argue that the selective role of the 
closed classes is primarily to minimise the amount of redundancy in the lexicon. In 
chapter six, I argue that the emergence of nested phrase structure is a by-product of 
selection for the ability to perform certain kinds of operations on sequences - a function 
that plausibly pre-dated the emergence of modem language. 
Before getting to these arguments, there are three chapters examining the 
background literature - one about language, one about evolution, and one about the 
evolution of language. Specifically, chapter two introduces the linguistic background 
that is necessary to characterise the universals under consideration. Chapter three then 
examines the kinds of evolutionary explanations that can be applied and what kind of 
evidence would allow us to distinguish between them in a principled way. Chapter four 
reviews studies that are specifically about the evolution of language, thus placing the 
current work in context and providing a point of contrast to illustrate how the current 
approach departs from the methods employed in that body of work. 
The optimaliiy diagnostic is introduced and developed in chapter three whilst 
confronting a number of obstacles that stand in the way of providing a selectionist 
account of language evolution. Some of these obstacles apply to evolutionary 
argumentation generally and some apply to inquiry into the evolution of language 
specifically. The general problems concern whether there are categories of evolutionary 
explanation other than natural selection that can account for the existence of a trait, as 
argued by Stephen Jay Gould and others (Gould & Lewontin, 1979; Gould & Vrba, 
1982; Gould, 1991; Lightfoot, 2000; Piatlelli-Palmarini, 1989; Uriagereka, 1998). I 
argue that there are certainly important lessons to be drawn from Gould's observations 
that are important for constructing rigorous evolutionary arguments, but while he and 
his colleagues argue that there are a plurality of forces acting in addition to natural 
selection, I argue that they only succeed in demonstrating that natural selection has a 
plurality products. 
Chapter three also addresses a number of problems specific to inquiry into 
language evolution. Chomsky (2002) and others argue that language is too elegant in its 
design to have been the result of evolutionary ^tinkering'. Lightfoot (2000) and others 
argue that many properties of grammar are actually maladaptive. Geschwind (1980) 
questions how any mutation of the language capacity could ever be favoured i f the 
mutant is not conforming to the rest of the linguistic community. Hauser, Chomsky and 
Fitch (2002: 1574) argue that properties of grammar have a "tenuous connection to 
communicative efficacy". I attempt to show that none of these arguments are 
compelling, thus leaving the door wide open for selectionist explanations and hence the 
proposals to follow in chapters five and six. 
To take the last of these arguments, the observation that properties like those in 
( I ) have a "tenuous connection to communicative efficacy" (Hauser et al, 2002: 1574) 
is only evidence that they were not selected for communicative functions, not that they 
weren't selected for non-commimicative functions. For instance, a universal could be 
selected for improving language leamability or for its effects on reducing the costs 
associated with the language faculty in terms of metabolic energy or other neural 
resources. The proposals in chapters five and six are of this character. 
Chapter five examines closed-class lexical items (i.e., grammatical function 
words and inflections) and concludes that they have the effect of minimising the amount 
of redundancy in the lexicon. By encapsulating lexical categories, closed class items can 
mediate grammatical relations so that lexical entries can remain extremely economical 
in terms of the number of formal features they need to contain. For instance, learning 
that a noun is associated with determiners allows a noun, encapsulated within a 
determiner phrase, to be used as either the subject or object of a sentence or as the 
object of a preposition and so forth. The language learner does not have to learn all of 
the contexts in which a new noun can be used because this information is encoded in the 
few words that constitute the closed class of determiners. So long as the proportion of 
closed-class items in the lexicon is small relative to the open-class items, the additional 
representational burden that they impose wil l be more than offset by the reduction in 
redundancy in the very many more open-class items. This has the effect of minimising 
the storage requirements of the lexicon, and would thereby presumably translate into 
savings of metabolic and neural resources - savings which we can expect natural 
selection to favour. A number of interesting findings also follow when examining the 
consequences of the theory. In particular, it appears that important properties like case 
( la) , agreement ( l b ) and the requirement that sentences have subjects are expected 
consequences of an optimised lexicon, the theory thereby relating these properties to 
natural selection for the first time. 
Chapter six applies the optimality diagnostic to the representation of sequences. 
A number of proposals for how sequences could be represented are evaluated with 
respect to the efficiency with which items can be inserted into them. The worst case 
would be i f each token is associated with an index marking its absolute order in the 
sequence, since the insertion of a new token anywhere before the end would require the 
remainder to be re-indexed. Other representations are considered thai encode relative 
order rather than absolute order and are compared with respect to the level of 
redundancy that insertion operations cause. The optimal representation allows an 
insertion to be made with a single operation and without introducing redundancy. The 
surprising feature of this representation is that it also allows nested phrase structure to 
be represented, which suggests that the mechanisms involved were co-opted rather than 
selected for their role in language, having been originally selected for manipulating 
sequences. Some further consequences of the theory are explored by looking at a lower-
level description of the same kind of representation. Strikingly, this representation 
appears to unify the representation of phrase structure with representations of the 
relation that is also implicated in movement (Ic) and binding (Id) . This relation, called 
c-command, is reviewed in chapter two. The theory also motivates other fundamental 
properties of language including the specifier-head-complement structure of phrases and 
sheds new light on the relationship between case and argument roles. 
The optimality diagnostic, as applied to these domains, has served to focus 
inquiry in interesting ways. As well as providing evidence of the original adaptive 
function of the properties in question, it has served to relate various phenomena that 
until now were not thought to be related, and to draw attention to other phenomena that 
have mostly escaped attention. The approach has therefore not only been informative 
about the origins of these properties, but also their nature. By focussing inquiry into the 
nature of language, it has many parallels with the Minimalist Program in linguistics, 
which proceeds according to the working assumption that the computational system that 
implements grammar is a perfect solution to the constraints imposed upon it by the 
systems with which it interfaces (Chomsky, 1995). At first glance, the assumption of 
perfection would appear to be entirely compatible with the optimising influence of 
natural selection, but this interpretation is rejected by Chomsky (1995) for reasons I 
examine in chapter three. There, I argue that Chomsky's rejection of this position is 
nevertheless premature and conclude that selectionist accounts are not only compatible 
with the assumption of perfection but actually provide independent motivation for why 
we should expect inquiry based on it to succeed in generating theories with better 
empirical coverage. Additionally, by further specifying that this perfection be of a type 
that plausibly relates to fitness (generally in terms of minimising metabolic or other 
costs rather than maximising communicative efficacy), the approach can be made even 
more restrictive. The number of substantive results generated in the present work would 
appear to reinforce this view. 
In terms of the scope of the present work, it is worth clarifying that the focus 
here is on the evolution of the computational system that implements grammar rather 
than the articulatory-perceptual or conceptual-intentional systems. Although questions 
about the evolution of these other systems are interesting in their own right, Ihey are 
separable. The articulatory-perceptual systems can be separated because language is not 
tied to any particular modality of expression, the same signal being expressible via 
speech, writing, hand signs for the deaf, braille for the blind, and many other 
conceivable systems. Thinking in words does not even require a signal to be 
externalised, but is still language. The distinction between the grammar system and 
conceptual-intentional systems is more difficult to motivate, but it is probably desirable 
to differentiate between the capacity for grammatical language and more general 
capacities for communication and thought which rely on the same conceptual 
knowledge but take non-linguistic forms. 
The final chapter summarises the methodological and empirical contributions of 
the present work and highlights further challenges. The central methodological 
contribution lies in illustrating how oplimality considerations can be applied profitably 
to focus inquiry into both the nature and function of evolved traits. Its success as a 
methodology is reinforced by the empirical contributions of the present work which 
deepen our understanding of the interrelations between many of the aforementioned 
linguistic properties. I conclude with some considerations about how the optimality 




This chapter provides the necessary background to characterise the syntactic universals 
that are the subject of evolutionary claims in chapters five and six. 
Ongoing disagreements about the nature of the language faculty mean it is 
something of a moving target for evolutionary theory, but there are nevertheless certain 
properties that most rational observers agree should be attributed to it even i f questions 
remain about whether the principles that linguists use to describe them are formulated 
correctly, whether they are specific to language or the species, and what genetic and 
environmental factors influence their development. The present review covers areas of 
consensus as well as some areas of current research. Naturally, the focus is on 
characterising the phenomena that are the subject of the substantive claims of the thesis 
so much more could of course be said about the language faculty than can justifiably be 
covered here. 
2.1 Approaches to the study of universals 
2.1.1 The typological approach 
Cross-linguistic comparisons are clearly an important source of data about language 
universals, revealing patterns that cannot be observed by analysing languages in 
isolation. This is the guiding principle of what is known as the typological approach. 
According to Croft (1990), linguistic typology is more than the taxonomical 
classification of languages into types. The patterns that are discovered by cross-
linguistic comparison lead to theoretical claims about what a person knows when he or 
she knows a language and hence to claims about the analyses of individual languages. 
The typological approach grew largely out of the work of Joseph Greenberg in 
the 1960s. In one of his earliest studies, Greenberg (1966) identified 45 universals from 
analysis of 30 languages from all over the world. Some of these universals were 
absolute as in (1) and some were statistical as in (2). 
1. Languages with dominant VSO' order are always prepositional (Greenberg, 
1966: 78). 
2. With overwhelmingly greater than chance frequency, languages with normal 
SOV order are postpositional^ (Greenberg, 1966; 79). 
As in these examples, most of the universals that Greenberg identified were 
implicational, having the form " i f a language has property .r, then it will also have 
property 
Another important kind of universal is the hierarchical universal, which is 
equivalent to a chain of implicational universals. An example is Keenan and Comrie's 
(1977) relative clause accessibility hierarchy which says that if a language allows 
possessors to take relative clauses, then it wil l also allow non-direct objects to take them 
and i f non-direct objects can take them, then so can objects, and i f objects can, so can 
subjects. The hierarchy is summarised using the notation in (3). I f a language can 
relativise a particular type on this hierarchy then it can also relativise every type that 
appears to its left, 
3. subject > direct object > non-direct object > possessor 
' V S O is short for verb-subject-object. 
^ Postpositions arc the same as prepositions, except they appear after the noun phrase they select. 
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Linguistic typology is often contrasted with the generative approaches, which seek to 
provide a more explicit theory of what a language user knows when he or she knows a 
language. 
2.1.2 The generative approach 
Under the generative approach, particular analyses are often argued on the basis of 
examples from within a single language, which form the basis of hypotheses about 
universals that are then tested with respect to other languages. To do this, researchers in 
the generative tradition rely heavily on potentially very subtle judgments about the 
contrasting grammaticality of carefully constructed examples. This is a very powerful 
method which is why researchers in this tradition are able to formulate such explicit 
hypotheses, but because of the difficulty of making such judgements for languages other 
than those that the researcher speaks with native proficiency, claims about universals 
need to be tested by eliciting judgements from a suitable sample of informants from 
different language-speaking backgrounds. 
Early work in the generative tradition from the 1950s focussed on the 
descriptive adequacy of grammars. The goal was to produce grammars that generated 
all of the well-formed sentences of a language and none of the ill-formed sentences and 
these grammars were produced using rules specific to each language. With significant 
progress in this aim, an additional aim came to the fore, that of explanatory adequacy -
explaining what a person knows when he or she knows a language and how this 
knowledge is acquired. This gave rise to what is known as the Principles and Parameters 
approach, an early version of which was articulated by Chomsky (1981). 
Central to this approach is the notion of universal grammar, which Chomsky 
(1986) defined as the initial state of the language acquisition device prior to linguistic 
experience. This state is taken to be universal to the species in the sense that differences 
I I 
between individual languages do not result from differences in the initial state. The term 
universal grammar is potentially misleading since the language acquisition device, in its 
initial slate, is not a grammar in the sense of a complete description of a language nor is 
the linguistic knowledge that it embodies limited to grammar in a narrow sense since it 
encompasses principles of phonology and semantics (although in practice Chomsky's 
focus has been syntax). Another problem with the term arises in the context of 
discussions about the evolution of the language acquisition device where hypotheses 
about natural selection favouring some variant of universal grammar might be 
entertained, but to suggest that different variants of a universal could co-exist is at odds 
with the usual sense of ^universal'. For these reasons, the more transparent term, 
language acquisition device will be used in place of universal grammar throughout the 
present text. Note that the term universal grammar is also often used to refer to specific 
theories of Chomsky's about the nature of the initial state and the knowledge it 
embodies, but a connectionist model of the initial state, for instance, would also qualify 
as a theory of universal grammar in the sense in which the term was coined. 
Under the Principles and Parameters approach, typological universals are taken 
to result from the fact that the language acquisition device places constraints on the 
form that grammars can take. These constraints are formalised in terms of principles 
that must hold for all languages,"* and parameters that allow languages to vary in limited 
respects. A particular grammar is characterised by a particular setting of these 
parameters (rather than by a set of language-specific rules), and the acquisition of a 
language is viewed as the process by which these parameters are set. The role of 
language data is as a kind of triggering experience analogous to that of visual input in 
the maturation of the visual system. 
^ Here and throughout, 'language' will be used in the sense of I-language in Chomsky (1986), an I -
languagc being the iniernalised grammar of an individual adull speaker as opposed lo the more 
problematic notion of a 'language' as spoken by a speech community. 
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Chomsky (1965; 1986) argues that the existence of these constraints is necessary 
to explain how a language can be learnt from the evidence available to the language 
learner. 
[LJanguage poses in a sharp and clear form what has sometimes been called 
"Plato's problem," the problem of "poverty of stimulus," of accounting for the 
richness, complexity, and specificity of shared knowledge, given the limitations 
of the data available (Chomsky, 1986: 7). 
Of particular interest is the finding that children appear to acquire a language in the 
virtual absence of negative evidence (Brown & Hanlon, 1970). Children are rarely 
corrected when they make mistakes, and even indirect evidence arising from the failure 
of parents to comprehend ungrammatical sentences is insufficient to draw the 
appropriate generalisations. Brown and Hanlon found that parental replies indicating a 
lack of understanding followed about as many grammatical utterances (42%) as 
ungrammalical ones (47%) and replies indicating understanding followed grammatical 
and ungrammatical utterances with equal frequency (45%). Marcus (1993) defends 
Brown and Hanlon's position against criticisms that parental replies are not so sharply 
distinguished and that a kind of noisy feedback is available. He analysed these claims 
statistically and concluded that "a child would have to repeal a given sentence verbatim 
more than 85 times to eliminate it from his or her grammar." (Marcus, 1993: 57). 
Furthermore, even i f negative evidence is available in certain contexts, there is a great 
deal of anecdotal evidence that children simply fail to understand the point of 
corrections. Braine (1971: 1600 recounts a particular instance: 
One case was use by my two-and-a-half-year-old daughter of other one as a 
noun modifier. Over a period of a few weeks I repeatedly but fruitlessly tried to 
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persuade her to substitute other + N for other one + N. With different nouns on 
different occasions, the interchanges went somewhat as follows: "Want other 
one spoon, Daddy" - "You mean, you want THE OTHER SPOON" - "Yes, I 
want other one spoon, please. Daddy" - "Can you say 'the other spoon'?" -
"Other...one...spoon" - "Say...'other'" - "Other" - "Spoon" - "Spoon" -
"Other...spoon" - "Other:..spoon. Now give me other one spoon?" Further 
tuition is ruled out by her protest, vigorously supported by my wife. Examples 
indicating a similar difficulty in using negative information wil l probably be 
available to any reader who has tried to correct the grammar of a two- or three-
year-old child. 
A number of mathematical proofs have been proposed in support of leamability 
claims (Gold, 1967; Nowak, Komarova & Niyogi, 2001) based on various assumptions 
about the learning procedure, but these are often based on worst-case learning 
conditions. Zuidema (2003) argues that a language should be easy to learn because the 
primary linguistic data is itself the output of a language learning process. But even i f 
language acquisition generally occurs under conditions that are more favourable than 
researchers have previously thought, there are many documented cases in which 
languages are acquired despite the available data being much worse than what is 
normally available to a child and even in cases where children do not appear to have 
been exposed to any relevant data at all. The most striking examples of this occur in the 
process of creolisation, which wil l be discussed in section 2.2.2. 
2.1-3 The Minimalist Program 
During the 1990s, Chomsky (1991; 1993; 1995; 1999) instigated a new program of 
research within the generative tradition that focuses inquiry on theories that predict the 
system that implements grammar to be an extremely elegant, non-redundant solution to 
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the demands placed on it by other systems of the brain. The decision to focus inquiry in 
this way arose from the observation thai, in ihe past, when principles have been 
postulated with oveHapping coverage 
Repeatedly, it has been found that these are wrongly formulated and must be 
replaced by non redundant ones. The discovery has been so regular that the need 
to eliminate redundancy has become a working principle in inquiry. (Chomsky, 
1995:5) 
This mode of inquiry is known as the Minimalist Program and has led to a number of 
interesting theoretical developments such as the bare phrase structure theory of 
Chomsky (1995: ch4) to be discussed in section 2.5. 
It is far from obvious why the language faculty should exhibit the kind of 
elegance that Minimalist theories predict. Indeed, Chomsky (1995) regards this 
perfection to be a surprising feature of a biological system. But the success of the 
Minimalist Program does not rely on knowing why it yields results - only that it does. 
The situation is not unlike a gold prospector restricting his search for gold to quartz-rich 
rock. It isn't necessary to know why gold is very often to be found in quartz to exploit 
the regularity. Nevertheless, I wil l examine how the language faculty could come to 
exhibit this kind of elegance in the course of chapter three and use this explanation to 
justify a suggested refinement of the Minimalist approach that wi l l be pursued for the 
remainder of the thesis. 
2.2 Language acquisition 
The study of syntactic universals necessarily involves the study of the properties of the 
language acquisition device. Hence, we should expect the way language develops in 
infancy to be instructive about its nature. Of particular interest are the cases of language 
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development that occur under exposure to extremely sparse or inconsistent linguistic 
input. In such cases, we observe the language acquisition device imposing order on the 
data to create new languages. Before discussing this process, called creolisation, I 
review the normal course of language development. 
2.2.1 Stages in language development 
Under normal circumstances, language acquisition proceeds through a number of 
distinctly recognisable stages marked by the kind of speech thai infants produce. The 
first stage, characterised by prelinguistic vocalisations (babbling, etc.), is followed by a 
single word stage beginning at around 12 months. Infants begin to combine words in 
utterances from around 18 months and are usually producing completely adull 
constructions by about school age. Each of these stages will be examined in this section. 
Sioel-Gammon and Menn (1997) divide the prelinguistic period into a number 
of sub-stages. In the first four months-after birth, vocalisations are strongly associated 
with emotional states. In the first two months, these are usually limited to cries, but 
infants soon begin to express other emotional slates by cooing and chuckling. From four 
to six months, infants begin to modulate the pilch and volume of vocalisations learning 
to yell, whisper, squeal and growl. During this period, they may also produce 
raspberries and sustained vowels. From around six months, infants enter the stage 
known as canonical babbling which is characterised first by the appearance of repetitive 
consonant-vowel sequences such as 'dadada' and *mamama', and later by sequences in 
which the consonants and vowels vary within the repeating consonant-vowel pattern. 
From around ten months, infants begin to use adult-like intonation and stress in their 
vocalisations both while interacting with other people and in solitary play. Although 
they are still not using recognisable words during this period, vocalisations (often 
accompanied by adult-like gestures) provide a very convincing impression of adult 
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speech. The infant's first words appear at about 12 months, but they continue to babble 
for several months after this. 
The first words that appear in an infant's productive vocabulary have been 
studied extensively with respect to their phonological and pragmatic properties. On the 
phonological side, the sounds used in eariy words have been found to be the same as 
those favoured in babbling (Sloel-Gammon & Menn, 1997). Pragmatically, early words 
tend to label aspects of the world that are important in the infant's daily life (Pan & 
Gleason, 1997). 
The eariiest single-word utterances include performatives such as *hi' and 'bye' 
as well as holophrastic utterances that perform the function of complete sentences in 
adult language. For example, an infant might use 'drink' on its own as a way of 
requesting a drink. 
When infants start to combine words at around 18 to 24 months, some basic 
properties of their syntactic knowledge begin to reveal themselves in that their two-
word utterances usually conform to adult word order (Tager-Flusberg, 1997). 
Braine (1963) also noted that early two-word utterances conform to paradigms 
with one word (the pivot) remaining constant while an open element varies. For 
example, one of the children in Braine's study was able to use 'see' as a pivot with a 
number of nouns such as 'boy' and 'sock' as the open word thus producing utterances 
such as 'see boy' and 'see sock'. 
Infants soon begin producing longer utterances, but these early 'sentences' are 
characterised by a lack of function words and inflections. As a result, this stage has been 
labelled telegraphic speech because of its resemblance to the abbreviated language of 
telegrams (Brown, 1973). Brown and his colleagues found that during this stage, infants 
omit grammatical function words and inflections even in repetition tasks. For instance. 
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when prompted to repeat the sentence "1 am drawing a dog", one of Brown and Eraser's 
(1963) subjects (aged 28*/2 months) responded with " I draw dog". 
The last stage is the transition to producing adult-like constructions, which is 
usually complete by school age, but children continue to acquire vocabulary at a 
phenomenal rate until adolescence and to a lesser extent throughout life. 
The stages in development that have been reviewed here have been described in 
terms of the productions of infants, but Elliot (1981: 81) cites a number of problems 
with using this kind of evidence to gauge a child's level of competence: 
Children come out with a lot of language which appears to indicate a more 
sophisticated level of language development than they have actually attained. 
For example, they sometimes go through a period of echoing the last parts of 
utterances addressed to them, often afier a delay, so that it is difficult to tell 
whether an utterance has been spontaneously created by the child or is an 
imitation of an adult utterance. They often learn stock phrases ... without being 
able to segment the phrase and recombine its parts. 
Studies that seek to test comprehension (e.g., Benedict, 1979) rather than production are 
also difficult to assess because children can often rely on contextual cues to infer 
intended meanings. Careful experiments have nevertheless been carried out using a 
preferential looking paradigm and sentence pairs that can only be disambiguated using 
word order (Hirsh-Pasek & Golinkoff, 1993). Golinkoff and Hirsh-Pasek (1995) found 
that children were able to reliably understand two word utterances before they were 
producing them at 17 months. 
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2 , 2 . 2 Creolisation and its implications 
New languages occasionally form under circumstances in which adults of different 
language-speaking backgrounds are brought together in a community, often as slaves. 
At first, adults spontaneously develop a language that is sufficient for rudimentary 
communication. This initial language is known as a pidgin and lacks many of the 
properties we usually associate with natural languages like movement, recursive 
structure and functional categories (i.e., function words like determiners and auxiliaries, 
and morphological inflections like markers o f lense and number). Ulierances of pidgin 
languages could be regarded as being like those of children in the telegraphic stage of 
language acquisition at least insofar as they lack more-or-less the same properties. 
In lime, pidgins develop into Creoles, which are full-fledged languages with 
structures characteristic of English or any other natural language. Given this, it is 
surprising that the transition from pidgin to creole can occur within a very short time, 
arguably even within a single generation (Bickerton, 1977). 
DeGraff (1999) distinguishes between three different theoretical positions with 
respect to how this process works. These are the universalist, substratist and 
superstralist positions. Universalists such as Bickerton (1977) believe that Creoles are 
invented by the children who acquire them natively under exposure to the pidgin input, 
their innate capacity for language allowing them to f i l l in those aspects of the language 
that are missing from the primary linguistic data. Substratists and superstratists argue 
that the properties of Creoles result from the influence of other languages. The former 
(e.g., Lefebvre & Lumsden, 1989) take the substrate languages (i.e., the ancestral 
•1. 
languages of the adults) to be influential and indeed the children usually acquire the 
native language of their parents in addition to the Creole. The latter (e.g., Chaudenson, 
1979) argue that the superstrate language (i.e., the socially dominant language spoken in 
the community) provides the model on which properties of the Creole are patterned. 
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Indeed, the superstrata language is usually the lexifier language (i.e., the language from 
which vocabulary items are mostly drawn). 
It is conceivable that each of the influences described by universalists, 
subsiratists and superstraiists are active in the formation of Creoles lo varying degrees, 
but only the universalist claims are interesting in the context of the present study. To 
assess these, it is prudent to look at those instances in which the process was least likely 
to have been influenced by language contact. Bickerton (1999) attempted to do this by 
limiting his observations to plantation Creoles formed after the displacement of 
populations from their ancestral communities thus minimising any influence from 
continued contact with substrate languages. Hawaiian creole is one such language and 
since this language formed relatively recently (about a hundred years ago), many 
records exist of utterances before, during and after its development. Bickerton (1999; 
53) describes the early form of that language as follows: 
LA]1I utterances show similar limitations (if not a complete absence) of 
grammatical structure: an almost complete absence of grammatical items 
(including a complete absence of tense, modality, and aspect (TMA) markers), a 
virtually complete absence of embedded structures, and frequent ellipses of 
arguments and even verbs. 
Within a decade or so, a recognisably distinct creole had emerged among the children of 
the community. This language had a developed system of grammatical morphemes. For 
instance, in the auxiliary system, speakers used the word *bin' to mark tense, 'go' to 
mark modality, and 'stay' to mark aspect. Bickerton (1999: 57) describes how these 
words come to be used with these functions: 
20 
In ihe normal case, a child of four or five wil l have acquired a wide range of 
grammatical items - enough to satisfy the structural requirements (in terms of 
government, anaphora, and so on) imposed by the innate syntax, in the creoIe 
case, for most of these requirements the child simply cannot find appropriate 
grammatical items in the pidgin. Grammatical items therefore have to be created 
by recruiting lexical items and bleaching them of their normal lexical meaning. 
Less data exists about the emergence of Creoles that emerged earlier, but Bickenon 
(1999) cites a number of grammatical similarities between them and the Hawaiian case 
suggesting that the language acquisition device falls back on default options in the 
setting of parameters when the primary linguistic data is lacking. 
Another important creolisation event, which is much less likely to have been 
influenced by substrate and superstrata languages has been directly witnessed by Judy 
Kegl and her colleagues in the last two decades in Nicaragua (Kegl, et ai, 1999). They 
have found that prior to the revolution of 1979, deaf individuals in Nicaragua were 
virtually isolated from one another and hence had no shared sign language. Following 
the revolution, public schools were established that allowed large-scale contact between 
deaf children. Prior to that contact, the only mode of communication open to deaf 
individuals was the idiosyncratic gesture systems they used in the home. These 
'homesigns' were rudimentary and almost never passed from generation to generation 
since deaf individuals rarely had (deaf) children due to their social isolation. Following 
contact in public schools, the first deaf students began to communicate with a more 
elaborate and conventional system known as Lenguaja de Sennas Nicaragiiense (LSN), 
which Kegl et al. (1999) equate with a pidgin or jargon. Soon after, a more 
sophisticated language known as Idioma de Sennas Nicaragiiense (ISN) emerged, which 
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ihey argue is a Creole in the sense of Bickenon (1991). Kegl et al. (1999: 187) recount 
the emergence of the latter language as follows. 
Groups entering the school al later dates had the benefit of exposure to both 
other homesign systems and to the more elaborated communication (LSN) that 
had developed among the first-generation homesigners. When very young 
children acquiring LSN surpassed their models, a new language (ISN) was 
added to the mix. Thus, the "language pool" to which each new group of signers 
becomes exposed is itself dynamic and ever-changing. 
The Nicaraguan case is a very important one because it appears to be an example of 
language emergence in the absence of any relevant influences from pre-existing 
languages (be they superstrate or substrate languages). 
First, the only potential superstrate was Spanish, a language inaccessible to Deaf 
people via the auditory modality and whose transmission via the visual modality 
is seriously compromised by the ineffectiveness of lipreading as well as the lack 
of literacy. Second, and more important, the only candidates for substrates were 
not languages but homesign systems (Kegl et al., 1999: 205). 
The phenomenon of creolisation presents a particularly vivid demonstration of the 
poverty of the stimulus argument, but as Kegl et al. (1999: 203) stress, the normal 
circumstances in which children acquire a language are the same in fundamental 
respects. 
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In typical child language acquisition, children hear only a fraction of the 
possible sentences in their native language, yet ihey are still able to master its 
complex rules and use them productively. In other words, children's input is not 
logically sufficient to lead ihem to a ful l grammar unless ihey are aided by an 
innate language faculty. So the child creolizing a language is doing nothing 
different from any child acquiring language. It's just that there is more 
information available from a natural-language model to determine the choice of 
more marked, yet still universally available, grammatical options. And thus, the 
typical case of child language acquisition wil l lead to a greater degree of 
linguistic conformity to the input language. 
2.3 The autonomy of grammar 
In the speech of foreigners and children we frequently hear ungrammatical utterances 
that are nevertheless readily intelligible. Uriagereka (1998: 65) provides the example in 
(4). As is the usual convention, asterisks are used throughout this text to indicate 
grammatically problematic utterances. 
4. *What have you discovered the fact that English is? 
Given that the status of such examples cannot be explained in terms of their 
interpretability, we must look to processes that are autonomous of semantic 
considerations for an explanation. 
It is also possible to produce sentences that are unintelligible, yet grammatically 
well-formed. Pinker (1994) cites Lewis Carroll's poem Jabbenvocky as an example, the 
first four lines of which are reproduced in (5). 
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5. Twas brillig, and the slilhy toves 
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe: 
A l l mimsy were the borogoves. 
And the mome raths outgrabe. 
The presence in this text, of inflectional morphology and grammatical words like the, 
and, did, and so forth is sufficient to identify the nouns, verbs and adjectives it contains, 
yet none of them are real English words. The poem has been translated into a number of 
other languages with similar results. The French and German translations of the first 
four lines are shown in (6) and (7) respectively (from Hofstadter, 1979: 366). 
6. French 
II brilgue: les loves lubricilleux 
Se gyrent en vrillant dans le guave. 
Enmimes sont les gougebosqueux 
Et le momerade horsgrave. 
7. German 
Es brillig war. Die schlichten Toven 
Wirrten und wimmelten in Waben; 
Und aller-miimsige Burggoven 
Die mohmen Rath' ausgraben. 
Examples (4-7) suggest that grammar is autonomous from those aspects of cognition 
that are concerned with the semantic and pragmatic interpretation of language. 
Examples (5-7) also support the view, advanced by Borer (1984) and Fukui (1995), that 
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language variation is limited to parameters associated with functional elements such as 
determiners, auxiliaries and prepositions, and morphological markers like tense and 
number. This is called the Functional Parameterization Hypothesis and one of the 
contributions of chapter five will be to demonstrate that it is an expected feature of an 
optimised lexicon. 
Pinker and Bloom (1990) argue that selective impairments affecting language 
without other aspects of cognition, or vice versa provide further suppon for autonomy 
claims, but as Deacon (1992) points out, this does not mean that language is necessarily 
implemented in a qualitatively different kind of neural ^circuitry' - it may be processed 
in a separate area, but with the same or similar types of circuits as those that occur 
elsewhere. 
Autonomy considerations are particulariy important in studying language 
acquisition, where some researchers (e.g., Dromi, 1999) have placed great theoretical 
significance on the distribution of eariy words into different syntactic or semantic 
classes. Unfortunately, Dromi (1999) and others often use the term noun 
interchangeably with object word, and the term verb interchangeably with action word, 
but such definitions, based on semantic properties of word classes, are highly 
problematic and represent a basic misconception about syntax. Brown and Miller (1991: 
2360 make this point in their introductory textbook: 
A moment^s thought uncovers many forms that are syntactically nouns but do 
not 'signify a person or thing' - action, activity, movement, and so on. Indeed, 
nouns like this 'signify an activity', supposedly the criterion for verbs. 
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They also cite examples like the words ripe (adjective), ripen (verb) and we could add 
to this ripeness (noun), which have related meanings, but manifest themselves in 
different word classes.'* 
The association of verbs with predicates, and nouns with arguments is similarly 
inadequate. The proposition studies(George, politics) can be expressed with either a 
verb or a noun as the 'predicate' as illustrated in (8). 
8. a. George studies politics. 
b. George is a student of politics. 
Terms such as 'noun' and *verb' are syntactic, and as such the preferred definitions are 
in terms of their formal syntactic properties rather than their semantic correlates. Nouns 
and verbs can only be distinguished on semantic criteria insofar as those criteria are 
syntactically represented. For example, count nouns label countable ^things' whether 
they are objects, abstract ideas or events and this fact is marked syntactically by the fact 
that these nouns can appear in both singular and plural forms. Nevertheless, there are 
many nouns (e.g., scissors, spectacles, trousers, tweezers, entrails) that have plural 
forms ^ even when they refer to single items and exhibit the usual agreement 
characteristics of any other plural as demonstrated by the contrasts in (9). 
9. a. *This scissors is blunt, 
b. These scissors are blunt. 
The differences in the meanings of these words are clearly illusiraied by defining ihem in lerms of each 
olhcr. To ripen means to become ripe, while ripeness is the dimension over which something varies as it 
ripens. 
^ These words do appear in singular form when modifying another noun (e.g.. 'scissor kick', 'spectacle 
frames', *;ro»5cr pockets*, c l c ) . 
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In all such cases, there is some element in the meaning that makes the plurality non-
arbitrary - some multiplicity of parts (scissors have two blades, spectacles have two 
lenses, etc), yet the label can only be used to refer to the whole object and not the 
individual parts. 
Ii is for reasons like these that linguists often define word classes in terms of 
formal morphological and distributional criteria (i.e., the kinds of inflections they lake 
and the syntactic contexts where ihey occur) rather than in terms of notional or semantic 
criteria. This is not to say that there is no relationship between syntactic categories and 
semantic categories. For instance, the category of nouns appears to include terms for 
concrete objects in all languages (Maratsos, 1988: 127). 
Problems also arise in determining the syntactic category of words used by 
infants who do not possess a complete grammar. Some researchers (e.g., Tomasello & 
Brooks, 1999) advocate determining the syntactic category of infant holophrases by 
looking 10 the word's category in adult usage. There are two obvious problems with 
this. First, there is no a priori reason to believe that an infant requires knowledge of a 
word's syntactic category to use it holophrastically. Second, words of different syntactic 
categories often have the same form, especially in English. For instance, 'drink' can be 
used as a noun or as a verb in adult usage and so, used holophrastically, there is no way 
to determine its syntactic categorisation even i f we could be sure that there is a fact of 
the matter from the infant's point of view. This wil l also be true of its semantic 
categorisation in many contexts because when an infant uses 'drink', he or she may be 
labelling an object (a drink), labelling an action (the act of drinking), or requesting a 
drink in which case the word may conflate such things as the state of wanting a drink, 
the actions associated with its preparation or consumption, and the object that is the 
drink itself. The trouble is determining what 'drink' means to the child over and above 
what the word is used to achieve. 
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This kind of indeterminacy is a typical property of adult language as well, and 
linguists reserve the terms sentence meaning and utterance meaning to distinguish 
between the literal, invariant aspects of an utterance's meaning and those which are 
specifically tied lo the pragmatic context of its use (e.g., Hurford & Heasley, 1983). 
Citing a number of contradictory studies on the classification of early words 
Kuczaj (1999: 142) is conservative in his conclusions: 
Rather than arguing about whether young children find it easier to learn nouns or 
verbs, it seems more important to remember that young children's early words 
are based on aspects of the world that they can directly experience, regardless of 
whether the words are nouns, verbs, or adjectives. 
2.4 Some syntactic universals 
The purpose of this section is to provide some specifics about the kinds of universals 
that language exhibits. The discussion in this section wil l avoid a commitment to any 
particular grammatical formalism, but subsequent sections pursue the question of how 
we might capture the regularities described here. 
2,4.1 Constituent structure 
2 . 4 . 1 . 1 A B R I E F R E V I E W O F T H E E V I D E N C E 
The phrase structure of all languages is characterised by the hierarchical nesting of 
phrases as revealed by various kinds of evidence that syntactic operations are sensitive 
to this structure rather than just contiguous strings of words. The evidence comes from 
various kinds of so-called constituency tests. I wil l examine three of these here, but 
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several other kinds are also used and are discussed in most introductory texts on syntax 
(e.g., Radford, 1988: 65fO.^ 
One common constituency test involves substitution, where a profonn (a word 
with an interpretation that is recoverable from context) is used in place of a longer 
phrase. The most familiar examples of proforms are pronouns like he, which can be 
used in place of noun phrases (NPs) such as the professor, but the same thing is possible 
with other types of phrases including verb phrases (VPs) and preposition phrases (PPs). 
Some examples follow. In each case, the (a) sentence provides a context for the 
interpretation of an italicised proform found in the corresponding (b) sentence. 
Substitution using an NP proform (i.e., a pronoun): 
10. a. The professor wil l arrive tomorrow, 
b. He will stay at the casino. 
{he is interpreted as the professor) 
11. a. The student wil l gamble at the casino, 
b. The professor wil l stay at it. 
{it is interpreted as the casino) 
Substitution using a VP proform: 
12. a. The student wil l stay at the casino, 
b. The professor wil l do so (too). 
{do so is interpreted as stay at the casino) . 
Substitution using a PP proform: 
Incidentally, it might be possible lo perform vaguely analogous tests lo assess the suucture that exists in 
other kinds of sequential represeniaiions such as music. We subjectively group sequences of musical 
notes into chunks that can be used as a theme that is repealed throughout a piece of music. Thai we see 
ihese sub sequences as somehow ihe same suggests ihey comprise a meaningful unii of structure. 
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13. a. The student will gamble at the casino, 
b. The professor wil l stay there, 
(there is interpreted as at the casino) 
Each of the (b) sentences above is interpreted with the meaning of the sentence 
in (14), the different sets of brackets indicating each of the sub-sequences that were 
replaced by proforms in examples (10-13). 
14. [The professor] wi l l (stay {at Llhe casino])). 
It is important to note that these brackets are perfectly nested inside each other. 
That is, when two bracketed sections overlap, one is always completely contained 
within the other. Indeed, there are no interpretation-preserving proforms that could be 
used in place of sequences that would not be nested like this. For instance, there is no 
proform that could be substituted for sequences such as professor will, will stay, stay at 
and so on. 
A second kind of constituency test concerns the availability of 'movement' 
operations which also appear to be sensitive to the same structural units. In each of the 
examples in (15), the bracketed segments are interpreted as i f they appear in the 
positions marked with # symbols where they are found in similar sentences such as (14). 
15. a. She saw [the casino] he wil l stay at #. 
b. She wants him to stay at the casino and [at the casino] he will stay #. 
c. She wants him to stay at the casino and [stay at the casino] he wil l #. 
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But you can't move strings such as stay at under any circumstances presumably 
because they aren't phrasal constituents. Hence, the closely analogous sentence in (16) 
is ungrammalical (as indicated, in accordance with the usual convention, by the 
asterisk). 
16. *She wants him to stay at the casino and [slay atj he wil l # the casino. 
A third type of constituency test involves coordinating conjunctions on the 
assumption that only constituents can be coordinated: 
17. a. [The professor] and [his wife] wil l stay at the casino. 
b. The professor wil l stay at [the casino] and [the hotel]. 
c. The professor wil l [stay at the casino] and [gamble all night]. 
d. The professor wil l stay [at the casino] and [at the hotel]. 
But consider the following instance of coordination. 
18. [The professor wil l stay at], and [his wife wil l gamble in], the casino. 
This example appears to indicate that the professor will stay at is a constituent of our 
basic template sentence (14), repeated here as (19), but \f.stay at the casino is also a 
constituent then, as indicated by the bracketing, they overlap without being nested one 
inside the other. 
19. [The professor wil l (stay at] the casino). 
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The proform substitution and movement diagnostics never indicate thai constituents 
overlap in this way, so there appears to be something different about coordination that 
poses interesting questions. This challenge has met with a number of different responses 
(Phillips, 2003). One obvious move has been to deny that coordination is a genuine 
diagnostic of constituency, there being such a thing as non-constituent coordination as 
well as constituent coordination. Another has been to argue that a sentence like (18) has 
the structure of the unproblemaiic sentence in (20), but despite the italicised material 
being represented, phonological processes prevent it from being pronounced, with the 
advantage of eliminating stylistically awkward repetition. 
20. [The professor wi l l stay at the casino] and [his wife will gamble in the casino]. 
Another alternative is the proposal by Phillips (2003) in which coordination is still taken 
as a genuine diagnostic of constituency, but with the apparent conflicts being the result 
of the facts of constituency changing during the course of a sentence's derivation. The 
details of this proposal wil l be elaborated further under section 2.5. 
The evidence obtained from constituency tests suggests that something about 
our menial representations of sentences has a nested structure al some level of 
description. I now turn to the question of how we might describe the constraints that 
apply to this structure in different languages. 
2 . 4 . 1 . 2 X - B A R THEORY 
Before the principles and parameters approach was widely embraced, generative 
grammarians (e.g., Akmajian & Heny, 1975) described grammars using long lists of 
language-specific phrase-structure re-write rules like those in (21) below. Starting with 
the S or sentence symbol, phrase structure could be generated top-down by replacing a 
symbol on the left of an arrow with the terms on its right (with optional replacements in 
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brackets) until none of the symbols in the string could be found on the left side of any 
rule. These remaining terms would be labels such as yV(oun) and ^(erb) and could be 













f. VP^V PP 
S' J 
g. S'Comp S 
Such lists not only contained a great many rules, but different lists had to be generated 
to describe the grammars of different languages. However, careful analysis revealed 
underlying patterns in these rules, which prompted the development of what is known 
as X-Bar Theory (Chomsky, 1970; Jackendo.ff, 1977). Under the version of, X-Bar 
Theory presented in Haegeman (1994), these rules are generalised to meta-r\jles such as 
the following, which apply cross-linguistically and restrict structures to those that are 
binary-branching. 
22. a, XP ^ X ' , (specifier) 
b. X ' -> X, (complement) 
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The commas between lerms on the right of the arrows indicate that no precedence is 
implied and, as before, brackets indicate optional constituents. The ordering of 
constituents was taken to be determined differently for different languages according to 
word order parameters. For example, rule (22b) would be realised as either X' -> X 
(complement) or X ' —> (complement) X depending on whether, in the given language, X-
level terms (i.e., heads) precede their complements (as in English) or follow their 
complements (as in Japanese). The claim was that a child is born with knowledge of this 
rule and so only needs to learn whether heads precede or follow complements in their 
language in order to use it (i.e., they simply set the head parameter). 
The meta-rules in (22) are implemented in English to generate phrases of the 





The head of a phrase is an individual word or morpheme that characterises the 
whole phrase. For example, a noun is the head of a noun phrase (NP) and a verb is the 
head of a verb phrase (VP). In general, an X is the head of an X phrase (XP) and the XP 
is termed the maximal projection of X while X ' (pronounced X-bar) is an intermediate 
projection. 
The complement and head combine to form an intermediate projection, and an 
intermediate projection combines with a specifier to form a maximal projection. The 
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specifier and complement phrases are both instances of maximal projections themselves 
and so can have their own specifiers and complements internal to them ad infmitum. 
Aside from specifiers and complements, X-bar theory allows adjunction which 
is captured with the following meia-rule, where Y can be an X, X' or XP: 
24. Y -> Y, adjunct 
Under the version of the theory presented by Kayne (1994), there are no intermediate 
projections, so a head and its complement form a maximal projection, and the specifier 
position is generated as an instance of adjunction to that. Hence, the schema in (23) 
would instead be as in (25) where the two XP terms are said to be different segments of 
the same category. 
25. XP 
A 
specifier ^ ^ 
X complement 
As well as adjunction at the XP level, adjunction to heads is also possible accounting 
for structure within words (i.e., inflectional morphology). 
Before concluding this section on phrase structure, it is worth introducing some 
terms used to describe the important structural relationships that hold between phrase 
markers in a tree. These wil l be defined with reference to the phrase markers in (26). 
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26. 
A phrase marker a is said to dominate another phrase marker P i f P is a 
constituent of a. For example, A dominates every other node in the tree in (26), while C 
dominates D and E, but not A or B. A phrase marker a thai immediately dominates 
another p is said to be the mother of P, and p the daughter of a. So in (26), A is the 
mother of B and C while B and C are its daughters. 
A phrase marker a is said to be the sister of another phrase marker p i f a and p 
are both immediately dominated by the same phrase marker. For example. B is the sister 
of C and vice versa since they are both immediately dominated by A in (26). 
Another important relation is traditionally known as c-command (constituent 
command) and now often simply command. In the pattern of the terms mother and sister 
this relation approximates the equivalent of an aunt relation (or great aunt, or great-great 
aunt etc.). A more formal definition follows where CHL refers to the computational 
system of human language, and a and P are phrase markers as before: 
27. Command 
Where a and P are accessible to CHL» ct commands P i f and only i f 
a. a does not dominate p, 
b. a 9^  P, and 
c. every category dominating a also dominates p. 
(Uriagereka, 1998:515) 
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Command is defined here in terms of dominance, but it is also possible to define 
dominance in terms of command (Frank & Kuminiak, 2000) for a restricted set of tree 
structures. Interestingly, Frank and Kuminiak have found that the set of tree structures 
for which this is possible is similar to the set of tree structures permitted by the 
constraints of X-Bar theory, thus suggesting that much of it can be derived from 
command. A variation on this proposal is adopted as part of the theory developed in 
chapter six. 
Another proposal by Kayne (1994), embraced in a modified form within the 
Minimalist Program (Chomsky, 1995), is that linear ordering of constituents derives 
from the command relation. Kayne labelled this regularity the Linear Correspondence 
Axiom and under the theory he developed, all phrases exhibit the same order of 
specifier, head and complement, with the apparent language variation in overt word-
order resulting from differences in the availability of processes that reorder constituents 
during derivations. 
Command plays a central role in many aspects of grammar including theories of 
movement and binding, discussed in some of the following sections. 
2,4.2 The lexicon 
The lexicon is the mental dictionary and encodes the meaning, phonetic features and 
grammatical properties of all the words and word fragments that a person has acquired. 
A comprehensive discussion of the lexicon is beyond the scope of the present review, 
but a number of its properties are relevant for the discussion in chapter five. 
The most important of these properties is the distinction between open and 
closed classes. The open classes are the nouns, verbs and adjectives of a language - the 
words that carry most of the meaning. The closed-class items are the frequently-used, 
but relatively small number of grammatical words such as determiners and auxiliary 
verbs, and other grammatical morphemes such as number and tense markings. The 
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former are always 'open' in the sense that new items can be added to them freely. An 
adult speaker can, for instance, add a new noun to his or her vocabulary without any 
difficulty. By contrast, the latter are 'closed' in the sense that an adult speaker wil l have 
great difficulty acquiring a novel item of their kind. For example, it would be difficult 
for an adult English speaker to accept the coining of a new tense marking to indicate a 
different kind of temporal relation such as the remote past.' Closed-class items clearly 
are acquired during language acquisition, but the capacity to do so declines severely by 
adulthood in a way that the capacity to acquire open-class items does not. 
Within a sentence, the items of the open classes always appear to be 
encapsulated within phrases headed by items belonging to closed classes (Abney, 1987; 
Grimshaw, 2005; Larson, 1988). A typical analysis will involve nouns being included 
within determiner phrases, verbs within tense phrases and adjectives within degree 
phrases as illustrated in (28). These encapsulating phrases are called functional 
projections.^ 




^ A dislinclion between past and remote past is found for instance in Italian, so there can be no conceptual 
reason why a language could not make use of it. 
^ The meaning of the term functional here relates to grammatical 'functions' so should not be confused 








Movement theory is motivated by the observation that certain elements take the same 
interpretation despite appearing in different structural positions. Consider the pair of 
sentences given in (29). 
29. a. The dog bit the man. 
b. The man was bitten. 
In both sentences, the man is interpreted as the person who was bitten despite appearing 
in different structural relationships with respect to the verb bite. To explain this, some 
part of the syntactic description should encode this. In generative approaches to 
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grammar, examples like this are traditionally explained in terms of movement, the idea 
being that the man originates in the same position in the derivations of both sentences, 
this position being where it receives its interpretation as an argument of the verb. 
Subsequent steps in the derivation cause it to move to the subject position where it 
appears in (29b). 
Within the earliest versions of Principles and Parameters Theory (Chomsky, 
1981), the underlying level of representation was called D-structure (deep structure) and 
this was related to S-siructure (surface structure) by transformations. In earlier 
approaches to generative grammar, there were many different types of construction 
specific transformations, but from Chomsky (1981), these were united under a single 
operation called move-a (move anything). A condition on movement is that the 
constituent in the landing site must command its trace, the trace being an unpronounced 
marker of the item's base position at D-siructure. 
The following are some examples of sentences that are argued.to involve 
movement in their derivations. Co-indexed traces are included to indicate the base 
position of the moved items. 
30. a. The book/ was l e n t t o her. 
b. She/ was lent the book 
(cf. Someone lent the book lo her.) 
31. Whom/ willy Mary tj see /,? 
(cf. Mary wil l see whom?) 
32. She/ seems // to like books. 
(cf. It seems that she likes books.) 
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Other approaches to the formal description of grammar take a different stance towards 
movement phenomena. For instance, in Lexical-Functional Grammar (Kaplan & 
Bresnan, 1982) and Head-Driven Phrase Grammar (Pollard & Sag, 1994), 'movement' 
is not captured in terms of derivational processes, but in terms of lexical alternations 
that allow variations in word order. However, the observation that the 'landing site' 
commands the 'base position' is difficult to reconcile with these approaches. 
2.4.4 Binding 
Binding theory (Chomsky, 1981) is the part of the grammar responsible for explaining 
the interpretation of pronouns such as 'her' in (33) and anaphors such as 'herself in 
(34) where the co-indexing denotes co-reference and the asterisks indicate the 
impossibility of the interpretation specified by the co-indexing. 
33. a. *Mary/bit her/. 
b. Mary/'s dog bit her,-. 
34. a. Mary,- bit herself,-. 
b. *Mary,-'s dog bit herself,. 
In (33a), *her' cannot refer to Mary, but in (33b) it can, but needn't. In (34), 'herself 
must refer to Mary in the (a) example, but cannot in the (b) example. The command 
relation is central to explaining restrictions of this kind just as it is with the relationship 
between moved elements and their traces. 
2.4.5 Case 
The morphological marking of case is not very rich in English compared to languages 
like Latin and Greek, but its presence is revealed through pronominal forms such as the 
italicised constituents in the following sentences. 
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35. a. He bit the dog. 
b. The dog bit him. 
The pronoun in (35a) is marked for nominative case, while the pronoun in (35b) is 
marked for accusative case. In English, noun phrases such as the man do not mark this 
distinction overtly as the comparable examples in (36) illustrate. 
36. a. The man bit the dog. 
b. The dog bit the man. 
Nevenheless, there are reasons to believe that they are assigned case abstractly in these 
positions, and indeed Chomsky (1981) proposed that all (pronounced) noun phrases 
must be assigned case. This universal principle is called the case filter and it is argued 
that the inability for a sentence to satisfy the case filter will lead to reduced 
acceptability. The following examples illustrate the kinds of data it can be used to 
explain. 
37. a. ITo give to the poor] is good. 
b. *[He to give to the poor] is good. 
c. *[Him to give to the poor] is good. 
d. [For him to give to the poor] is good. 
;^  e. I've known [him to give to the poor]. 
Nominative case is associated with finite tense, while accusative case is associated with 
verbs (with the exception of passive and unaccusative verbs) and, in English, with 
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prepositions. In each of the above examples, the verbs are not tensed in the embedded 
clause (shown in brackets) and so cannot assign nominative case to their subjects. In (a) 
there is no overt subject, so there is no violation of the case filter, but in (b), there is a 
violation because he cannot receive nominative case. Him cannot receive accusative 
case in (c), so this too is ungrammatical. In (d), for is in the appropriate structural 
relationship to assign accusative to him so this sentence passes the case filler. The 
subject of the embedded clause in (e) is assigned accusative case by known despite not 
being one of its arguments. 
Examples (d-e) illustrate that nominative case is not always associated with the 
subject position and that accusative case is not always associated with the object 
position. Example (e) also illustrates a dissociation between case and argument roles as 
do the examples in (38). 
38. a. Someone lent the book to him. 
b. He was lent the book. 
The (b) example in (38) is the passive sentence associated with the active sentence in 
(a). In both sentences, the pronoun has the same argument role (the recipient), with 
respect to lend but in (a) it is assigned accusative case and in (b) it is assigned 
nominative case. In (39) below, it does not refer to anything and is not an argument, yet 
it is in a position to receive case so the sentence passes the case filter. 
39. // seems that the student borrowed a book from the teacher. 
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These examples serve to illustrate that case forms are not directly associated 
with structural relations like subject or object, or with thematic roles like agent and 
patient. 
2.4.6 r/ieta theory 
Theta theory (Chomsky, 1981) is concerned with the relationships between a predicate 
and its arguments. Arguments are constituents that take part in some kind of relation 
specified by the predicate. For example, in the following sentence, the predicate hit has 
arguments Mary and John. 
40. Mary hit John. 
Each argument of a verb has a different role called a thematic role (or 0-role). In the 
above example, the thematic role of Mary^ would typically be analysed as the AGENT 
of /;/'/, while John would typically be analysed as the PATIENT of hit. Linguists have 
advocated the use of other terms for thematic roles such as THEME, EXPERIENCER, 
BENEFACTOR, GOAL, SOURCE and LOCATION, but there is little agreement about 
how to apply these terms. In the lexical entries for predicates, thematic roles are often 
simply numbered instead to avoid such controversies. 
Theta roles are assigned to arguments in their base positions rather than their 
derived positions. This is suggested by the comparison in (41) where we see that 'the 
lie' is what is believed in both sentences despite being displaced some distance from its 
base position (i.e., the direct object position of 'believe') in (b). 
41. a. Everyone believed the lie. 
b. The Ue\ seems t j ' to be believed ti by everyone. 
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To rule out sentences like those in (42), which have either too many or too few 
arguments, Chomsky (1986) proposed a principle called the theta criterion. 
42. a. *Mary slept the baby, 
b. *Mary hit. 
The theta criterion is formulated in terms of movement chains which mark each of the 
positions that a constituent occupied in a derivation. For example, in the case of (40b), a 
chain is formed with the three co-indexed positions //,//', and the lie, because the moved 
element moved twice leaving two separate traces. The chain is conventionally written 
with the head (or final position) first and the foot (or base position) last, hence in this 
case the chain would be <the lie;, I , ', l,>. We can now make sense of the definition of the 
theta criterion which is as follows. 
43. Theta criterion 
Each argument A appears in a chain containing a unique visible theta position P, 
and each theta position P is visible in a chain containing a unique argument A. 
(Chomsky, 1986: 97) 
For well-formed argument chains, the theta role is assigned at the base position and case 
is assigned at the head position. The references to 'visibility' in the above definition 
relate to this property of having a case-marked position. Chains involving non-
arguments are also formed, but are of little relevance to the present review. 
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2.5 Minimalist syntax 
With the background of the preceding section, we can now look at developments that 
have occurred within the Minimalist Program (Chomsky, 1995) to simplify the theory 
of grammar. Minimalist syntax brings with it a new conception of phrase structure, 
movement and parametric variation, which are now reviewed. 
Within Minimalist syntax (Chomsky, 1995), X-Bar Theory is replaced with the 
theory of Bare Phrase Striiciiire in which there is no equivalent of D-structure as such, 
only an indexed array of syntactic objects that are inserted into the derivation as it 
proceeds. These can be combined using an operator called Merge to form larger 
syntactic objects that can themselves enter into mergers. At some point (the equivalent 
of S-structure), an operation called spell-out causes the derivation to split into two parts 
(conceptualised in (44)). One part of the derivation, consisting of only the features that 
encode phonological information, proceeds to the level of phonetic form (PF) which 
interfaces with the articulatory-perceptual system. The rest of the derivation proceeds to 
the level logical form (LF) which interfaces with the conceptual-intentional system of 
the mind. These interfaces are what define the system as one that mediates sound and 




The Merge operator takes a pair of syntactic objects a and P and combines them to form 
a larger syntactic object, which takes a label derived from either a or p depending on 
which is the head. The resulting object can then enter into mergers itself. In (45), the 
phrase the dog is the result of merging the and dog and projecting the head the. 
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Within the terms of bare phrase structure, a maximal projection is defined as a 
constituent that does not project to a higher level. In (45), the maximal projections are 
dog and the dog but since the was projected when the merger took place, it is no longer 
a maximal projection. As this example illustrates, what counts as a maximal projection 
at one point in the derivation wil l not necessary count as a maximal projection at a later 
stage. This is important because projections that are neither maximal nor minimal (i.e., 
intermediate projections) are taken to be invisible to operations. 
Movement phenomena are explained in terms of a second operation called 
Move, an example of which is illustrated in (46). A copy is made of a syntactic object a, 
which is part of a larger syntactic object with the head p. The copy of a then targets P 
merging with it to form a new syntactic object which again projects p. 
46. before: after: p 
C O P Y 
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In earlier theories of movement, it had to be stipulated that the unpronounced 
trace marking the base position of the moved element had to be commanded by the 
copy, but in Minimalist syntax, it follows from the nature of the Move operation that the 
copy wil l command its trace, so this no longer has to be specified as an explicit 
condition. 
Merge and Move operations operate in the derivation to combine all of the 
lexical items of the sentence into a single syntactic object. When and how these 
operations occur is determined by features specified in the lexical entries of these items. 
In Stabler's (1997) derivational formalism, the features relevant for Merge are distinct 
from those relevant for Move. Those relevant for merging are of two kinds: the base 
features which indicate basic syntactic categories, and the select features that base 
features are checked against. Stabler indicates base features in lowercase as in (47). 
47. base = {n, v, a, p, d, c, t, . . . ) 
The features in this set are associated with the syntactic categories noun, verb, adjective, 
preposition, determiner, complementiser, tense and so on. 
Select features have types corresponding to base features, but the way they are 
annotated depends on how the Merge is to occur. The select feature that checks the base 
feature n, is written -n for a simple merge, =N for the case where the head containing 
the n feature should be adjoined to the head containing the select feature with its 
phonetic content suffixed, and A^= when it is to be adjoined but with its phonetic content 
prefixed to the selecting head. This means that when the select feature is lowercase, the 
selecting head wil l acquire either a complement or specifier phrase via the Merge, and 
when the select feature is uppercase, the item containing the select feature is a bound 
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morpheme which the Merge operation will attach to a morphological stem. To 
summarise, select features are any of the following: 
48. select = (=x. =X, X=} I x e base 
The Move operator checks another pair of feature types, which Stabler calls licensors 
and licensees. These are always checked in a specifier-head relationship, specifiers 
being the only possible landing site for phrasal movement. The phrases that undergo 
movement to specifier positions have negatively specified features like those in (49). 
49. licensees = {-case, -wh, . . . } 
The heads to which they attach have licensor features that are positively specified. 
Licensor features can also be either strong or weak, which determines whether the 
phonetic content they are associated with moves overtly or not. Strong features are 
indicated in uppercase, and weak features are indicated in lowercase. Hence, the 
possible licensors corresponding to the licensees in (49) are as in (50). 
50. licensors = {+case, +CASE, +wh, +WH . . . ) 
In Stabler's formalism, lexical entries contain ordered lists of these features, which 
determine the sequence in which items are merged and moved. As an illustration, 
Stabler derives the sentence Some linguist speaks every language, specifying the feature 
content of each item in the derivation as in (51), not all of these items having phonetic 









=n d -case 
=n d -case 
n 
n 
=d +case =d v 
=v +CASEI 
=lc 
The derivation proceeds as in (52). In the first step, the initial =n feature of every^ and 
the initial n feature of language allow them to merge. When these features are checked 
they are then deleted from their respective feature lists making the next feature visible. 
In the case of language, there are no further features so it wi l l no longer enter into any 
more operations. The item carrying the select feature is always assigned the status of the 
head of the phrase. This is indicated by the arrow < in (52a). 
52. a. Merge 
every 
= B d -case 
language 
n 
A second Merge operation allows the syntactic object created in (a) to combine with 
speaks this time checking the =d and d features to create the structure in (b). 
b. Merge 
speaks 
= d +casc = d V 
every 
d - case 
language 
50 
The initial feature of speaks is now the licensor feature -^case so triggers a Move 
operation. For this operation to be valid» there must be exactly one syntactic object with 
an initial -case feature within its complement phrase. There is indeed such a phrase, 
every language, which wil l move to check the -vcase feature and form (c). However, 
since the -^-case licensor is weak, the phonetic content of the moved phrase is not carried 
with it. There is no clear consensus that the direct object actually moves covertly in this 
way, but Stabler assumes it does. 
c. Move 
(every) (language) speaks 
-€ase +ease=d v 
every language 
Some and linguist merge to form the syntactic object in (d) which in turn merges with 









i language) (every) 
every language 
The phrase in (e) still has the verb speaks as its head and has two specifiers. In Slabler's 
example, it then merges with a tense element lo generate (0, which in turn triggers an 
overt Move operation to check the -case feature of the subject resulting in (g). A final 
Merge occurs to join the unpronounced complementiser, which Stabler takes to be a 
kind of terminating symbol. At this point, the only unchecked feature is the terminating 
c feature of the complementiser. 
f. Merge 
(T) 
+ C A S E I 
linguist some 
-case 
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Minimalist grammars provide a very economical way of accounting for word order 
variation between different languages. For instance, the above derivation could be 
altered to produce an SOV word order simply by making the case-licensing feature of 
the verb strong (i.e., +CASE instead of +case). This would trigger oven rather than 
covert movement of the object. Similarly, VSO languages could be generated by having 
strong verb selecting features (i.e., =V instead of =v) that trigger head movement when 
verbs are merged with tense so thai the verb head moves across the subject position (the 
specifier of tense). These aspects of language variation are thereby confined to the 
lexicon with no need to specify global parameters on grammars to account for them. 
The view that the lexicon is the only source of language variation is embraced by 
Chomsky (1995) within the Minimalist tradition, but has its roots in Borer (1984) and 
Fukui (1995). 
The approach of Stabler (1997) differs from that of Chomsky (1995) in a 
number of ways. First, it doesn't have a single point at which Spell-Out occurs to split 
the derivation into its PF and LF parts. For Chomsky, strong features must be checked 
before spell-out which is what forces overt movement, coven movement occurring after 
spell-out in the LF-component where it cannot have consequences for the PF part of the 
derivation. Another important difference is that Chomsky takes chains generated by 
movement to be explicitly represented at the LF interface where they are necessary for 
the interpretation of argument structure. 
On the question of chains, Brody (1995) argues that the derivations that produce 
them and . the resulting representations end up duplicating one another's functions. 
Hence, by the logic of the Minimalist Program, the grammar should only need one or 
the other device. Brody developed a representational version of Minimalist syntax, 
which does away with derivations entirely, but it is unclear whether it has the same 
empirical coverage with respect to certain kinds of phenomena such as so-called 
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reconsiruciion effects thai provide evidence for the existence of earlier stages in a 
derivation. 
Phillips (2003) has provided some evidence that suggests that actually both 
representational and standard derivational approaches to Minimalist syntax may be 
improperly formulated. The evidence concerns sentences like those in (17-19) and 
summarised here in (53), which involve coordination. As we saw earlier, i f coordination 
is used as a test of constituency, these examples suggest it leads to conflicting results as 
in (53c) where the elements thai can be coordinated as in (a) and (b) clearly overlap. 
53. a. The professor wil l [slay at the casino] and [gamble all night]. 
b. [The professor will slay at], and [his wife wil l gamble in], the casino. 
c. [The professor will (stay ai] the casino). 
Phillips (2003) argues that i l is actually possible to maintain that coordination is a test of 
constituency without challenging the view that constituents are nested i f sentence 
structures are built incrementally from left to right. The apparent conflicts arise because 
the facts of constituency actually change as the structure is being built. Hence, before 
the phrase the casino is added to the end of the sentence in (53c), the phrase the 
professor will stay at is a constituent, but once it is added, it ceases to be one. 
This kind of derivational approach therefore accounts for the daia quite 
elegantly, thus suggesting the nature of the Merge and Move operators have to be 
reconsidered. To argue that the facts of constituency change during the course of a 
derivation, one must also necessarily eschew a purely representational view. The issue 
of representational, derivational and linear structure-building processes will be relevant 
in chapter six. 
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2.6 Summary 
This chapter served two main purposes. Firstly, it served to introduce some of the detail 
that theories of the evolution of language universais need to explain. These details 
include the course of development in first language acquisition, the capacity for infants 
to acquire language under the imperfect conditions that they do, and the universais that 
exist in constituent structure, the lexicon, movement theory, binding theory, case theory 
and theta theory. Although the emphasis has been on syntactic universais, there are also 
universais of phonetics, phonology and semantics that demand evolutionary 
explanations. 
Secondly, the chapter served to introduce some of the specific phenomena that 




Evolutionary biology, like geology, cosmology and other sciences concerned with 
reconstructing past events, cannot proceed by manipulating experimental variables, but 
must instead rely on inferences made from whatever traces these events leave in their 
wake. The case of language is particularly challenging because many of the sources of 
evidence that evolutionary biologists usually rely on are unavailable. There is, for 
instance, no evidence of properties like relative clauses or subject-verb agreement in the 
communication systems of other species to form the basis of comparisons and very little 
can be inferred from the fossil record about changes in linguistic or, for that matter, any 
other kind of cognitive capacity. Despite this, Botha (2003) argues that the main 
obstacle to advancing our understanding of the evolution of language is not the paucity 
of evidence as such, but the paucity of restrictive theory, "restrictive to the extent that it 
makes it possible to distinguish in a non-arbitrary way between entities that are 
instances of a specific kind of evolutionary event, process or product and entities that 
are not" (Botha, 2003: 115). It may be more accurate to say that there is a paucity of 
both evidence and restrictive theory, but that it is only the latter that we can do anything 
about. 
This chapter attempts to address this challenge by considering (1) the categories 
of evolutionary explanations that could be applied to explaining the emergence of any 
kind of trait, (2) what evidence should lead us to prefer one type of explanation over 
another, even in the problematic case of human-specific cognitive capacities such as 
those associated with language, and (3) specific objections that have been raised about 
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the possibility of attributing selective functions to linguistic properties. In the process, I 
outline a diagnostic for identifying selective functions, which, following Parker and 
Maynard Smith (1990), is based on design optimality. This, I argue, is restrictive in 
Botha's sense and overcomes a number of shortcomings associated with vague 
diagnostics of the sort applied by Pinker and Bloom (1990), which are instead based on 
design complexity. 
3.1 Non-selectionist categories of explanation 
Stephen Jay Gould and his colleagues (Gould & Lewontin, 1979; Gould & Vrba, 1982; 
Gould, 1991, 1997, .2002) argue that there are a number of other factors aside from 
natural selection that account for properties of organisms. In the context of language 
evolution, Lighifoot (2000: 236) follows in this tradition and adopts its terminology, 
categorising theorists as either singularists, who believe "that every evolutionary 
change of any importance is due to the shaping effects of natural selection", or 
pluralists, who "allow that forces in addition to natural selection may be at work in 
guiding evolutionary developments". The following sub-seciions are an attempt to 
review and clarify the kinds of alternatives the *pluralists' have in mind. I wil l argue 
that these are not alternatives to natural selection as such, but that there are lessons to be 
drawn from these considerations for developing restrictive theories that would allow us 
to make legitimate inferences about evolutionary origins. 
3.1.1 The lesson about spandrels: Concomitant changes 
We cannot assume that all changes that occurred in the evolutionary history of a given 
trait were the result of selection for advantages it alone conferred to ancestors. Aside 
from the obvious case of selectively neutral genetic drift, some changes in a trait occur 
as necessary consequences of changes occurring in other traits with which they are 
inextricably linked. The redness of blood is often cited as an example. Blood is red 
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because it contains haemoglobin, a molecule thai carries oxygen and waste gases around 
the body. Haemoglobin was presumably refined under selection for these useful 
properties, and it may have become redder as a result, but unlike its gas-transporting 
properties, colour probably didn't play any pan in it being selected over other 
haemoglobin-like molecules because whatever colour variation existed was probably 
irrelevant for fitness. It is not completely inconceivable that colour was a factor in the 
selection of haemoglobin, but the point is merely that this needn't have been the case 
for a change in colour to occur. Such a change could have occurred simply as a by-
product of selection for gas-transporting properties. 
Gould and Lewontin (1979) use the architectural metaphor of a *spandrer to 
illustrate this point, a spandrel being the roughly triangular space found in the shoulder 
of an arch or in the shoulders of a pair of adjoining arches as in (1). 
Spandrels (darkly shaded) arc ihc uiangular spaces bounded by an arch, wall and ceiling or by 
iwo arches and a ceiling. 
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Specifically, they discuss the four spandrels that appear between the arches under the 
central dome of the Basilica di San Marco in Venice, noting that these spaces are 
elaborately decorated and that 
[tjhe design is so elaborate, harmonious, and purposeful that we are templed to 
view it as the starting point of any analysis, as the cause in some sense of the 
surrounding architecture. But this would invert the proper path of analysis. The 
system begins with an architectural constraint: the necessary four spandrels and 
their tapering triangular form. They provide a space in which the mosaicisis 
worked (Gould & Lewontin, 1979: 581). 
For Gould and Lewontin, spandrels are architectural by-products of constructing arches, 
arches being the analogue of adaptations. The biological analogues of spandrels, 
according to Gould (1997: 10750), are traits that "arise nonadaptively as secondary 
consequences ... but then become available for later cooptation to useful function in the 
subsequent history of an evolutionary lineage". 
Gould and Lewontin argue that many properties of organisms are also 
inextricably linked in the way that spandrels and arches are, which means that it isn't 
always possible for an organism to be atomised into distinct trails with a different 
adaptive explanation applying independently to each. Other comments of theirs suggest 
that they believe that organisms can never be atomised into distinct traits regardless of 
the choice of ontology, but this is a much stronger claim and ihey advance no argument 
in support of it. 
By defining spandrels as traits that arose as necessary by-products of 
adaptations, Gould and Lewontin (1979) also obscured at least three important 
generalisations. Firstly, there is no necessity that, when a pair of traits are linked, there 
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is an asymmetry such that one is functional and the other non-functional from the 
outset. It may be that both are originally functional or neither.^ Therefore, knowing that 
the existence of one trail necessary implies the existence of another is not sufficient 
evidence to conclude that current utility of one or other is irrelevant for any explanation 
of why it was initially selected. Current utility may be relevant in some cases and not in 
others. To avoid any presuppositions about functional asymmetries I wi l l simply refer to 
trails that are linked in this way as concomiiant traits. Secondly, Gould and Lewontin 
define spandrels in terms only of origins rather than change generally, thereby giving us 
a term for a trail that originates as a by-product of the origin of another, but no term for 
the very similar concept of a trail that changes as a by-product of changes in another. In 
their architectural example, a change of this kind would correspond to a refurbishment 
of the building where a spandrel's shape is altered, say to accommodate a different kind 
of decorative design, with the shape of the arch being warped in the process. Since it is 
useful to refer to changes that are correlated in this way, i i would be desirable to fill this 
terminological gap. I wil l do so here by referring to concomitant changes. Thirdly, the 
requirement that these linkages be necessary misses the generalisation that some 
linkages are not strictly necessary, but are just, in some sense, very likely, as when the 
frequency of a gene increases in the gene pool simply because it appears alongside 
another that confers an advantage on the same chromosome. 
Despite citing spandrels in support of a plurality of forces at work in evolution, 
Lightfoot (2000: 237) himself tentatively acknowledges that a feature "might have 
arisen as a by-product of something else that was selected for" and cites the 
aforementioned example of the redness of blood as a by-product of selection acting on 
haemoglobin. In this example, and in general, the 'force' that produces these by-
' 'Functional' is to be understood here as enhancing some componem of fitness relative lo genetically 
similar variants. The functionality of a trait can only be understood in relative terms. For instance, nipples 
are no advantage to males relative to smooth uninterrupted skin, but would presumably be an advantage 
over many other imaginable alternatives such as long protruding spikes appearing in their place. 
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products is still natural selection. The fact that spandrels are only an indirect result of 
natural selection does not change that. The meaningful questions raised by the spandrel 
analogy are not about whether natural selection is required to produce them, but about 
(1) the extent to which a given trait was shaped under selection for functions served by 
traits that are concomitant with it, and (2) how we could reliably determine which traits 
are linked in this way. 
3.1.2 The lesson about exaptation: Current utility and 
tiistorical origins 
We cannot assume that a given trait has been selectively shaped for present functions, 
since its form may owe much more to ancestral uses that are no longer relevant (Gould 
& Vrba, 1982). The arrangement of bones in a bird's wing, for instance, is essentially 
the same as in the forelimbs of its flightless ancestors and of tetrapods generally. The 
shapes and sizes of these bones have been modified under selection for fiighi, but the 
basic architecture evolved much earlier and persists either because it is maintained 
under selection for its new role or because to change it would require taking a radically 
different course at a very early stage in the growth of the embryo, a change that would 
have unmanageable consequences for all subsequent stages. Given that the particular 
number and arrangement of bones were determined during an earlier stage of evolution, 
it would cleariy be a mistake to seek an explanation for the original selection of these 
properties in terms of selection pressures associated with flight. 
To stress the importance of the dissociation between the historical origins and 
current utility of features, Gould and Vrba (1982: 4) coined the term exaptation for 
"features that now enhance fitness, but were not built by natural selection for their 
current role". They intended this definition to cover not only traits that previously had 
functions that they may or may not continue to have, but also traits that previously had 
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no function at all. '° The term is widely used to refer to a trait that has been modified in 
some way to accommodate its new uses, but if we adopt this interpretation then 
according lo orthodox Darwinism, every adaptation is one sort of exaptation or 
the other... i f you go back far enough, you wil l find that every adaptation has 
developed out of predecessor structures each of which either had some other use 
or no use at all (Dennett, 1995:281). 
The distinction between adaptations and exaptations remains meaningful only in the 
case where a trait acquires a new function in the complete absence of any change in the 
actual form of the trait. If the label exaptation is reserved for such cases, adaptations 
and exapiations wil l typically refer to different properties of the same structures. The 
properties that remain the same will be the exaptations and the properties that are 
refined under selection will be the adaptations. Applied to the example of the bird's 
wing, we would say that the arrangement of its bones was exapted, while their specific 
shapes and sizes were adapted, both for flight. The arrangement o f a set of bones 
(understood in terms of their number and the pattern of connectivity between them) is a 
rather abstract property, but it was literally the same before and after the forelimbs were 
co-opted for flight, the conversion of function only being possible because of the 
simultaneous adaptation of the shapes and sizes of the same bones. 
There are a few things to note here. Firstly, like adaptation, the process of 
exaptation can be gradual with a trait being increasingly utilised for a new function over 
successive generations. Secondly, since the wing is not the same as the forelimb from 
which it evolved, it cannot, as a whole, be labelled an exaptation (under the narrow 
This is esscmially how Gould (1991a) distinguishes ihe lerm from preadaptation (a concept familiar to 
Darwin), but Gould's definition of preadaptation as a trait that "performed a different function in 
ancestors" (p. 144) is much narrower than the definitions typically found in the literature which are often 
compatible with the wider sense that he reserves for exaptation. 
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usage applied here) even i f the arrangement of the bones in it can be. Thirdly, whether 
we call something an exaptation depends on how generally we define its function in the 
ancestor and descendant species. For example, i f the function of the arrangement of 
bones in a bird's wing is defined in very general terms as providing a skeletal 
framework for the forelimbs, then it would not have changed at all from the time when 
the forelimbs were legs rather than wings. With the function defined in these terms, 
there is literally no change. Hence, it is not an instance of exapiation even though it 
would qualify as one under a narrower characterisation of function in terms of fiight. 
Finally, the definition of exaptation runs into conceptual difficulties when a trait reverts 
to the function it was originally selected for after a period in which it served other 
functions. The wings of penguins for example, were presumably originally selected for 
swimming in their earliest letrapod ancestors, and although the wings also serve that 
function now, they were not utilised for this function by more recent ancestors who used 
them for walking and fiying. Since the forelimbs of penguins (or aspects of them) were 
*'built by natural selection for their current role", this case wouldn't technically count as 
an instance of exapiation even though there have been changes in function." 
These complications do not impact on Gould and Vrba's central point which 
was that we cannot assume that all traits emerged under selection for their current roles. 
This is not to say that we have no evidence that would bear on this. A possible hint 
about how we could distinguish original functions from exapted ones comes from the 
observation by Pinker and Bloom (1990: 710) that, when a trail has not been refined 
under selection for a function that i l serves, this function is likely to be very *simple\ 
For instance, 
" Another instance of functional change that is not covered by ihis term is the simple loss of function 
which defines vestigial properties. 
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A wing used as a visor is a case where a structure designed for a complex 
engineering task that most arrangements of matter do not fu l f i l l , such as 
controlled flight, is exapted to a simple engineering task that many arrangements 
of matter do fu l f i l l , such as screening out reflections ... When the reverse 
happens, such as when a solar heat exchanger is retooled as a fully functioning 
wing in the evolution of insects ... natural selection must be the cause. 
A few pluralists, such as Piattelli-Palmarini (1989), cite exaptaiion in support of 
an alleged plurality of evolutionary forces acting in addition to natural selection, but 
exaptation is, by definition, change in a trait's function rather than in the trait itself, 
hence does not involve a change in an organism's morphology at all. To the extent that 
there are morphological changes associated with exapiation events, these are still the 
result of natural selection or genetic drift. Explanations in terms of exaptation and 
natural selection are therefore not mutually exclusive. The co-opting of a trait for a new 
function is nevertheless relevant for evolutionary explanations insofar as it says 
something about what selection pressures were at play. A change in one trait that 
enables another trait to be utilised for a valuable new function wil l have positive 
consequences for selection. 
3.1.3 Tiie lesson about the physical channel: Constraints on 
natural selection 
Chomsky (2002: 141) observes that evolutionary explanations cannot ignore the fact 
that there are constraints acting on natural selection: 
Natural selection can't work in a vacuum; it has to work within a range of 
options, a structured range of options; and those options are given by physical 
law and historical contingency. 
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It is useful to think about this "structured range of options" by visualising the 
range of possible genotypes on an imaginary Titness landscape' where the elevation o f 
the terrain at each point indicates the fitness of the variant that the point represents, 
nearby points being genetically similar and the highest peaks being associated with the 
fittest variants. 
Many of the variants in the space of genetic possibilities will possess genetic 
'instructions' that are incoherent from the point of view of development, causing the 
process to fail before an organism can reach maturity. Such variants cannot therefore 
reproduce and so no lineage could have them as ancestors. Without the possibility of 
having descendants, non-reproductive variants constitute boundaries within the genetic 
space within which natural selection acts,'^ and in terms of the fitness landscape, wil l be 
represented by low-lying plains with zero fitness, perhaps covering most of its area. 
These topological features of the fitness landscape are a function of the physical laws 
that determine what kind of development can occur and hence the fitness of different 
variants within a given environmental niche. This terrain is sometimes described as the 
channel within which natural selection acts (e.g., Gould, 1991; Chomsky, 2002).'^ 
The constraints imposed by past evolution can also be understood in the 
vocabulary of the fitness landscape. In these terms, natural selection is a 'hill-climbing' 
process, but because it lacks the foresight to descend from small peaks in order to scale 
even larger ones, it wi l l tend to get stuck in locally optimal regions. Hence, the range of 
options available for the future evolution of a variant depends on which peaks can be 
These boundaries will accoum for various constraints such as 'scaling laws' that relate the size of an 
animal to its metabolic rate, and so forth. As Lightfoot (2000: 238) notes, a mouse the size of an elephant 
"wouldn't have enough surface area to dissipate the heat generated by the superaciive mouse metabolism, 
and it would cook itself to death in short order". 
Logic also imposes boundaries on what is possible. For example, an organism that simultaneously does 
and does not have some trait is impossible for reasons that have nothing to do wiih physical law. 
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scaled from its present position, its present position being the result of the "historical 
contingencies" of past evolution to which Chomsky refers. 
Historical contingencies are also important for understanding the effect of 
mutations. The variation generated by mutations is the raw material on which natural 
selection acts, but their effects on a phenotype can be counterintuitive. The number of 
petals that appear on the flowers of different species of plant illustrate this point. We 
might expect that a mutation causing the average number of petals to change from eight 
to nine would be more likely to occur than one causing a change from eight to a larger 
number like thirteen. But even a cursory examination of the extant variation in 
flowering plants suggests that this would be wrong. There are many plants whose 
flowers normally have eight petals, and there are plants whose flowers normally have 
thirteen, but intermediates that normally have an average of nine are rare or nonexistent. 
Interestingly, the number of petals appears to be limited to a choice among the 
Fibonacci numbers (or numbers trivially related to the Fibonacci sequence). The 
restriction to the Fibonacci numbers appears to be the result of a genetic commitment to 
a particular type of growth function. To produce a variant with a non-Fibonacci number 
of petals would require a radical redesign of flower architecture, meaning a large and 
improbable leap through the space of genetic possibilities. By comparison, the existing 
variation in flowering plants suggests that mutations leading from one Fibonacci 
number to another are relatively common, the result of relatively small mutations. 
Given the complexities involved, claims about which evolutionary changes have 
taken place in a structure (or behaviour) need to be supported by evidence that the 
hypothesised pathways are actually open to evolution. Existing variation within a 
species or between closely-related species is one source of this kind of evidence (Parker 
& Maynard Smith, 1990). The fossil record is another, though one which isn*t very 
informative about behaviour and soft tissues like the brain. A third source of evidence 
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comes from the finding that the course of an organism's development often reflects the 
order in which evolutionary developments must have taken place. The evidence for this 
comes from observations by Karl Ernst von Baer made a few decades before Darwin 
and Wallace published on evolution (Gould, 1977). Von Baer observed that more 
species share earlier stages of development than later ones. This is usually explained in 
terms of the likelihood that adjustments to any given stage of development will impact 
on all subsequent stages that depend on it, making changes to features that appear 
earlier in development less manageable, and therefore less likely, than those that occur 
later. The earliest stages of development wil l therefore generally be the most ancient 
ancestrally and most widely observed in different species.'"* 
It is possible to overstate the extent of the constraints that historical 
contingencies impose. The case of mammals is instructive on this point given that a 
commitment to the mammalian body plan has not stopped them from spreading into an 
enormous range of niches. In addition to all the land-going mammals inhabiting 
environments as diverse as deserts, polar regions, jungles and cities, evolution has 
produced dolphins with fins like fish, and bats with wings like birds. One of the reasons 
that historical contingencies do not always prevent certain forms appearing is that 
similar forms are often attainable by variants that are very far apart in genetic space. 
In the spirit of pluralism, Lightfoot (2000: 237) considers the physical channel 
as yet another alternative to explanations in terms of natural selection. 
Some properties of organisms are not selected for and are not accidental by-
products, but emerge because of deep, physical principles which affect much of 
life. For example, organisms as diverse as robins, redwoods and rhinos obey 
exactly the same mathematical laws governing the way size affects structure. 
This is ihe acceptable version of ihe discrediled biogenetic law which says that 'ontogeny recapilulaies 
phylogeny', originally proposed by Haeckel in the 19"' century. See Slobin (2002) for a critical look at 
language evolution studies that have applied this kind of argument. 
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physiology and life history. Those laws, the 'scaling relations', are a near-
universal feature of life. They reflect fundamental limits on the kinds of things 
that evolution can make, and ihey arise from the interaction of a few simple 
physical principles. 
But Lightfoot's position deviates from the that of other pluralists such as Gould 
and Lewontin (1979) who acknowledge that the physical channel is not so much an 
ahemative to natural selection as the structured *space' that it operates within. 
[This thesis] does not deny that change, when it occurs, may be mediated by 
natural selection, but it holds that constraints restrict possible paths and modes 
of change so strongly thai the constraints themselves become much the most 
interesting aspect of evolution. 
Discussions of physical constraints are effectively discussions about selection 
pressures in another guise. To attribute- the existence of some property to natural 
selection without any discussion of these pressures (which determine the shape of the 
fitness landscape) is indeed to assert something so obvious as to be uninteresting. In 
Chomsky's (1972: 97) words, "it amounts to nothing more than a belief that there is 
some naturalistic explanation for these phenomena". 
3.1.4 The iesson about laws of growth and form: Non-adaptive 
elegance 
The recurrence of certain kinds of structures in biological systems can be explained in at 
least two ways aside from the obvious case of common ancestry. Firstly, natural 
selection might lead to the independent discovery of good or optimal designs 
(convergent evolution) as judged against the physical laws that determine what makes a 
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good wing, fin, eye, and so on. Secondly, certain ubiquitous patterns and features like 
logarithmic spirals, Fibonacci numbers and hexagonal tiling patterns show up in 
inorganic contexts as well which means thai it is unnecessary to invoke a process of 
cumulative natural selection to explain them. When these properties show up 
independently in distantly related species, it may be simply because some very basic 
formal properties are shared by the relevant developmental processes or by the relevant 
environmental conditions under which the traits evolved. It isn't so surprising that a 
piece of mathematics developed to describe one phenomenon will be applicable to 
others i f the formal properties that the phenomena share are very simple. On the other 
hand, i f a pattern requiring a mathematically complex formal description were found 
throughout nature, then this would require an explanation perhaps in terms of 
convergent evolution. If such a pattern also appeared regularly within inorganic systems 
then this would challenge our understanding of the laws of physics. The Fibonacci 
sequence, for instance, is very much in the category of simple mathematics and so it 
shouldn't be surprising to find it showing up in all kinds of circumstances without any 
adaptive reason. 
Fibonacci numbers even show up in language. Camie and Medeiros 
(unpublished) have pointed out that, in a phrase structure tree like (2) below, which has 
every ^specifier' and ^complement' position filled, the number of maximal terms in each 
line of the tree (i.e., the XP terms where X is variable) is 1, I , 2, 3, 5... (i.e., the 
Fibonacci sequence). The number of X'-level terms in each line also conforms to the 
sequence, but this time starting from 0 to give 0, 1, I , 2, 3... Similarly, the number of 
X-level terms is 0, 0, I , 1,2... which conforms to the sequence except for the initial 0.'^ 
Uriagereka (1998: 483fO has also made some interesting suggestions about how 
Fibonacci patterns might also show up in phonology and pragmatics. 
" This tree can be generated using the pair of rewriic rules: (i) XP YP X'. (ii) X' - » X ZP (where X, Y 
and Z are variable). For some more general comments aboui how rewrite rules can be used to generate 
Fibonacci pallerns in domains outside linguistics, see Uriagereka (1998: 1920-
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Uriagereka (1998) and Gould and Lewontin (1979) present laws of growth and 
form as an alternative to explanations in terms of natural selection citing the work of 
Thompson (1961) who examined many of the mathematical patterns that recur in the 
organic and inorganic world. However, unlike these authors, Thompson did not see 
these laws and natural selection as mutually exclusive modes of explanation. 
Paraphrasing Aristotle, he compared the situation to how we might explain the existence 
of a house: "the house is there that men may live in it; but it is also there because the 
builders have laid one stone upon another" (p. 5). In other words, developmental 
explanations and evolutionary explanations are not mutually exclusive.'^ However, we 
do not need to account for very simple mathematical patterns in terms of cumulative 
natural selection. The developmental processes that give rise to properties like 
logarithmic spirals are so simple that they are effectively the atoms of variation on 
which natural selection acts and so could plausibly arise via a single mutation rather 
than a series of them. 
Thompson (1961: 3) did. however, express reservations about doing "natural history" which "deals 
with ephemeral and accidental, not eternal nor universal things" preferring to study physical forms from a 
mathcmaiical perspective involving "truths remote from the category of causation". This stance strongly 
resonates with Chomsky's (1980; 2000b) views on the need for idealization in naturalistic inquiry, typical 
of what he refers to as the 'Galilean style' of inquiry. 
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3.1,5 The lesson about the role of genes and the environment 
To inquire into the contributions of genetic and environmental factors in the evolution 
of language, we need to ask, i f it is meaningful to do so, which linguistic phenomena 
should be considered 'innate' and which are not. There are disagreements about this, but 
there are two points for which there is a broad consensus. 
3. a. Human infants develop a type of linguistic competence that does not develop in 
any other existing species exposed to the same linguistic input." 
b. The result of language development depends to some extent on the type of 
linguistic input that an infant is exposed to (i.e., which language). 
The first point is ultimately an acknowledgement of genetic effects while the second is 
an acknowledgement of environmental effects. A difference in either could lead to a 
different developmental outcome. 
Unlike discussions of genetic and environmental effects, it is often less clear 
what researchers mean when they claim that a given property is innate. Synonyms such 
as genetically programmed, instinctive, and hard-wired suffer similar short-comings. As 
an example, consider the oft-repeated assertion that the propensity to fall to the ground 
does not have to be *genetically programmed'. One of the characters in Uriagereka's 
(1998: 140 philosophical dialogue, expresses his version of it in the following terms: 
lN]ature is clever enough not to programme the shape of an organism into its 
genetic code, i f the laws of physics or chemistry produce it anyway... [TJhink of 
the two distinct phases in the aquatic/aerial behaviour of the common salmon. 
Since language can be expressed in any modality (speech, signing, writing, etc.) the generalisation 
expressed here should therefore not be confused with a statement about the ability of other species to 
produce the relevant kinds of vocalisations. The ability to modulate sounds that could be used for speech 
is present in some species and absent in others. 
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The first phase, the impulse to jump out of the creek, is programmed into the 
fish's genes. But the second stage, its falling back to water, is a consequence of 
gravity. Nature needn't specify that in the genes! 
Chomsky (2002: 143) has also made similar comments: 
[NJobody thinks there are genes that [during mitosis] tell the breaking cell to 
turn into spheres, just as you do not have a gene to tell you to fall i f you walk of f 
the roof of a building. Thai would be crazy, you just fall because physical laws 
are operating, and it is probably physical laws that are telling the cells to break 
up into two spheres. 
If we understand a 'genetic programme' in terms of genetic effects, then Uriagereka's 
claim would be that no genetic difference would enable the salmon to do anything other 
than fall, but i f the genetic difference was such that the salmon was actually a sea bird, 
then this would clearly not be the case. It wouldn't have to fall back into the water 
because, after leaping into the air,-it could fiy away. There can be a genetic effect in this 
sense. Uriagereka and Chomsky might not be speaking of genetic 'programmes' and 
'specifications' with this meaning, in which case this criticism would not apply. There 
is, however, another fundamental reason for rejecting their view.. Given that all 
processes are governed by physical laws, the assertion that such processes are not 
'genetically programmed' leaves nothing that is. We could argue that the salmon's leap 
does not have to be genetically encoded, only the flapping of its tail since physical law 
takes care of the rest. Or we could go further and say that the flapping of its tail does not 
have to be genetically encoded either, only the muscles and the system that generates 
Gould (1991) also uses the falling fish example, but merely as an example of a non-adaptation. It is 
originally due to Williams (1966). 
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the electrical impulses that control them since the flapping is inevitable once you have 
these things in place. And we could carry this reasoning down to the level of protein 
synthesis where we could argue that proteins do not have to be genetically encoded, 
only DNA, since the chemical properties of DNA in the context of a cell with its 
cellular machinery wil l inevitably lead to protein synthesis for reasons having only to do 
with the laws of chemistry. It should be clear that reasoning of this kind strips the notion 
of a *genetic programme' of any useful meaning. 
More commonly, a distinction is made between 'innate' and 'acquired' 
characteristics, and this is still pervasively seen as a strict dichotomy such that a given 
trait can only be one or the other, or at best, a mixture of components of one or the other 
type each of which is wholly innate or wholly acquired but not both simultaneously. At 
the same time. Innate' properties are taken to have genetic causes while 'acquired' 
characteristics are taken to have environmental causes. Now, to say that a genetic factor 
is the 'cause' of some phenoiypic property, it presumably means that i f it were absent or 
altered, then the relevant phenotypic property would not be expressed in the same way 
or with the same likelihood. Similarly, a discussion of environmental 'causes' 
necessarily implies a comparison of environments in which the relevant property will 
and wil l not be expressed with the same likelihood. Depending on whether we are 
studying environmental or genetic differences, we may hold one of these variables 
constant to look at the effect of the other, but we cannot escape the conclusion that both 
factors wil l be 'causes' of one and the same property if the development of that property 
is simultaneously contingent upon the presence both of certain genes and of certain 
environmental conditions.'^ Given that all development depends upon environmental 
factors such as the presence of nutrients, and that there are very few properties that are 
necessarily shared by genetically dissimilar organisms (the exceptions being properties 
This treatment of causation omits many details but suffices for present purposes. For a recent review of 
some of the complexities involved sec Dennett (2003: 83ff). 
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like existing that obtain of non-organisms as well), it is the norm for any given property 
to be subject to both genetic and environmental effects. In short, the dichoiomous 
position must be abandoned, not Just for unusual cases, but for all cases. Given that an 
acceptance of this dichotomy is usually implied by the use of the term innate and its 
synonyms, I wil l confme myself to speaking in terms of genetic and environmental 
effects, understood (in the standard way) in terms of differences.'** 
Restated in terms of effects, claims about innaieness are usually not so much 
about genetic effects as a surprising lack of specific kinds of environmental effects. For 
instance, an infant acquiring language does not need to be exposed to any evidence 
about contrasts in grammaticality status for it to develop the ability to make the relevant 
distinctions (Brown & Hanlon, 1970; Marcus, 1993). That language development is 
insensitive to whether or not this data is present in the linguistic environment is also 
supported by the observation that infants are inattentive to it even when it is available, 
often simply failing to understand the point of parental corrections (Braine, 1971). 
The genetic and environmental contributions to development can be viewed in 
terms of the range of phenotypes that can be expressed on the basis of a given genotype 
with environmental conditions determining which developmental pathway is actually 
followed in specific cases.^' This is, in essence, the principles and parameters view 
adopted by Chomsky (1981), Piattelli-Palmarini (1989) and others, who describe the 
role of the environment as triggering or selecting between possible parameter settings 
that are within the range imposed by an individual's genetic endowment. For example, 
genetically identical ants wi l l develop different morphologies (the body plan o f a queen, 
soldier or worker) depending on environmental stimulation. Environmental factors such 
^ 'Innate' properties are also frequently referred to as hard-wired, which suggests a slightly different 
dichotomy (that between fixed and variable traits) thai is also problematic. Even so-called 'hard wiring' 
has to get wired up during development so there is a problem with drawing the line between that which is 
fixed and that which is variable. If it is the immutability of something after it has been 'wired up' that is 
important, then anything that is 'learned', but never 'unlearned', would fit into that category. 
'^ An equivalent formulation involves considering the range of phenotypes that can potentially be 
expressed under a given set of environmental conditions wiih genetic variables determining which of 
these phenoiypes is actually expressed. 
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as temperature, photoperiod and diet trigger the setting of the body plan 'parameter* 
from among a restricted set of possibilities (Abouheif & Wray, 2002). Within the 
domain of cognition, contingent development of this kind is usually referred to as 
learning, but development is still bounded within a restricted (though possibly infinite) 
set of possibilities.^' 
The results of contingent development are another category of traits that Gould 
and Lewontin (1979: 591) argue are not produced by natural selection. They note that 
the *'phenotypic plasticity that permits organisms to 'mold' their form to prevailing 
circumstances during ontogeny" produces characteristics that '*are not heritable", though 
they qualify this by saying "the capacity to develop them presumably is". They 
conclude that characteristics that are not inherited could not have been selected for, but 
the impossibility of Lamarkism (the inheritance of 'acquired' characteristics) follows 
from the impossibility of inheriting any characteristics of the phenotype, not just those 
whose development is contingent on certain environmental conditions. What is inherited 
is always "the capacity to develop them" (in other words, an individual's genes), which 
is the reason why a person with an amputated leg does not have one-legged children. 
The claim that a given characteristic was selectively favoured can only mean that 
individuals who possessed '*the capacity to develop" that characteristic (e.g., legs, a 
suntan, etc.) had more offspring than others on average by virtue of that characteristic 
being expressed in the phenoiypes of those individuals (perhaps only intermittently). 
This idea is neatly captured in Ridley's (2003) phrase "nature via nurture". 
" Even if the set of expressible phenotypes excludes most altcmaiives. there is no necessity that this set 
be finite in size conmiry to what is often assumed about the principles and parameters approach. The 
presence or absence of each triggering stimulus will lead development down a different pathway (i.e.. set 
a distinct developmental parameter) and by definition, there will be as many parameters to set as there are 
environmental infiuences capable of effecting development. 
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3.1.6 The lesson about cultural evolution 
Some cognitive tasks are more intuitive than others due to the biases inherent in 
'learning' mechanisms.^'' Deacon (1997: 105) argues that these biases wil l mean that, as 
well as the brain evolving to support language, we should expect that "language itselF' 
adapts to the pressures governing its cultural transmission from generation to 
generation, the properties that flourish being those that are passed on with highest 
fidelity during language acquisition. In parameter-setting terms, the notion of a 
"language itself" being transmitted from one generation to the next can be interpreted 
as a statement about how inferences from the utterances of adult speakers wil l lend to 
induce in the next generation, a close approximation to adult parameter settings 
(including the lexicon)."'* Parameter settings that are more reliably inferred on the basis 
of primary linguistic data will tend to be more highly conserved from one generation to 
the next than alternatives. 
The cultural transmission of linguistic parameter settings is just one example of 
natural selection acting in the cultural domain. Within culture, the replicating entities 
are not genes, but pieces of information or what Dawkins (1976) termed memes, and 
like a person's genes, a person's memes can be passed on to subsequent generations 
with modifications. Some of those memes wi l l , by their nature, be passed on more 
readily than others depending on the consequences they have for their own replication. 
Deacon (1997) and others have noted that the rate of cultural evolution is much 
faster than genetic evolution, but as Pinker (1994: 1510 stresses, the syntax of 
languages does not vary without limit: 
" We could describe this situation in terms of cognitive biases favouring certain kinds of hypotheses 
about the worid or equivalently, in terms of biases disfavouring others (cf. Deacon. 1997). 
" Though see Chomsky (2002) who argues thai Deacon's (1997: 105) remarks are unintelligible because 
the latter appears to entertain ihe notion that language exists "outside brains". 
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Beyond a time depth of about a thousand years, history and typology often do 
not correlate well at all. Languages can change from grammatical type to type 
relatively quickly, and can cycle among a few types over and over; aside from 
vocabulary, they do not progressively differentiate and diverge. 
Given that the environment that determines the fitness of a culturally evolving language 
(i.e., the language acquisition device) is comparatively stable, we should expect cultural 
evolution to continue only until languages are optimal with respect to the fidelity of 
transmission from generation to generation. At this point, we can expect that they wil l 
cease to improve although they may drift neutrally between equally fit alternatives thus 
accounting for the cyclicity to which Pinker refers. Prolonged periods of stasis are the 
norm in genetic evolution as well when environmental conditions are stable. This is 
because after a species has adapted to fit its niche, it has no further hill to climb in the 
fitness landscape. Many species have remained essentially unmodified for hundreds of 
millions of years, presumably because any minor deviation from their design would be a 
disadvantage. In other cases, such as the co-evolution of predators and prey or where 
there are interactions between different adaptive strategies in a population, the dynamics 
are more complex so the endpoint wil l not necessarily be a fixed point attractor, but 
may be some other kind of attracior such as a limit cycle or strange attractor. Bui i f the 
cultural evolution of language has an optimal endpoint given some set of learning 
biases, then this endpoint is as subject to genetic effects as the learning biases 
themselves and could feed back to affect genetic selection. When genetic inutaiions 
alter the learning biases, the effect on cultural evolution would be delayed by a number 
of generations while the parameter settings are optimised for cultural transmission under 
the conditions the mutant language-learners impose, but the attraciors in the space of 
cultural evolution are not thereby any less subject to genetic effects than the learning 
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biases themselves. In a literal sense, a culturally stable state can be regarded as an 
extended phenotypic property (cf. Dawkins, 1982) and hence, from a genetic 
perspective, the proper treatment of cultural evolution is alongside ontogenetic 
development but with the developmental process potentially extending beyond the 
lifetime of individual organisms. 
Gould and Lewontin (1979: 591) observe that "[t]he mere existence of a good fit 
between organism and environment is insufficient for inferring the action of natural 
selection" (i.e. natural selection in the biological domain) because this fit can also be the 
result of processes like learning and cultural evolution, a point also made by Kirby 
(1999). As I have attempted to show, there is no contradiction in saying that a trait that 
has arisen via either of these processes was also favoured by selection, but they would 
be right to warn us that characteristics that humans never exhibited before modem limes 
cannot have been relevant for the selection of the capacities that give rise to them. 
Language universals are not just a modem phenomenon so do not fit into this category, 
but there remains a possibility that some of them exhibit fit to functions for which they 
were never indeed selected for in biological evolution. 
3.1.7 Some conclusions about allegedly non-selectionist 
mechanisms 
There is a certain perception, fostered particularly by Gould and his colleagues, that 
phenomena such as spandrels, exaptations, the physical channel, laws of growth and 
form, ^acquired' characteristics, and cultural evolution represent radical altematives to 
The view that cultural evolution is open-ended is perhaps an illusion engendered by the rapid 
technological and social changes of our recent history, but it is far from obvious that even these aspects of 
culture will continue to change for much longer. We are, for instance, brushing up against the physical 
limits of computer miniaturisation, limits imposed by the Uncertainty Principle that mean the 
indeterminacy in the location of signal-carrying electrons becomes important. The reflex of 
miniaturisation has been advances in computing speed since signals take less time to propagate over 
smaller distances. Various developments may delay the inevitable, but it appears that advances in 
computing speed will soon grind to a halt as a result. Entire fields of scientific inquiry will also inevitably 
cease to be fruitful when the limiLs of what can in principle be discovered about them are eventually 
reached (cf. Morgan, 1996). 
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neo-Darwinian orthodoxy. This has led to claims, for instance by Piattelli-Palmarini 
(1989), that we need to replace the neo-Darwinian orthodoxy based on natural selection 
with one based on *exira-adapiive* mechanisms. Nevertheless, representatives of the 
'orthodoxy' do not accept that these ideas (insofar as they are intelligible) are radical at 
all (Dawkins, 1991; Dennett, 1995). 
Those who argue that the existence of these phenomena is evidence of the 
existence of evolutionary 'forces' other than natural selection are guilty of a confusion 
between a plurality of Torces' and a plurality of the products of a 'force' as well as 
between natural selection and the developmental constraints imposed upon it. There are 
interesting questions about which kind of product and what kind of constraints, but not 
generally which 'force'. 
Gould and Lewontin (1979: 583) argue that the rhetorical strategy of the 
"evolutionist" (by which they mean researchers who prefer to see everything in terms of 
adaptation) is to admit the existence of a given mechanism of "nonadaptive evolutiori", 
but "circumscribe its domain of action so narrowly that it cannot have any importance 
in the affairs of nature". Gould and Lewontin list a number of apparently non-adaptive 
alternatives along the lines expressed in the preceding discussion, but almost all of these 
are not 'processes' at all but either the indirect results of natural selection or physical 
constraints acting on it. One of the mechanisms they cite is, however, a genuinely non-
adaptive kind of change: genetic drift (selectively neutral change in the frequency of 
genes in the gene pool). But there are some sound reasons to doubt the importance of 
genetic drift even for those who refuse to adopt the kinds of entrenched positions to 
which Gould and Lewontin allude. The main reason is that genetic drift is the antithesis 
of a 'force', non-directional by definition, leading to the accumulation of selectively 
neutral mutations, which, among other things, results in the degeneration of vestigial 
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structures, structures on which selection has ceased to act.^ ^ Drift is in many ways the 
evolutionary equivalent of the second law of thermodynamics, an increase in entropy 
that occurs in the absence of selection. To describe it as a source of creativity would be 
misleading at best. 
3.2 Optimality as a diagnostic of selective function 
With the conceptual clarifications of the proceeding discussion some more precise 
questions (4) can now be formulated about the emergence of a given trait. 
4. a. To what extent could it have been shaped under selection for functions served by 
concomitant traits? 
b. Does the trait result from developmental processes that are so simple that it 
could plausibly have arisen through a single mutation rather than being refined 
by a process of curhulalive natural selection? 
c. Under which environmental conditions wil l the trait be reliably expressed? 
d. Does the trait only emerge after a period of cultural evolution? 
e. What selection pressures / physical constraints were relevant for the original 
selection of the trait? 
f. Have the selection pressures that have shaped it remained the same over 
evolutionary time? 
g. What limits have the historical contingencies of past evolution imposed on its 
variation? 
Questions (a)-(d) are essentially about ontogenetic development so can be explored by 
observing processes that occur today. For instance, (a) can be addressed by determining 
II is worth stressing here that natural selection continues to act even after it has affected a change. Il 
acts to preserve advantageous traits, weeding out mutations that would otherwise accumulate through 
genetic drift and which can accumulate when a property ceases to be relevant for reproductive success. 
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everywhere a given gene is expressed in an organism and how different trails are linked 
in developmental processes. In the case of language, answers would be suggested by 
looking at where else in the body genes implicated in language development are 
expressed (e.g., Enard, Przeworski, Fisher, Lai, Wiebe, Kitano, Monaco & Paabo, 2002) 
and what other kinds of effects are associated with heritable language deficits (e.g., 
Gopnik & Cargo, 1991). Question (d) can be evaluated by (1) looking at properties of 
language that are not acquired by imitation, (2) looking at properties that are found in 
spontaneously emerging Creole languages like thai which emerged among deaf children 
in Nicaragua (e.g., Kegl, et ai, 1999), and by (3) exploring the dynamics of cultural 
transmission in computational models (e.g., Kirby, 2001). 
Questions (e)-(g) require us to make inferences about the past so are inherently 
more challenging to answer, but these issues may be informed by examining whether a 
trait exhibits optimality with respect to candidate functions. This is essentially a 
variation on the argument from the appearance of design, most famously presented by 
William Paley, who used it as the basis of an argument for the existence of a deity. 
In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a stone, and were asked 
how the stone came to be there; I might possibly answer, that, for anything I 
knew to the contrary, it had lain there for ever: nor would it perhaps be very easy 
to show the absurdity of this answer. But suppose I had found a watch upon the 
ground, and it should be inquired how the watch happened to be in that place; I 
should hardly think of the answer which I had before given, that for anything I 
knew, the watch might have always been there. (Paley, 1828, cited in Dawkins, 
1991: 5) 
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Paley goes on to argue that given the likelihood thai an object such as a watch 
could form by chance is so remote, the existence of such objects can only be explained 
by attributing design to them by a designer. He then extended this argument to living 
things, which he observed to be even more intricately crafted. !n the absence of an 
ahemative explanation, he argued that living things must have also been designed. 
Of course, since Darwin we are aware of another non-random process that can 
give rise to such objects, and so the appearance of design can now be viewed as 
evidence of the action of natural selection. Pinker and Bloom (1990: 707) make this 
point in relation to language: 
Evolutionary theory offers clear criteria for when a trail should be attributed to 
natural selection: complex design for some function, and the absence of 
alternative processes capable of explaining such complexity. Human language 
meets this criterion: grammar is a complex mechanism tailored to the 
transmission of propositional structures through a serial interface.^' 
The intuition is that complex functional designs are unlikely to come into existence by 
chance. Pinker and Bloom's discussion owes much to Dawkins (1986/1991: 9) who is 
more explicit about this. 
Complicated things have some quality, specifiable in advance, that is highly 
unlikely to have been acquired by chance alone. In the case of living things, the 
quality that is specified in advance is, in some sense, ^proficiency'; either 
proficiency in a particular ability such as fiying, as an aero-engineer might 
In this quote. Pinker and Bloom are discussing language as a whole rather than individual properties of 
it, but (he same logic applies in both cases. 
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admire it; or proficiency in something more general, such as the ability to slave 
o f f death, or the ability to propagate genes in reproduction. 
It should be clear from the discussion in the preceding sections that non-trivial questions 
arise about how to determine what evolutionary pathways are available, and these 
present serious difficulties for determining the likelihood of evolutionary transitions, but 
for a selective explanation to be minimally favoured over a non-selective one, it need 
only be argued that the likelihood of the transition occurring is greater via a process of 
cumulative natural selection than via either genetic drift or a single mutation. We will 
only fail to have any preference for one variety of explanation over another when we 
know absolutely nothing about what variations mutations can produce, whether the 
resulting organism has greater fitness than the ancestral form, and so on. 
The emphasis on complexity that Pinker and Bloom inherit from Dawkins 
reflects the particular concems of the latter, whose aim was to illustrate the explanatory 
power of natural selection. Dawkins took seriously Paley's observation that the 
existence of extremely complex objects demands an explanation in a way that the 
existence of simple ones does not and sought to demonstrate that natural selection could 
provide this explanation even in the most remarkable cases of complex design. What 
Dawkins had no need to stress is that natural selection is also the best explanation for 
the existence of even mildly complex designs. 
A more fundamental reason to doubt the relevance of complexity as a diagnostic 
of adaptation is that it can decrease for adaptive reasons as well as increase. The real 
^ Paley's style of argument can also be applied lo objects much simpler than watches. This is nicely 
illustrated in a short story by Arthur C . Clarke entitled The Sentinel and the film it inspired. Stanley 
Kubrick's 200/; A Space Odyssey. In both the short story and the film, explorers discover an unusual 
object on the Moon, which its discoverers judge to be of alien construclion based on the perfection of its 
geometry. The object exhibits the appearance of design, not because it is complex, but because it is 
perfect. In the film, this object is just a large, black, rectangular monolith. It is hard to imagine a simpler 
kind of object, yet despite iis simplicity, if such an object really were found, the conclusion that it was of 
artificial construction would be almost inescapable. 
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issue is the likelihood of a useful property arising rather than the complexity of the 
result relative to some putative ancestor. 
A clearer picture emerges of adaptation when we replace the emphasis on 
complexity with considerations of opiimality. However, the view that natural selection 
is an optimising process is not without controversy. Simon (1957) coined the term 
*satisficing' to capture an alternative conception of natural selection as producing 
solutions that are good enough for survival without necessarily being optimal. But as 
Dawkins (1982: 450 notes "UJhe trouble with satisficing as a concept is that it 
completely leaves out the competitive element which is fundamental to all l ife." If an 
individual with a capacity that is merely good enough came into competition with 
another individual with a capacity which was better, natural selection would, by 
defmition, favour the latter over the former. Few biologists would argue that natural 
selection finds perfectly optimal solutions, but it is still an optimis//ig process, the 
designs attained generally being locally rather than globally optimal. With this rationale, 
assumptions of optimality guide inquiry in some strands of evolutionary biology much 
as they do within Minimalist inquiries in linguistics (e.g., McCleery, 1978; Orzack & 
Sober, 2001). 
Parker and Maynard Smith (1990) call this approach Optimality Theory^"^ ^x\6 
outline how evidence of optimality can be used to understand adaptations and their 
functions. A basic requirement is that a descriptive theory be constructed of the 
purported adaptation as a (locally) optimal solution to the constraints imposed upon it 
by the environment and the other systems with which it interfaces. In essence, this 
involves (a) identifying what they call the strategy set, which is the local range of 
genetically attainable variants that differ with respect to the trait in question, (b) 
identifying the function over the strategy set for which the observed trail is optimal 
" Noi 10 be confused with ihe linguistic iheory of Prince and Smolensky (1993) with the same name. 
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among the possible choices, and (c) relating this function to fitness (even i f only 
fulf i l l ing a fitness-related role at some time in the past). If the trait is optimal for a 
function unrelated to fitness, it cannot have been selected for it. Attaining some 
plausible view of the strategy set requires some evidence about what local variations are 
possible given the limitations imposed by physical law and the contingencies of past 
evolution. Parker and Maynard Smith use existing variation in closely-related species as 
one source of evidence about this. Variation during ontogeny is another. On this issue, 
Parker and Maynard Smith (1990: 27) note that when constructing models 
[ijypical biological constraints usually define some obvious boundary conditions 
for the strategy set, but strategic possibilities that have never in fact been 
observed are included unless there are reasons of this kind for leaving them out. 
We can justify including possibilities that we cannot be certain are physically 
attainable on the grounds that i f the observed value is optimal even with these 
possibilities included then it is also optimal without these possibilities included. 
However, an inflated strategy set could give us a false impression of how improbable 
the optimal value is. It may be that the observed state represents the only possibility or 
one of very few, in which case, it would be unnecessary to invoke a process of 
cumulative natural selection to account for i i . Similarly, a function which can be served 
optimally in a large number of ways is not something that we can confidently conclude 
was a factor in the selection of the observed variant. This point is illustrated in the 
diagrams below. In (5a), a large proportion of variants correspond to the highest 
possible fitness value, while in (5b) only a small proportion are optimal. The presence 
of improbable' optimality is hence more likely to be a sign of the function's relevance 
to selection. 
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a. Probable oplimality b. Improbable optimality 
In its present form, the optimality diagnostic requires us to assume that 
functionally relevant properties of the environment are static and that evolution has an 
opportunity to scale peaks in a fitness landscape without its topography changing. This 
is an assumption that wil l not hold in cases where co-evolutionary dynamics exist 
between different variants such that changes in one wil l affect the other's chances of 
survival. In predator and prey species for example, the fitness landscape of each species 
wil l be continually changing as each innovation in predation is matched with an 
innovation for evading capture in the prey species. More wil l be said about how the 
opiimaliiy diagnostic could be generalised lo more complex dynamics in chapter seven. 
Until then, the environment wil l be idealised as static, since none of the phenomena to 
which the optimality diagnostic is applied in the present thesis appear to be subject to 
co-evolutionary dynamics. This appears to be an appropriate idealisation for present 
purposes. 
The discussion in the previous section concerned whether there are alternatives 
to natural selection for explaining the existence of traits. A related, though distinct 
question concerns whether there are processes other than natural selection that could 
account for the existence of a good fit between trait and function. The existence of such 
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mechanisms might of course lead to problems for applying the optimality diagnostic. 
Indeed, this problem does arise when there are optimally evolved biological 
mechanisms that themselves perform optimising functions such as learning mechanisms 
that generally seek to minimise certain kinds of errors (say between predictions and 
observations). The neural mechanisms involved in action planning and the immune 
response are also examples of optimising processes that sit atop the biological substrate. 
Cultural evolution is in a slightly different category, but is also an optimising process 
that could lead to problems for interpreting the optimality diagnostic.''^ 
To resolve these issues, we need to find some way to distinguish between the 
optimising effects of genetic selection on the one hand and those .of these other 
processes on the other. One way to do this is to examine whether the properties still 
emerge when the action of other processes can be ruled out. In the case of language, we 
can for instance observe whether a putative learning process has the necessary feedback 
available to it to form appropriate generalisations about the linguistic input. We can also 
observe which properties emerge in the earliest stages of creolisation before cultural 
evolution can be implicated. On the other hand, genetic evolution can be ruled out as an 
explanation for functions that are only optimally served in modem times (e.g., noses 
being optimally suited to supporting spectacles). For one of the other processes to be 
implicated, it would also be necessary to at least show that the trait in question 
optimises a function of the relevant kind. In the case of cultural evolution, the function 
would have to be some kind of selection pressure that applies to cultural transmission. 
To optimise this function, the trait would have to be something that can actually be 
passed on culturally and which replicates more successfully than similar but 
incompatible traits because of factors like the nature of the learning bottleneck and the 
Opiimising processes that occur outside of ihc domain of biological evolution may also have an 
esseniially selectionist nature. Proposals of this kind have been made to explain cultural evolution 
(Dawkins, 1976), certain kinds of learning (Edelman. 1987), planning and intentionality (Calvin, 1996; 
Denneu, 1991), and the immune response (Jeme, 1955). For an overview examining many of these ideas, 
see Cziko(I995). 
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extent to which people are predisposed to acquiring it. These predispositions may in 
turn have been genetically selected for the same function. So while it may be the case 
that a good fit between trait and function is insufficient to conclude that a function was 
relevant for genetic selection, evidence of cultural selection for the same function is not 
in itself an indication that it wasn't. 
Considerations of optimality also allow the function for which a propeny was 
selected to be identified without making any specific claims about the form of earlier 
variants. Given that all variants in the proximity of an optimal form wil l be less fit (by 
definition), evolution could have preceded from any direction towards the current state. 
At the same time, this mode of inquiry severely restricts the kinds of adaptaiionist 
theories that can be proposed by requiring that a fitness-related function be identified 
for which the trait is locally optimal. Such restrictions rule out certain kinds of adaptive 
explanations that might otherwise seem plausible making it harder to tell unfalsifiable 
'just-so' stories about which functions were relevant for the selection of a trait. The 
approach advocated here could be demonstrated to be invalid i f it fails to differentiate 
between different adaptive stories even while adhering to the principles outlined above. 
The discussion so far has been an attempt to place appropriate boundaries on 
evolutionary theorising and to develop a more principled set of diagnostics for 
identifying functional pressures. I have devoted considerable space to these issues 
because of their importance, but I now turn to the specific arguments relating to 
language. 
3.3 Reconciling linguistics with evolutionary biology 
The question of what kind of evolutionary explanation could account for language 
universals is something which should be asked separately for each property 
individually. Several varieties of explanation have been proposed, each implicating 
natural selection in a different way. A given property might have been exapted for its 
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new function from pre-existing neural structures that were selected for previous 
functions (Piattelli-Palmarini, 1989; Gould, 1991; Uriagereka, 1998; Chomsky, 2002; 
Hauser et ciL, 2002), or from structures that became available as a result of adaptive 
increases in the size or complexity of the brain (Chomsky, 1972, 2002; Uriagereka, 
1998) or the prefrontal cortex in particular (Deacon, 1992). Alternatively, Pinker and 
Bloom (1990: 721) argue that the emergence of language must have involved an 
adaptive reorganisation in the brain rather than simply an increase in size given that 
*'mere largeness of brain is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for language" 
citing in support of this Lenneberg's (1967) studies of nanencephaly and individual 
craniomelric variation. 
It is not impossible to determine which of these or any other conceivable 
hypotheses is more accurate. If a property was originally selected for reasons other than 
language, then we should not expect it to serve its language-related functions optimally. 
The existence of such properties might nevertheless be explainable in terms of their 
optimal fit to previous or other functions of the relevant neural structures, or lo 
functions of concomitant traits. Considerations of optimality therefore present 
themselves as a way of systematically comparing the relevant hypotheses. If a property 
is improbably optimal for a language-related function, we should conclude that it was 
selected for this function. If it is improbably optimal for a function that pre-dated 
language, then we should conclude that it was selected for that function and only later 
exapied for language. 
Considerations of oplimaliiy already manifest themselves in interesting ways 
within linguistic theorising. Within the 'Minimalist Program' (Chomsky, 1995), inquiry 
proceeds with the null hypothesis that the computational system responsible for 
grammar is a more-or-less perfect solution to the demands that are placed on it by the 
cognitive systems with which it interfaces. In particular, it is hypothesised to have only 
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two interfaces, one with what is called the articulatory-perceptual system and the other 
with what is called the conceptual-intentional system. In less formal terms, it can be 
thought of as providing a mapping between a system dealing with signals and a system 
dealing with meanings. A Minimalist wil l assume that this mapping is achieved in an 
extremely economical way without redundancy thus severely limiting the kinds of 
theories that could be proposed to explain it. The legitimacy of this mode of inquiry is 
reinforced to the extent that explanatory theories can in fact be discovered this way and 
the approach has indeed led to important developments in many areas. I f this is a 
realistic view of the language faculty, it appears to be entirely compatible with the 
optimising infiuence of natural selection, which, we might expect, would explain why it 
works. This interpretation is nevertheless rejected by Chomsky (1995) for reasons 1 wil l 
examine in section 33.1 . 
Another pattern in theorising that is in apparent harmony with the view thai 
linguistic properties were selected for linguistic functions concerns leamability. 
Chomsky (1986) argues that the language faculty must be heavily constrained i f we are 
lo account for the swiftness of language acquisition, and linguists routinely appeal to 
leamability considerations in support of proposed universals. For instance, Chomsky 
(1986) uses leamability considerations to argue against vacuous movement (i.e., 
movement that does not result in a change of word order or pronunciation), Pinker 
(1994) argues for the head parameter (i.e., a single parameter that determines whether 
verbs precede or follow their objects, whether there are prepositions rather than 
postpositions, and so on), Kayne (1984) argues that syntactic trees are at most binary-
branching, and Radford (1988) uses this kind of argument to support the view that 
words belong to different categories since assuming this allows a language learner to 
generalise syntactic knowledge acquired about one word to every other member of the 
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class to which it belongs.^' The appeal to leamability considerations is a typical one and 
i f swift acquisition confers a selective advantage it is one that is perfectly compatible 
with adaptive explanations because we should expect all constraints to be functional in 
limiting the range of hypotheses that need to be entertained in language acquisition. 
Despite the apparent compatibility of these claims with selectionist accounts of 
language evolution, some linguists have presented a number of arguments that 
challenge the view that aspects of language could be adaptations. I summarise four of 
these here, which I take to encompass the most serious objections and for which I have 
never seen any convincing refutation. The objections are (a) that the ^tinkering' process 
of natural selection could not have crafted something as elegant as the language facuUy, 
(b) that certain properties of language actually appear to be maladaptive, (c) that a 
beneficial language mutation could not succeed because the first mutant would not be 
able to benefit from it i f he or she was the only individual in his or her linguistic 
community who possessed it, and (d) that grammatical universals are unlikely to be 
adaptations because there is very little evidence of links to communicative efficacy. I 
tackle each of these points by illuminating counterexamples and hidden assumptions, 
thus leaving the door wide open for selectionist explanations and hence the proposals to 
follow in chapters 5 and 6. 
3.3.1 The messiness of evolution and the elegance of language 
Chomsky (1995; 2002), Piattelli-Palmarini (1989) and others have expressed scepticism 
about the possibility of explaining the elegance of the language faculty in terms of what 
Jacob (1977) described as the 'tinkering' of evolution. Chomsky has particulariy 
emphasised the apparent lack of redundancy in the principles of the grammar. To the 
extent that descriptions have had overlapping coverage he says 
'^ These claims can be motivated in other ways as well and not all of ihem are currently accepted. The 
head parameter for instance was dispensed with by Kayne (1994) by deriving precedence relations in 
terms of the structural relation of asymmetric c-command, a proposal adopted in a modified form within 
the minimalist program of Chomsky (1995: ch4). 
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Repeatedly, it has been found that these are wrongly formulated and must be 
replaced by non redundant ones. The discovery has been so regular that the need 
to eliminate redundancy has become a working principle in inquiry. (Chomsky, 
1995:5) 
He regards this as surprising noting that 
language is a biological system, and biological systems typically are "messy," 
intricate, the result of evolutionary "tinkering," and shaped by accidental 
circumstance and by physical conditions that hold of complex systems with 
varied functions and elements. Redundancy is not only a typical feature of such 
systems, but an expected one, in that it helps to compensate for injury and 
defect, and to accommodate to a diversity of ends and functions. (Chomsky, 
1995:29) 
But despite claims to the contrary, redundancy is not an expected feature of biological 
systems i f it is costly to the organism. Naturally enough, redundancy is retained i f it 
helps to "compensate for injury and defect" and so on but, under conditions that impose 
heavy demands on processing or other neural resources, the situation can be very 
different.^^ 
Part of the difficulty in imagining how extremely elegant structures could be 
crafted by natural selection may be associated with seeing evolution exclusively in 
^' Chomsky blurs the distinction between the notion of redundancy in the functioning of a system and 
redundancy in the description of a system, but this makes a big difference. Many internal organs like the 
lungs come in pairs, suggesting a certain amount of functional redundancy, but a description of a pair of 
organs needn't itself contain superfluous elements. We could for instance describe the bifurcating 
bronchial structure of the respiratory system in terms of a derivational procedure. that combines 
'respiratory objects' (much as the merge operator of minimalist syntax combines syntactic objects) thus 
producing a very economical and non-redundant description of a system possessing redundancy. 
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terms of the adding of parts, but natural selection can also strip away unnecessary 
components established in connection with previous uses of structures. Structures can 
be stripped away under selection for streamlining (the loss of limb structures and bodily 
hair in aquatic mammals for instance). Features can also degenerate when they cease to 
play an important role in selection. This occurs as a consequence of the accumulation of 
mutations that would otherwise be selected out and can explain the deactivation of 
genes like those responsible for manufacturing products that have become readily 
available in an organism's diet such as vitamin C in the case of apes (Pauling, 1986), 
and the existence of vestigial organs like the eyes of cave fish, wings of fiightless birds, 
and so on. Redundancy and streamlining are consequences of different design 
priorities, like those that govern the design of passenger airliners versus those that 
governed the design of experimental aircraft used to break the sound barrier. 
Redundancy is only inevitable in aircraft design i f safety overrides other concems. 
A related issue concems the view that a 'complex' adaptation necessarily 
consists of many different parts that could have evolved relatively independently, but it 
is not clear that this is tme of language at the level of grammar or its neural 
representation. Indeed, within Minimalist inquiries (Chomsky, 1995), there is a trend 
towards a conception of the language faculty requiring fewer and fewer descriptive 
principles. These principles are so interrelated that language may be 'irreducibly 
complex' in the sense that no subset of its parts could be functional for any purpose. But 
even i f this is tme, it would only present a problem for an adaptive account of language 
evolution i f it is assumed, incorrectly, that natural selection always proceeds via the 
adding of parts. 
It is conceivable that when certain neural stmctures were exapied for language, 
they were very complex and cumbersome from the point of view of its new function, 
perhaps having the ability lo encode an unnecessarily broad range of grammatical 
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possibilities. Natural selection might have worked to streamline them, making them 
more efficient in various ways. One result of streamlining may have been to limit the 
scope of hypotheses that each new generation of language learners needed to entertain 
about the stmcture of the input, a result that would have increased both the speed and 
accuracy of acquisition. 
As an analogy, we know that Michelangelo's David could not have been 
assembled by adding one part at a time because it is a sculpture consisting of a single 
piece of marble. Nevertheless, we know that it was the result of a very slow process that 
'released' it from an initially amorphous block of stone. There is a similar 'sculpting' 
process in the ontological development of the brain that involves the selective pruning 
of neurons and the connections between them. The stmctural consequences are dramatic 
with more than half of the neurons that develop being killed of f by adulthood 
(Oppenheim, 1991). This phenomenon, called programmed cell death, also occurs in 
the development of other organs including the hands and feet where digits are sculpted 
as a result of the death of the tissue between them (Saunders, 1966). 
The loss of simcture also occurs in genomes. The human genome for instance, 
has fewer chromosomes and, according to the Animal Genome Size Database, is 
slightly smaller (by weight) than the genomes of all of the other great apes. The loss is 
probably mostly associated with the amount of non-coding rather than coding DNA, but 
there may be an adaptive reason for it. Piattelli-Palmarini (1989) uses the existence of 
non-coding DNA as evidence that evolution is wasteful and messy, but there is evidence 
to suggest that the optimal amount of non-coding DNA is not nil. In many cases, 
differences in genome size between closely related species might be explained in terms 
of their consequences for the rate of cell division. Cell division rates in turn have 
consequences for developmental rates and hence the kinds of seasonal niches that a 
species can occupy (Gregory, 2002). 
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Given that evolutionary mechanisms can and do reduce the redundancy of 
systems either by removing stoictures or by disabling their functions, the generality of 
Chomsky's assertion about the level of redundancy that should be expected in 
biological systems should be called into question. The language faculty (narrowly 
constmed in terms of the computational system) may or may not be unusual, but it is 
what it is - a biological system with apparently very little redundancy."^ "* The question is 
whether this can be explained in terms of the kinds of processes that are known to 
reduce redundancy in biological systems or whether a new category of explanation is 
required to account for how such an elegant system could emerge. 
A further complication is that it is not clear whether a language faculty without a 
given property would be simpler in all cases. Take the property of movement for 
instance. Is a language without movement phenomena simpler than a language with 
movement phenomena? The answer is not obvious. Suppose that to realise a certain 
syntactic dependency between a pair of constituents, they need to appear in some 
specified stmctural configuration. If this structural configuration is defined in 
sufficiently broad terms then it may be that the man bears the same structural 
relationship to bite in both of the sentences below, thus accounting for the uniformity in 
interpretation (the man being understood to have been bitten in each case). 
6. a. The dog bit the man. 
b. The man was bitten. 
If the same configuration is implicated in both sentences, then the flexibility in word 
order would be a result of a lack of constraints that would prevent it rather than of the 
computational system having properties like a MOVE operator to generate it, so it is 
" I will assume that Chomsky (1995) is correct about the lack of redundancy in language. This premise 
could perhaps be challenged, but Vm attempting to show that even if we accept it, a selectionist account is 
not ruled out. 
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possible in principle that a language faculty that allows movement would be less 
complex than one that disallows it. Rather than ask what accounts for this flexibility, it 
might be more sensible to ask what limits it. Such examples highlight the difficulties 
inherent in distinguishing figure from ground, or of what requires an explanation versus 
what does not. 
3-3.2 Maladaptive consequences of grammatical universals 
Some commentators argue thai there are grammatical universals that are actually 
maladaptive (Piattelli-Palmarini, 1990; Uriagereka, 1998; Lightfoot, 2000). These 
arguments follow a general pattern of which Lightfool (2000) is typical. He makes the 
point with reference to the constraint that blocks the extraction of subjects from tensed 
clauses under certain conditions. This constraint is illustrated by the comparison in (7). 
In (7a), who is moved from the embedded object position (leaving the unpronounced 
trace /) . By contrast, extraction from the embedded subject results in the unacceptable 
sentence in (7b). 
7. a. WhOi do you think [that Ray saw / J ? 
b. *WhOi do you think [that /, saw Fay]? 
Lighifoot notes that this constraint appears to apply universally, but that there is 
variation in the strategies that are used to overcome it in different languages. In English, 
extraction from both the object and subject positions is permitted when the overt 
complementiser that is not used to introduce the embedded clause, as in (8). 
8. a. WhOi do you think [Ray saw r,]? 
b. WhOj do you think [t, saw Fay]? 
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Lightfoot argues that since different languages employ different strategies to 
circumvent this constraint, speakers have some use for expressing what the constraint 
disallows. This, he argues, makes the constraint maladaptive, from which he concludes 
that selectionist accounts of such properties are misguided. 
Assuming for a moment that Lightfoot is justified in concluding that the 
constraint is non-functional or maladaptive, then there are only two ways to account for 
its existence. Either it exists despite itself - by chance surviving the processes that tend 
to weed out maladaptive properties, or it is a concomitant of some other trait that does 
have adaptive consequences. Indeed, i f a property is costly in some ways, then its 
continued existence is puzzling and so could actually be used as evidence for it being 
associated with a counterbalancing benefit as when the increased choking hazard 
apparently associated with a descended larynx is used as evidence of it being an 
adaptation for speech (Lieberman, 1984).-''* Lightfooi (2000: 244) lakes this approach, 
arguing that "the restriction on the movement of subjects is a by-product of the more 
general condition on movement traces" and therefore, "a spandrel", noting that this 
**general condition may well be functionally motivated, possibly by parsing 
considerations". I f it is a by-product of a constraint that evolved by natural selection, it 
is, by virtue of this, a by-product of natural selection, which means that selectionist 
accounts are not, as he suggests, irrelevant, although these cases do serve to warn us 
that when we are attempting to discover what selective changes have taken place, we 
cannot assume that a given pair of traits exist independently of one another (the lesson 
of §3.1.1). 
The logically prior conclusion that the constraint on subject extraction is 
maladaptive is not adequately established by Lightfoot either. Firstly, it doesn't follow 
^ Fitch and Reby (200!) argue thai a descended larynx could be an adaptation for something other than 
speech on the basis that it has also been observed in other species. A possibility they raise is that a 
descended larynx, by lowering formant frequencies, was selected for as a way of exaggerating apparent 
body size. This may be a matter of controversy, but the logically prior conclusion that the existence of a 
choking hazard would suggest a counterbalancing benefit is not generally disputed. 
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that a constraint that rules out an utterance phrased in a particular way would present a 
disadvantage to language users i f its meaning can easily be expressed in other ways. 
The intended meaning of (7b) can, after all, be expressed by (8b) so a language faculty 
that allowed both wouldn't necessarily be belter adapted. It may actually be desirable 
from a computational point of view to eliminate the kind of arbitrary choices that would 
allow exactly the same meaning to be expressed in more than one way. 
Secondly, even i f we grant that a given constraint is a disadvantage from the 
point of view of cenain functions in certain contexts, this disadvantage may be offset by 
(a) the function being adaptive in other contexts thai are more relevant, or (b) the 
constraint also serving functions other than those for which it is considered maladaptive. 
There are disadvantages associated with most traits, even the vertebrate eye, which 
many regard as the archetypal adaptation. Eyes are easily irritated, and provide a 
gateway to the body and the brain for foreign bodies and infections, so i f we evaluated 
their functional significance in the environment of a sandstorm, we might conclude that 
they too are maladaptive. We would also come to this conclusion i f in more typical 
contexts we only considered the occasional problems of eye infections and ignored the 
advantages associated with vision, but all of the consequences of a trait in combination 
contribute to whether it wil l be selected. Evidence that the constraint on subject 
extraction prevents speakers from communicating certain kinds of useful meanings tells 
us nothing about its evolution other than the mundane conclusion that it wasn't selected 
for communicating those specific meanings. It doesn't tell us that there was nothing it 
was selected for. 
This kind of conceptual error might have something to do with the pervasive 
tendency to define trails in terms of their functions or effects. It is tempting to conclude 
that the only effect associated with the property that blocks extraction from subjects is 
to block extraction from subjects, but the function of a trait cannot simply be stipulated 
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in its definition - it must be empirically discovered. Unfortunately, the strategy of 
defining traits in terms of their functions is often necessary when dealing with cognition 
since very little is known about how cognitive capacities are physically realised in the 
brain. The situation is akin to someone with no knowledge of aerodynamics discussing, 
in functional terms, the property of birds that gives them the power of fiight. It is 
possible to discuss this property without having any understanding of the role that wings 
play in it, and from this perspective, it may seem implausible that other consequences of 
wings, such as those having to do with thermal regulation, could be associated with it. 
Likewise, the property responsible for preventing the extraction of subjects might have 
various other effects that, from our present state of knowledge, appear unrelated. 
A broader variant of Lighifoot's argument concerns the autonomy of syntax 
from cognition. Uriagereka (1998) argues that the possibility of producing sentences 
that are ungrammatical but comprehensible (speech errors, speech of foreigners, speech 
of infants under three years old, etc.) and sentences that are grammatical but 
incomprehensible (garden path sentences, sentences with complex embedding, difficult 
technical language, etc.) suggests that usability considerations are orthogonal to 
grammaticality considerations, but this is not necessarily the case. Such examples have 
traditionally been used by Chomsky (1980) and others merely to argue that grammatical 
and semantic representations are dissociable, not that the well-formedness of each type 
of representation is uncorrelated. Grammatical sentences appear to be easier to process 
and comprehend than ungrammatical ones so a functional role is not ruled out. If the 
computational system responsible for grammar is autonomous from the rest of 
cognition, its constraints may operate even when they are unhelpful, but nevertheless be 
favoured by selection on the basis of their utility in other contexts. 
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3.3,3 Mutants would have no one to talk to 
Anoiher poleniial problem with an adaptive view of language evolution arises from the 
necessity that it proceed via a sequence of plausible stages such that each step represents 
an increase in fliness over the last. The problem, noted by Geschwind (1980), Hurford 
(1999b) and others, concerns how any mutation of the language faculty could ever be 
favoured i f an individual's ability to communicate relies on conformity to the 
conventions of a linguistic community. Any departure from grammatical conventions on 
the part of the mutant, it is argued, would present a problem for mutual comprehension. 
A similar question arises in the familiar case of language change that is cultural 
rather than genetic like the gradual sequence of changes that led from Latin to French. 
These changes do not have a biological basis. Instead they are the result of language 
learners *misanalysing' structures, and of speakers inventing new words, applying old 
ones to new contexts and so forth. We could argue that these departures from 
conformity impair communication too, but it would be manifestly untrue to claim that 
this kind of gradual change is impossible and i f the conformity argument doesn't work 
as an argument against gradualism in this specific case, then it cannot be used in 
general. 
Assuming that the evolution of the language faculty did proceed via a number of 
small steps, the problem would still remain as to how changes initially arising in one 
individual could come to dominate in the broader population. If the change was also 
associated with other effects that were a selective advantage then these could have 
offset any disadvantage associated with nonconformity. There are at least three kinds of 
arguments that could be made along these lines. 
Firstly, the disadvantage associated with nonconformity might have been 
buffered by a tendency for people to value novel, creative use of language. 
Unconventional language can draw attention to itself and provoke curiosity in the way 
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that puzzles do, a fact long exploited in literature, advertising and politics. Minor 
deviations from standards might therefore be advantageous precisely because of their 
nonconformity, thus outweighing any costs associated with occasional difficulties in 
comprehension. 
The second possibility is that communicative functions were outweighed by 
other functions of language that don't require conformity to the conventions of the 
linguistic community. As Chomsky (2002: 148) notes, language also has non-
communicative functions. 
Actually you can use language even i f you are the only person in the universe 
with language, and in fact it would even have adaptive advantage. If one person 
suddenly got the language faculty, that person would have great advantages; the 
person could think, could articulate to itself its thoughts, could plan, could 
sharpen, and develop thinking as we do in inner speech, which has a big effect 
on our lives. 
The third possibility relates to the observation by Sperber (1990) that adaptive 
changes can actually occur without breaking the conventions of the linguistic 
community. Introducing grammatical constraints that improve the efficiency of 
language acquisition, and that reduce costs associated with computation and 
representation would make the language faculty better adapted to acquiring and using 
the kinds of languages that it is already exposed to without leading to nonconformity. 
3.3.4 The lack of convincing adaptive explanations 
The previous arguments fail to rule out adaptive functions, but Hauser et ai (2002) 
point out that there isn't much in the way of compelling evidence to rule them in either. 
They observe simply that many linguistic properties have a "tenuous connection to 
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communicative efficacy" (p. 1574), and argue that the most promising explanation for 
this lack of fit is that the language faculty ^'evolved for reasons other than language*' 
(p. 1578) later being co-opted for its present function without much modification. 
This view is open to criticism on the basis that whai is generally meant by 
"communicative efficacy" is an unnecessarily narrow view of linguistic function so 
seeing selection for prior non-linguistic functions as the only alternative is to ignore 
many categories of explanations. Misleading connotations of the word function may be 
largely to blame given that the word usually suggests an increased benefit rather than a 
reduced cost while non-functional misleadingly lumps neutral and costly traits together. 
Some general categories of functions that might be associated with linguistic properties 
are listed below, beginning with some that could come under the category of 
"communicative efficacy," and leading on to others that wouldn't normally be described 
in these terms. 
9. increased expressiveness; reduced ambiguity; better information theoretic signal 
properties; reduced processing load (in production and comprehension); 
distribution of processing load facilitating simultaneous activities tike hand 
movements; increased biases facilitating language acquisition making it faster 
and more accurate; reduced cost associated with memory consumed by the 
lexicon; reduced nutritional and energy requirements (growth/acquisition; 
maintenance and running costs); reduced dependency on scarce resources 
(metabolic or processing resources); reduced risk associated with faults, 
instability and other negative side-effecis; increased capacity for reasoning and 
structuring of thought 
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Costs associated with language may have been more relevant in the selection of 
its specific properties than communicative functions. Properties could have been 
selected for their effects on reducing representational and processing costs ultimately 
understood in terms of metabolic energy or other neural resources, or reducing the costs 
associated with language acquisition in terms of time, effort and reliability. The 
proposals presented in chapters 5 and 6 are of this kind. 
3.4 Summary 
There are various naive paths to a selectionist account of language evolution which we 
would be right to criticise, but there is arguably also an informed path. The naive paths 
are pursued without adequately appreciating the facts in (10). 
10. a. Not every trait has an independent selective function (cf. §3.1.1). 
b. A trait that currently serves a given function may not have originally arisen 
under selection for that function (cf. §3.1.2). 
c. The forms that natural selection is capable of producing are constrained by 
physical law and the historical contingencies of past evolution (cf. §3.1.3). 
d. Elegant structures can emerge as a result of simple, self-organising, 
developmental processes (cf. §3.1.4). 
e. Some properties emerge as a result of learning (cf. §3.1.5). 
f. Some properties emerge as a result of cultural evolution (cf. §3.1.6). 
The informed path involves recognition of the facts in (10), but also those in ( I I) and 
(12). 
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11. a. Demonstrating that a property is an incidental by-product of selection for a 
concomitant trait does not allow us to conclude that the property was not refined 
under genetic selection (cf. §3.1.1). 
b. Demonstrating that a property serves functions that it wasn't selected for does 
not allow us to conclude that the property was not refined under genetic 
selection (cf. §3.1.2). 
c. Demonstrating that there are physical constraints on the forms that natural 
selection can produce does not allow us to conclude that a given property was 
not refined under genetic selection (cf. §3.1.3). 
d. Demonstrating that there is a self-organising developmental explanation for the 
emergence of a given property in ontogeny does not allow us to conclude thai 
the property was not refined under genetic selection (cf. §3.1.4). 
e. Demonstrating that a property will be acquired under some conditions and not 
others during the lifetime of an organism does not allow us to conclude that the 
property was not refined under genetic selection (cf. §3.1.5). 
f. Demonstrating that a property can or did emerge after a period of cultural 
evolution does not allow us to conclude that the property was not refined under 
genetic selection (cf. §3.1.6). 
12. a. Complexity can decrease as well as increase for adaptive reasons (cf. §3.3.1). 
b. Selection against redundancy is expected to occur under certain circumstances 
(cf. §3.3.1). 
c. Maladaptive consequences of a property are not evidence of its non-optimality 
(cf. §3.3.2). 
d. It is not necessarily a disadvantage for an individual to exhibit non-conformity 
with respect to the conventions of his or her linguistic community (cf. §3.3.3). 
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e. Mutations that affect language competence wil l not necessarily result in the 
mutant exhibiting non-conformity with respect to the conventions of his or her 
linguistic community (cf. §3.3.3). 
f. Language universals were not necessarily selected for communicative functions 
(cf. §3.3.4). 
A recurrent obstacle to theoretical progress appears to be the acceptance of a 
number of false dichotomies. We see this in the ^debates' about functional versus 
physical modes of explanation (cf. §3.1.4), genetic versus environmental causes (cf. 
§3.1.5), and genetic versus cultural evolution (cf. §3.1.6). 
Another obstacle appears to be the use of misleading terminology. I have argued 
here that the term spandrel should be abandoned in favour of the terms concomitant 
traits and concomitant changes (cf. §3.1.1), that the term exaptation should be reserved 
exclusively for changes in the function of a trait in the literal absence of any changes in 
its form (cf. §3.1.2), and that the term innate and synonyms such as genetically 
programmed, instinctive and hard-wired should be set aside in favour of discussions in 
terms of genetic and environmental effects or the absence thereof (cf. §3.1.5). 
I have also attempted to outline and extend a diagnostic of selective functions 
based on optimality considerations (cf. §3.2). This diagnostic allows theories of 
selective functions to be compared on the basis of the extent to which the relevant trait 
performs a hypothesized function optimally and the extent to which this optimality is 
improbable, thus providing a principled way of distinguishing between candidate 
hypotheses. The approach potentially enriches the Minimalist Program of Chomsky 
(1995) in which inquiry into the nature of the language faculty proceeds with the 
working assumption that it is a perfect, non-redundant solution to the constraints 
imposed upon it by the systems with which it interfaces. This working principle, has 
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been adopted simply because it appears to yield results, but has lacked independent 
motivation. I have attempted to show that traditional arguments against motivating this 
principle in terms of the optimising effect of evolution are not compelling, and that 
perfection and elegance are indeed compatible with the process of natural selection 
under certain conditions (cf. §3.3.1). To demand that the perfection of language be 
related to adaptive functions would further restrict Minimalist theorising. As such, 
assumptions of evolutionary optimality may help to facilitate inquiry into the nature of 
the language capacity as well as its origins. 
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4 
The Evolution of Syntactic Universals 
Chapters two and three looked at syntactic universals and evolutionary explanations 
respectively. The current chapter examines the intersection of these two fields within 
the context of the language evolution literature more broadly, setting the concerns of the 
current thesis against this backdrop. 
4.1 Broader issues in the language evolution literature 
Much of the work on the evolution of language has ignored or postponed the issue of 
syntactic universals and concentrated on issues like dating the origin of language, the 
evolution of performance systems, the social function of language, or the 
neuroanatomical changes that accompanied its emergence. Work on the evolution of 
syntactic universals occurs within the broader context of this literature and similar 
methodological issues arise within it so it is reviewed here before focusing on the 
literature that touches most closely on the particular concerns of the current thesis. At 
each stage, it wi l l be instructive to review the kinds of evolutionary arguments used to 
address these questions and categorise them in the vocabulary developed in chapter 
three. 
4,1.1 Dating the origin of language 
In dating the origin of language, Lieberman's (1984) work on the evolution of the vocal 
tract has been very influential. Of particular interest are the developments that begin 
with archaic Homo sapiens from around 250,000 years ago, which involved the 
lowering of the larynx in the vocal tract. These changes, Lieberman argues, provide 
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evidence of speech because they had the effect of increasing the number of speech 
sounds that could be produced. These changes are interesting in light of an observation 
originally noted by Darwin about the choking hazard associated with the anatomy of the 
human vocal tract. Cziko (1995: 182) summarises this point: 
[U]nlike mammals thai maintain separate pathways for breathing and feeding, 
thus enabling them to breathe and drink at the same time, adult humans are at a 
much higher risk for having food enter their respiratory systems; indeed, many 
thousands die each year from choking ... The risk of choking to which we are 
exposed results from our larynx being located quite low in the throat. This low 
position permits us to use the large cavity above the larynx formed by the throat 
and mouth (supralaryngal tract) as a sound filter . . . We thus see an interesting 
trade-off in the evolution of the throat and mouth, with safety and efficiency in 
eating and breathing sacrificed to a significant extent for the sake of speaking. 
In other words, we should expect these vocal tract modifications to be selected against 
without a counterbalancing pressure favouring them. Archaic Homo sapiens must have 
been using their vocal tracts in ways that provided the necessary selection pressure to 
power their adaptation and the changes probably occurred soon after the selection 
pressure was introduced. Speech is assumed to be the most likely source of this 
pressure, but language must have reached a level of sophistication that made it 
reasonably important for reproductive success in order to counterbalance the choking 
hazard associated with the modem shape of the vocal tract. 
The vocal tract evidence suggests a lower limit on the timing of some form of 
spoken language at around 250,000 years ago. It is a lower limit because, as Pinker 
(1994: 389) has noted, "...e lengeege weth e smell nember ef vewels cen remeen quete 
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expresseve, so we cannot conclude that a hominid with a restricted vowels space had 
little language". Indeed, there appear to be modern languages with a comparable 
number of vowels. In Yimas for instance, "90 percent of all tokens of vowels are central 
vowels" (Foley, 1997: 71). Such languages may be possible, but that does not 
necessarily make them as efficient. Having access to a larger repertoire of sounds gives 
a speaker the ability to produce a greater number of distinct signals of a specified length 
so it is conceivable that such pressures drove the evolution of the vocal tract once 
speech had gained some evolutionary value. However, Fitch and Reby (2001) argue that 
a descended larynx could also be an adaptation for other things since it is not uniquely 
human. They also observe it in red and fallow deer and argue thai, in these cases a 
descended larynx, by lowering formant frequencies, was selected for as a way of 
exaggerating apparent body size. 
Changes in the vocal tract may or may not be evidence of the emergence of 
speech, but further evidence would be required to link this evolutionary event to the 
emergence of language itself. Manual sign languages do not make use of the vocal tract 
at all so could have predated spoken language as Corballis (1991) and others have 
suggested. Alternatively, the changes in the vocal tract might have occurred merely as a 
response to increased vocalisations that were more like the call systems of other species 
than human language, with a fully syntactic language coming later and making use of 
speech organs that were pre-adapted to the task. The vocal tract is part of the 
articulatory-perceptual system which interfaces with the computational system, hence 
the constraints imposed by it may have also infiuenced the evolution of the latter. This 
is to be expected of performance systems generally, a point which wil l be pursued in 
more detail later in this chapter. 
Lieberman (1984) was attempting to use the vocal tract evidence to date the 
origin of language, but in so doing, needed to establish that the descended larynx was 
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selected for speech. He appealed to design properties to do this, one of those properties 
being the choking hazard originally highlighted by Darwin (a concomitant trait 
associated with the lowering of the larynx), which he argued implies the existence of a 
counterbalancing benefit. To establish that this counterbalancing benefit was associated 
with speech, he argued that a descended larynx allows a greater variety of sounds to be 
produced. 
In principle, it would be possible to evaluate this hypothesis more rigorously by 
appealing to optimality considerations. If the descended larynx not only increases the 
variety of speech sounds that can be produced, but also satisfies the functions of the 
vocal tract optimally, then it would be surprising i f these were not the functions it was 
selected for. The optimal solution in this case would be some kind of compromise 
between the speech function and other functions such as breathing and digestion, but 
without further study, it is far from obvious what the ideal vocal tract characteristics 
would be for any of these functions, let alone what we should expect the perfect 
compromise to be like. 
4.1,2 The evolution of the performance systems 
As discussed in chapter two, a working hypothesis within Chomsky's (1995) Minimalist 
Program is that the computational system is an optimal solution to the constraints 
imposed on it by the performance systems with which it interfaces. I f this is correct, 
then an understanding of the functional pressures on the performance systems is likely 
to provide some important insights into the evolution of the computational system. A 
number of studies have looked at the evolution of the performance systems, though not 
necessarily from this perspective. These studies have looked at the articulatory-
perceptual side as well as the conceptual-intentional side, and also memory, which is 
necessarily used by both the 'performance' and computational systems. Indeed, any 
limitations on resources available to the computational system can be regarded as 
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arising from performance rather than competence issues, competence having only to do 
with the knowledge that the system embodies rather than how it is applied, though the 
question of how knowledge can be distinct from the processes that apply or extract it is 
ultimately a metaphysical one. 
On the articulatory-perceptual side, the aforementioned studies of the evolution 
of the vocal tract are examples. De Boer's (1997) work on the self-organisation of 
vowel systems is another. De Boer uses computational models to optimise the acoustic 
distinctiveness of vowel systems for communication over a noisy channel. In this 
model, pairs of simulated agents in a population engage in "imitation games" in which 
one member of the pair called the initiator produces a vowel sound chosen randomly 
from its repertoire which the other member attempts to match with one of the acoustic 
prototypes in its own repertoire. The closest match is then repeated back to the initiator 
and in turn matched against its acoustic prototypes. If the closest match corresponds to 
the sound that this agent originally uttered, the imitation game is judged to be 
successful, but i f it is different, it is judged to be a failure. The agents use failures to 
modify the formant"*^ characteristics of their acoustic models, to add entirely new 
vowels or to remove those that consistently lead to imitation failures. The signals 
produced by the agents also have some random noise added, which has the effect of 
causing failures when an agent possesses more than one acoustic model that comes 
close to matching the properties of the signal. Over time, the acoustic models of agents 
self-organise such thai they conform to those of the population at large while also being 
maximally distinct within the vowel space. The optimal dispersion of vowels 
throughout the vowel space is also typically observed in real languages. Hence, de Boer 
(1997) argues that something analogous to the process he models could explain it. 
•'^  Formants arc bands of high energy in the frequency spectra of vowel sounds. Differences in formanl 
frequency relationships correspond to differences in ihe perception of vowel quality (Ladefoged, 1993). 
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contrasting this explanation with ones that would account for the optimal distinctiveness 
as a genetic adaptation. 
However, as discussed in chapter three, demonstrating that there is a self-
organising explanation for the emergence of some property in development (either 
within an individual's lifetime or over a number of generations via cultural evolution) 
does not allow us to conclude that the property was not refined under genetic selection. 
In this case, a genetic mutation that for instance increased the fidelity of transmission so 
that less noise was introduced in exchanges between speakers would allow an agent to 
represent acoustic models that were more alike. In turn, this would mean that a larger 
number of acoustic models could be squeezed into the available vowel space. Hence, a 
muiani allele that increased fidelity could be viewed at a higher level as a gene 
controlling the number of vowels in the language. Likewise, a population of mutants 
who responded to successes in the way that de Boer's agents respond to failures would 
presumably not succeed in producing the optimal dispersion of vowels. Hence, the 
genes that control what happens when an imitation game fails can be viewed as genes 
for the optimal dispersion of vowels. In the real world, such genes may have been 
selected for this role. There are a wide range of functionalist explanations which seek to 
explain the existence of language universals in terms of semantic or pragmatic pressures 
rather than in terms of 'innate' or ^genetically determined' characteristics, but they all 
insist on the same dichotomy that de Boer embraces, and for that reason, prematurely 
exclude a role for genetic selection. 
De Boer's use of optimality appears to raise important questions for the 
optimality diagnostic i f optimality can arise for reasons other than successive genetic 
refinements. The difficulty arises because the mechanisms underiying learning and 
development also perform optimising processes. But since these mechanisms are 
themselves optimised by evolution, the outcomes are nearly always in alignment with 
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genetic fitness. Learning mechanisms that optimised behaviour in a way that routinely 
did more harm than good for instance, would not be selected. In this way the genes 
controlling the optimisation mechanisms can also be said to be genes for the traits those 
optimisation mechanisms produce. There is in fact no sense to a dichotomy of the kind 
that says a given trait T is either the result of developmental optimisations or genetic 
optimisations, but not both. 
Performance systems have also been studied on the conceptual-intention side, 
particulariy with reference to the conceptual capacities of non-human species. Heyes 
(1998) for instance, reviews the evidence for whether nonhuman primates possess a 
theory of mind, which it would seem would be a crucial prerequisite for being able to 
reconstruct the intentions of an interlocutor in communicative exchanges of the kind 
that characterise modem human language. 
4.1,3 The social functions of communication 
4 . 1 . 3 . 1 VERBAL GROOMING 
Dunbar (1993; 1996) has observed a linear correlation between the amount of time 
nonhuman primates spend grooming each other and mean group sizes. Given the time 
allocated to social grooming (as much as 18.9% of the day for Papio papio baboons) 
that could otherwise be utilised for feeding and other survival-related activities, he 
argues that it serves an important adaptive function and suggests that this function is to 
maintain group cohesion. This would explain why the time budget allocated to 
grooming increases with group size since the larger the group, the greater the number of 
relationships an individual needs to maintain. 
Dunbar argues that i f humans were to use the same strategy to maintain group 
cohesion, the group sizes observed in hunter-gatherer and traditional horticulturalist 
societies could only be achieved by placing prohibitively excessive demands on time. 
He argues that the emergence of linguistic communication could have arisen as a more 
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efficient strategy for maintaining group cohesion since speech can accompany other 
activities and can be directed at more than one individual at the same time. Language 
also allows individuals to learn about third parties without having to engage with them 
directly. Dunbar (1993) cites a number of pieces of evidence in support of this including 
a study of the content of conversations in a university refectory in which he found that a 
large proportion of conversation was devoted to a kind of 'gossip' used to reinforce 
social relationships. 38% of conversation concerned personal relationships while a 
further 24% concerned personal experiences. Both types of content, he regards as 
important in developing social knowledge and bonding. 
Dunbar extrapolates from a correlation between neocortex size and group size in 
non-primates to predict the expected group sizes of primitive humans. He uses this 
group size to calculate how much lime humans would need to devote to grooming to 
maintain group cohesion using the same strategy. There are interesting questions about 
the validity of claims about group sizes and expected grooming time allocations, but I 
wil l set these aside and concentrate on the specific claims about the role of language in 
usurping the social function of grooming. 
Dunbar (1993: 689) summarises what he sees as the link between the content of 
modem conversations and the evolutionary function of language as follows. 
The acquisition and exchange of information about social relationships is clearly 
a fundamental part of human conversation. The implication, I suggest, is that 
this was the function for which language evolved. 
There are a number of serious problems with this inference. Firstly, as we saw in the 
previous chapter, historical origins cannot be directly inferred from current utility. 
People who can be found conversing in university refectories allocate a vanishingly 
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small proportion of their lime to the defining activities of hunter-gatherers so we can 
hardly expect the content of modem conversation to reflect whatever ancient concerns it 
may have been selected for. Secondly, i f we were to take lime allocations to be an 
indicator of selective functions generally, then we would frequently find ourselves 
drawing rather absurd conclusions. In making inferences about the role of genitalia for 
instance, the amount of time they are utilised for sex relative to the time that they aren't 
would lead us to dramatically underrate their principal function. For the same reasons, 
we cannot conclude that because most conversations are of a certain type, these 
conversations served an important selective function. Gossip may simply be what the 
language faculty does in its downtime and hence be as frivolous as it appears to be. 
It is also far from obvious that language is a more efficient means of reinforcing 
social bonds. As Hauser, Gardner, Goldberg and Treves (1993) suggest, the bonding 
function of grooming may actually rely on it being costly to the groomer, since 
expending effort demonstrates personal commitment. Dunbar offers no panicular 
explanation why a communication system with the specific properties of human 
language would be especially suited to this function either. Social relationships could in 
principle also be reinforced by engaging in various other social activities that have the 
social benefits of spoken language without being as complex. Simple calls that allow a 
hearer to infer whether a speaker is a friend or foe such as the hisses and purrs of a cat 
would do. These calls could be produced while carrying out other tasks and could be 
directed towards multiple individuals simultaneously. A communication system as 
powerful as language with the ability to symbolise, communicate prepositional content, 
ask questions, speak about objects that are not present or hypothetical events, and so on 
would only be necessary to serve social functions that are not served by grooming such 
as gaining knowledge about other individuals without having to observe or interact with 
them directly. 
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It is also far from obvious what kind of evidence could falsify Dunbar's theory. 
As Deacon (1993: 699) notes, Dunbar's claim 
is yet another in a long line of reverse logic, *'just-so" stories about language 
evolution of the form: "Language makes X more efficient, therefore selection for 
X explains the origins of language/' Substitute your favourite fashionable X 
from a large range of possible alternatives (more efficient foraging, better 
transmission of past experience to offspring, stronger social cohesion for 
intergroup competition, more subtle and devious social-sexual manipulation, 
closer bonds between kin and sexual partners, etc.)... The generic quality of this 
argument excludes few alternatives and offers little in the way of explanation for 
the remarkable structural complexity and semiotic uniqueness of language as 
compared with other forms of communication. 
Indeed, other explanations for the correlation between group size and grooming are also 
easy enough to imagine. As the size of a group increases, an individual comes into 
contact with more conspeciflcs, who could potentially be carrying lice or other 
parasites. The increase in the amount of time spent grooming may be an adaptive 
response to this threat, regular and thorough checks allowing an infestation to be 
curtailed before it spreads out of control. The number of parasites found during 
grooming sessions might often be none, which again shouldn't be any indication that 
this is not its function. The number of weapons found by x-ray machines in airports is 
also extremely low, but that is still their purpose. The consequences of missing a 
weapon are serious, hence the need for vigilance. Likewise, a serious infestation of 
blood-sucking lice can lead to anaemia or the spread of various blood-bome diseases. 
Many mammals have special adaptations for grooming which highlight the seriousness 
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of the threat and while grooming may have a social function amongst primates, it is 
important to note that they are actually grooming, rather than just stroking, cuddling or 
fondling each other. Lemurs, like other primates, groom one another (Nakamichi & 
Koyama, 1997), but whatever social functions this behaviour serves wil l not directly 
explain why they have specially adapted grooming claws or why many also have lower 
incisor teeth that act as a comb (Rosenberger & Strasser, 1985). 
The social cohesion theory and the hygiene theory do in fact make different 
predictions. If the former is correct and grooming time increases with group size 
because individuals have to service more relationships rather than because they need to 
be more vigilant about parasite infestations, then we would not only predict more 
grooming in larger groups, but more variety in grooming partnerships. Dunbar (1993: 
687) himself cites evidence against this: 
The distribution of the data suggests that grooming does not necessarily function 
in such a way that each individual grooms with every other group member; 
rather ... it suggests that the intensity of grooming with a small number of 
'^special friends" (or coalition partners) increases in proportion to increasing 
group size. 
Social grooming may service relationships between conspecifics, but the evidence just 
cited suggests that its primary function has little to do with the specific social function 
of improving the cohesion of the broader group. Dunbar regards it as mysterious how 
this kind of grooming functions to integrate large primate groups, but fails to view it as 
counterevidence against his theory. On the other hand, if grooming time were 
determined by hygiene requirements, then we wouldn't necessarily expect the number 
of grooming partners to increase with group size because it wouldn't matter which 
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individuals were grooming each other so long as all members of the group were 
adequately checked. 
Whatever the link between grooming time and group size, the correlation is 
necessarily broken in modem humans, i f grooming served to reinforce social bonds, 
language might have been able to fu l f i l this role for group sizes beyond the practical 
limits of the grooming strategy, but a similar question also arises about how those 
practical limits would be exceeded i f ihe primary function of grooming relates to 
hygiene. If the hygiene theory is correct, we should expect to observe novel adaptations 
for avoiding parasite infestations when group sizes get as large as those of hunter-
gatherer societies. Indeed, this may be the long-sought explanation for what triggered 
human hairlessness."'^  
•'^Thc suggesiion that human hairlessness is an adaptation lo avoid parasites is not new, but as Morris 
(1967: 42) argued, Ihc theory has lacked a clear explanation for why our ancestors were more susceptible 
(o this problem than mammals that retain their fur coverings: 
One explanation is that when the hunting ape abandoned its nomadic past and settled down at 
fixed home bases, its dens became heavily infested with skin parasites. The use of the same 
sleeping places night after night is thought to have provided abnormally rich breeding-grounds 
for a variety of ticks, mites, fleas and bugs, to a point where the situation provided a severe 
disease risk. By casting off his hairy coal, the den-dweller was better able to cope with the 
problem. There may be an element of truth in this idea, but it can hardly have been of major 
importance. Few other den-dwelling mammals - and there are hundreds of species to pick from 
- have taken this step. 
Pagel and Bodmer (2003) argue that hair loss was a response to the problem of parasites, but only once 
humans acquired technological methods of regulating body temperature such as clothing and fire that 
would compensate for the lack of insulation. However, it appears that humans have evolved a layer of 
insulating subcutaneous fat to compensate for the loss of hair, as have aquatic mammals such as dolphins 
and whales (Morris. 1967). If technological innovations provided a substitute for hair, wc would not 
expect hair loss to continue to the point that a compensating adaptation of this kind would be required. 
Cross-infection risks associated with larger group sizes may partly explain hairlessness, but this 
could not be the only factor at play given the existence of the very many mammalian species that are 
untroubled by their fur coverings despite living in much larger groups. Wildebeests for instance migrate 
in herds numbering in the hundreds of thousands. However. Morris (1967: 31) notes that most herding 
animals are not parasitized by fleas because the flea "lays its eggs, not on the body of its host, but 
amongst the detritus of its victim's sleeping quarters" and "for at least the first month of its life a flea is 
cut off from its host species". This means that animals of a nomadic species will leave any flea eggs 
behind and will generally be untroubled by them. By contrast, den-dwelling animals such as humans are 
parasitized by fleas and, as Morris (1967: 36) notes, 
we have our own special kind of flea - one that belongs to a different species from other fleas, 
one that has evolved with us. If it had sufficient time to develop into a new species, then it must 
have been with us for a very long while indeed, long enough to have been an unwelcome 
companion right back in our carhcst hunting-ape days. 
119 
The evidence of a correlation between grooming lime and group size is no more 
supportive of the social cohesion theory than the hygiene theory and the kinds of 
evidence Dunbar (1993) uses to determine the selective functions of social grooming 
and language are too weak to have any confidence in his conclusions. The weaknesses 
become more apparent i f we apply the optimality diagnostic described in the previous 
chapter. I f grooming behaviour was primarily selected to reinforce social bonds, we 
should expect it to be optimal among similar strategies, but it is unclear why this 
function would be better served by grooming than other social activities observed in 
primates including other forms of physical contact such as cuddling. Likewise, there is 
nothing particularly remarkable about language that suggests it was specifically selected 
for the exchange of socially relevant information. This function does not lead us to 
predict specific qualities like hierarchical phrase structure, movement, case systems, 
agreement and so on. Dunbar's theory also requires that language would only replace 
grooming when the cost of the latter exceeds a certain threshold at which language 
becomes the more efficient strategy, but no explanation is given for why language 
would not also be a more efficient strategy for reinforcing social bonds in much smaller 
groups. By contrast, a hygiene theory of grooming would predict the transition to 
hairiessness to occur where the cost associated with parasite infestations and the 
grooming time required to combat them exceeds the thermal benefits of having a thick 
covering of hair, but there is no reason to expect the costs to tip the benefits in the same 
way all over the body. Indeed, the areas that retain a thick covering are the most vital 
for survival and reproduction so are precisely the areas that need the greatest protection 
from the cold. 
4 . 1 . 3 . 2 CULTURAL INHERITANCE 
The capacity for humans to imitate and communicate means that members of each new 
generation benefit from the accumulated wisdom of past generations without having to 
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rediscover everything for themselves. Isaac Newton captured this idea in a letter to 
Robert Hooke in 1676 with the words " f f I have seen farther, it is by standing on the 
shoulders of giants". Interestingly, the 'giants' who preceded Newton also deserve most 
of the credit for the substance of this very phrase itself Earlier versions of it are known 
to dale back at least to Bernard of Chanres in the twelfth century with the wording **We 
are like dwarfs standing upon the shoulders of giants, and so able to see more and see 
farther than the ancients" (Merton, 1993). Here we see that even Newton's task of 
expressing this idea was itself made easier by exposure to the cultural legacy he'd 
inherited, and by re-appropriating the idea as it had been passed down to him, he was 
unconsciously illustrating it. 
Dawkins (2006) argues that the reason humans are easily deceived into believing 
falsehoods during childhood is because our capacity to take cultural knowledge on trust 
is adaptive more often than it is maladaptive for the simple reason that it allows us to 
rapidly acquire a vast reservoir of knowledge accumulated by previous generations 
without having to expend the time and effort to rediscover it for ourselves. This 
argument parallels that of the choking hazard being an indicator of a counterbalancing 
benefit associated with a descended larynx, but in this case, the cost is associated with 
being vulnerable to deception and the counterbalancing benefit is argued to be access to 
the accumulated wisdom of previous generations. In the terminology adopted in the 
previous chapter, vulnerability to deception and access to accumulated wisdom would 
be 'concomitant traits'. 
Language isn't necessary for all forms of cultural transmission. It is possible to 
learn various customs and technologies simply by observing conspecifics. Nevertheless, 
language enables us to transmit knowledge about events and objects that are not directly 
present and which might be difficult or cosily to observe under normal circumstances. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Pinker and Bloom (1990) argued that the ability 
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to transmit propositional content was the selective function of grammar, but their 
argument relied on a diagnostic of selective function that was based on the complexity 
rather than the opiimality of its design, and it is far from obvious how their argument 
could be successfully recast in terms of the latter. Logicians have explored countless 
formalisms for encoding propositional content that differ quite substantially from the 
grammars of natural language, lacking characteristic properties such as case, agreement, 
movement, and tense, none of which appear to be especially important for expressing 
propositional content. Certain properties of natural language are nevertheless found 
within predicate calculus style formalisms. These include nested structure, quantifiers, 
pronoun-like variables and the distinction between predicates and arguments. Any 
attempt to argue that the transmission of propositional content was a relevant selective 
function would, at the very least, have to focus on these properties of grammar lo the 
exclusion of others that contribute nothing to this end. 
If language was selected for the capacity lo transmit knowledge from speaker to 
listener, a number of authors have raised the question of what adaptive benefit this 
would confer on the speaker (e.g., Ackley & Liiimann, 1994; Batali, unpublished; 
Cangelosi & Parisi, 1998; Hurford, 1999b). The benefit to the listener is taken to be 
obvious i f it allows knowledge to be acquired without having to discover it for oneself, 
but as Cangelosi and Parisi (1998: 85) ask, "[w]hat is the advantage of producing the 
signal to the individual that produces it? Why should an individual that produces the 
appropriate signals live longer and have more offspring than other individuals that fail 
to do so?"" 
Interestingly. Catania (1990: 730) makes virtually ihc opposite argument, that the primary function of 
language is »o change Ihc behaviour of others, thus explaining the beneni to speakers but not listeners: 
By talking, wc can change what someone else docs. Sometimes what gets done Involves 
nonverbal consequences, as when we ask someone to move something or to bring something to 
us. Sometimes it involves verbal consequences, as when we change what someone else has to 
say about something. 
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We could approach this from the point of view of kin selection, in which case 
providing information to listeners would confer an advantage to the speaker's genes i f 
the listeners are close kin because they would likely share copies of the speaker's 
speaking genes. Another way to account for it would be to invoke the idea of a social 
contract (helping others with the expectation of being helped in return). The benefits of 
this kind of cooperation would presumably outweigh the very low costs associated with 
providing information to others. Talk is cheap. 
But even a cursory examination of the public relations industry suggests that 
such theoretical manoeuvres are unnecessary. It simply isn't the case that speaking 
benefits the listener to the exclusion of the speaker. The daily flood of advertising 
messages to which people in developed' countries are exposed, provide an obvious 
counterexample. It is also the speaker, rather than the listener, who is the primary 
beneficiary in acts of boasting and other forms of propaganda, so the question of the 
speaker's advantage may not be as paradoxical as some have suggested. Nor is it the 
case that only one or the other benefits at any one time. In acts of persuasion and 
negotiation, both parties potentially benefit from the speaker's act simultaneously. The 
view that communication is a zero-sum game is simply an inappropriate model. 
4.1.4 The evolution of the linguistic brain 
The marked asymmetry in hominid brain anatomy is delectable from fossil endocasts of 
Homo habilis onwards (Tobias, 1987) and is argued to result from tool use in which the 
hands are used asymmetrically - the left hand being used to hold or stabilise an object, 
and the right hand being used to manipulate the object with a tool. This pre-existing 
hemispheric specialisation may provide clues as to why language also became one of 
the functions that is strongly lateralised, being processed predominantly in the left 
hemisphere for most people. 
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Deacon (1992) stresses that non-human primates do not lack regions found in 
the modem human brain. However, from the time of Homo habilis about two million 
years ago, the ratio of hominid brain to body size has been larger than for any other 
primate. The proportion of brain regions has also changed, the prefrontal region being 
disproportionately large in modem Homo sapiens. Considering the areas that are 
enlarged, Deacon (1992: 64) argues that 
This likely produced differences in functional dominance of prefrontal circuits 
over other cortical and subcortical circuits, enhancements of certain 
computational capacities (e.g., verbal short-term memory, combinatorial 
analysis, and sequential behavioural ability), and probably corresponding 
differences in predispositions to employ these functional strategies - but not 
qualitative differences in the kinds of neural calculations possible. These are 
very specific changes that can best be explained as a consequence of constant 
directional selection for the specific demands imposed by language processing. 
Deacon (1992, 1997) argues that as well as the brain evolving to support 
language, language use probably adapted to the pressures goveming its cultural 
transmission from generation to generation - the grammars and vocabulary items that 
flourished being those that were easiest to leam from available linguistic input. I f so, the 
changes in neural anatomy associated with language would in some sense reflect both 
the cause and effect of language use. 
Another area of research arguably relevant for understanding the neural substrate 
of language concerns an observation by Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese and Fogassi (1995) 
that neurons in an area of monkey cortex, homologous to Broca's area in humans, fire 
both when grasping and when observing another individual performing the same action. 
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Because of this property, Rizzolatti et al. (1995) label these mirror neurons and 
experimentally distinguish them from other neurons in the same area of cortex including 
those that only fire when a monkey performs the action itself in response lo the sight of 
a graspable object. 
Arbib (2002) argues thai the mirror system is important for understanding the 
evolution of language because some such system appears to be required to capture the 
fact that interiocutors share meanings. It is also compatible with gestural theories o f the 
origin of language since the Rizzolatti et al. (1995) evidence concerns the control of 
hand movements in monkeys in a brain area crucial for language processing in humans. 
Arbib (2002) also argues that this system is important for imitation, a skill which isn't 
well developed in monkeys but plausibly developed out of the mirror system. 
4.1,5 The evolution of the critical period in language 
acquisition 
A child can acquire multiple languages with native proficiency i f models of each are 
present in his or her linguistic environment in early life. But the capacity to acquire a 
language declines with age, the greatest success being generally achieved prior to 
puberty. Language learning in adulthood also progresses via quite a different course, 
suggesting that it relies on different processes (Lenneberg, 1967). The existence of a 
critical or sensitive period for language development presents a puzzle. If we assume 
that the capacity to acquire a language is adaptive, why shouldn't it persist throughout 
life? 
Hurford (1991) argues that the question of decline is wrongly formulated and 
that we should instead ask what selective advantage there is for a language acquisition 
capacity to exist at each stage of life. His view is that the existence of the capacity at a 
given stage requires an explanation in a way that the lack of the capacity at another 
stage does not. 
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Hurford (1991) developed a computational model to attempt to evolve critical 
period effects under the assumption that genetic variables can determine the ease with 
which language acquisition can occur at each stage of life. In his simulations, genes 
affecting language acquisition in early life were found to be under strong positive 
selection pressure, while those affecting later life stages were neither strongly favoured 
nor disfavoured, the capacity to acquire a language being by then mostly irrelevant. The 
result was that entities evolved that possessed language acquisition capacities that were 
only active in the earliest stages of life. 
In the model, the simulated 'genes' that determined the level of language 
acquisition capacity at each stage were shared to a large extent with those that 
determined it at earlier and later stages, ensuring that abrupt differences from one stage 
10 the next did not occur, but the capacity under genetic control otherwise had no 
continuity of existence, as i f individuals are disassembled and reassembled with a 
slightly modified plan at stage of life. The model did not allow the existence of the 
language acquisition capacity to be simply a vestige of earlier development in the way 
that a functionless womb persists in a post-menopausal woman. The model parameters 
were such that the language acquisition capacity would have to evolve independently 
for each life stage at which it contributed to fitness, with the exception that some 
smoothing would occur due to genes affecting development at one stage also affecting 
development at neighbouring stages. 
The simulations illustrated when, during the course of an individual's lifetime, a 
language acquisition capacity would positively contribute to fitness. However, the 
question of whether this capacity would actually be present at any given stage of life is a 
separate one which must be answered with reference to the history of an individual's 
development. Hurford's simulation model could have captured the inertia of an 
individual's life history by reinterpreting the combined genetic contribution at each life 
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stage as the change in language acquisition capacity rather than as the absolute value. 
This interpretation seems more plausible than the one he stipulated, and under such 
conditions, it is hard to see any reason why the capacity would decline once present, 
unless the decline was driven by natural selection, but Hurford (1991: 172) "can think 
of no plausible circumstances in which it would be advantageous to lose, or to have lost, 
the capacity." 
Elman's (1993) computational model of language acquisition provides one 
possible explanation. In this model, a recurrent neural network was trained to predict the 
next word in a text containing nested structures and other complex properties. Initial 
attempts failed, but in subsequent attempts, he found that appropriate generalisations 
could be obtained by effectively limiting the memory of the network. He did this by 
reselling the units in the context layer at semi-regular intervals, very frequently at first 
and then less so as the learning proceeded. This "starting small" approach had the effect 
of limiting the dimensionality of the optimisation problem, making it more tractable. 
Networks that started with large 'working memory' capacities were unable to acquire 
the structures contained in the input to anything like the same standard. Elman relates 
these findings to the observation that short-term memory capacity matures in childhood 
and argues thai it is these limitations that account for the critical period in language 
acquisition."*^ 
In evaluating this proposal, it is important to note that language development is 
far from alone in exhibiting a sensitive period. Other systems such as those involved in 
vision and audition also need to receive sensory input to develop normally. Such 
phenomena have been studied in a wide range of species. Elman's explanation for the 
sensitive period in language acquisition does not readily generalise to these other cases. 
Memory limitations would not explain why sensitive periods exist in the development 
•'^  Baddeley (1999) argues ihai it may be the rale of rehearsal in ihe phonological store that matures rather 
than memory span per se. but this would have the same effect of windowing the input so that fewer words 
are visible to the language system. 
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of vision for instance (at least, not in any obvious way). In principle, it is possible that 
the sensitive period in language acquisition exists for reasons that are entirely unlike 
those that account for the sensitive periods in other developmental contexts, but some 
scepticism about this is probably justified. 
Another problem for the '^starting small" theory is that it leads to the prediction 
that bilingualism should only be possible i f both languages are literally acquired at a 
matched pace, since under the theory, 'working memory' capacity would limit the 
complexity of sentences that can be comprehended in one language to the same extent 
that it would in the other. But this is simply not the case - an infant can be at the stage 
of comprehending and producing quite complex structures in one language while just 
beginning to acquire the basic structures of another. So long as both languages are 
acquired within the sensitive period, there will generally be no problem attaining 
fluency in both, regardless of whether or not they are acquired exactly in parallel. It is 
far from obvious how such facts could be reconciled with a view of language 
acquisition as being dependent on the increase of 'working memory' capacity or indeed 
any other variable that would affect cognition globally. 
A proposal of the kind Elman presents would nevertheless resolve one apparent 
paradox. It would explain how the decline in sensitivity could arise as a by-product of 
selection. Again, this would be a case of an apparently maladaptive consequence (losing 
the language acquisition capacity) being offset by a counterbalancing benefit (gaining a 
more tractable learning regime for first language acquisition and better 'working 
memory' capacity in adulthood). Nevertheless, there are altematives that could allow us 
to attribute a selective benefit to the decline directly. 
I f a system ceases to be of use beyond a certain age, it would make no 
evolutionary sense to continue to devote resources to its maintenance. It may even make 
sense to actively disable the system so that it cannot consume metabolic resources that 
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could be better spent elsewhere. Examples of organisms shedding juvenile 
characteristics are not hard to find. One example is the sea squirt, which in its juvenile 
state, 
wanders through the sea searching for a suitable rock or hunk of coral to cling to 
and make its home for life. For this task, it has a rudimentary nervous system. 
When it finds its spot and takes root, it doesn't need its brain anymore so it eats 
it! (Dennett, 1991: 177) 
It is conceivable that the language acquisition device receives similar treatment after its 
period of usefulness expires, the cells that comprise it literally dying of f so that their 
nutrients can be reabsorbed into the body. 
Another explanation might be that sensitive periods are simply the timeframe 
during which certain kinds of finite neural resources are consumed. As an analogy, we 
could imagine an employee who is on call, being paid wages regardless of whether he or 
she is actually called into service. The employee wil l continue to be paid while there is 
funding available, but once it runs out, he or she can no longer be called upon to 
perform the service. There may be a neural resource analogous to this funding, which 
simply dries up over time even i f the relevant developmental programme is never 
enacted. This resource may relate to what is referred to as ^plasticity', although a proper 
treatment of what this deceptively simple term may mean is beyond the scope of the 
present review. A variation on the same idea would be that there is a finite resource, 
which is competitively consumed by different developmental processes in the brain so 
that i f a particular process is prevented from making use of the resource, others wi l l 
eventually end up consuming its budget. The competition might be for control over 
cortical area, which can be carved up and rewired to suit various different sensory-
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motor or higher-level functions. Sensitive periods would necessarily exist i f such 
resources are finite, and more noticeably so for those developmental processes that have 
higher budgetary demands. 
Evolutionary simulations of the kind employed by Hurford (1991) are inherently 
compatible with a methodology based on opiimaliiy considerations. Simulations model 
the traits that undergo optimisation and the selective functions by which their fitness is 
evaluated. Running them will produce entities possessing traits that are optimised for 
these functions and i f these trails are observed in the real world, then the results of such 
simulations can be used to support claims that the selective functions embodied in them 
have relevance for the evolution of corresponding real-world phenomena. 
4.1,6 Stages in the evolution of language 
Bickerton (1990) draws parallels between the language of infants in the telegraphic 
stage of language development, pidgin speakers, adults who were deprived of language 
as children and language-trained apes. He equates these with a hypothesised stage in the 
evolution of language which he dubs protolanguage and argues that it provides the 
foundation on which fully syntactic language is built. Bickerton argues that the earlier 
appearance of this kind of language in ontogeny is evidence that the development of 
fully syntactic language rests on its foundation and must also therefore have come later 
in evolution. He further supports this by arguing that people fall back onto it under 
various social conditions such as when forced to communicate outside of one's native 
language as well as when people suffer brain damage that results in Broca's aphasia. 
Bickerton argues that the transition from protolanguage lo fully syntactic 
language must have occurred quite abruptly given the abruptness of the analogous 
transitions observed in child language development and creolisation. This would be 
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possible if, in the space of genetic varianis, ihey are actually quite close to each other 
despite the dramatic difference in the phenotypes. 
As discussed in chapter three, optimalily considerations wil l allow us to assume 
that variants sit atop peaks in the fitness landscape, but wil l say nothing about the 
direction from which evolution has scaled these peaks. Nevertheless, they can allow us 
to make inferences about functional pressures that may have existed in the past i f a trait 
is optimal for a function that it no longer serves. In such cases, they may be a useful 
source o f evidence for reconstructing evolutionary history. I f an argument along these 
lines could be developed, it may reinforce Bickerton's protolanguage theory. 1 wi l l 
return io these issues in chapter five, which concerns a key aspect of what could be 
interpreted as the transition from protolanguage to full syntax. 
4.2 The evolution of syntactic universals specifically 
Many studies have also looked specifically at the evolution of grammar and its features. 
The evidence available to these inquiries is generally even more limited than many of 
the aforementioned studies. As Botha (2003) observes, many of them also lack a 
restrictive theoretical framework with which to assess the hypotheses they entertain. 
4.2. J Sequential motor control representations exapted for 
syntax 
Lieberman (1985, 1991) argues that the neural mechanisms used to encode syntactic 
structures were exapted from mechanisms used in serial motor control, from the motor 
control of hand movements to the motor control of speech and then to syntax.''^ 
Evidence in support of this is that the areas of the brain most associated with grammar 
also appear to be implicated in the motor control of speech (see also Deacon, 1997), 
However, Bickerton (1998), Hurford (1999b) and Botha (2003) regard Lieberman's 
Kimura (1979) and Calvin (1983) have also made similar suggestions. 
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emphasis on sequential processing to be simplistic, since it fails to appreciate that 
syntactic representations are not merely representations of word order, but of nested 
hierarchical structure. Lieberman's account could be strengthened i f it could be 
demonstrated that syntactic representations are optimally suited to the representation of 
sequences, or that they are as suited as one might expect i f the mechanisms involved 
were previously selected for sequential processing and only slightly modified under 
selection for their new function. Indeed, a novel proposal of this kind is presented in 
chapter six in which I argue that the nested hierarchical structure of syntactic 
representations is a by-product of selection for the ability to perform certain kinds of 
operations on sequences. 
4-2; 2 Conceptual structure exapted for syntax 
Wilkins and Wakefield (1995) argue that the brain utilises non-modality specific 
conceptual structures that are hierarchically organised and govern a wide variety of 
processes including those involved in motor control (see also Greenfield, 1991), arguing 
that it was these conceptual structures that were exapted for syntax. In a similar vein, 
Bickenon (1998) and Calvin & Bickerton (2000) argue that the particular aspects of 
conceptual structure involved in keeping track of the social calculus of who did what to 
whom provided the foundations of linguistically represented aspects of predicate-
argument structure, namely thematic roles. These proposals are essentially speculative, 
relying mostly on analogy rather than evidence. As with Lieberman's claims, they could 
be strengthened i f it could be shown that the traits in question are of something like the 
optimal form for serving their previous functions. 
4.2.3 Syllable structure exapted for syntax 
Carstairs-McCarthy (1999) identifies a number of similarities between the structure of 
syllables and the structure of simple sentences, which leads him to suggest that 
representations of the latter were co-opted from representations that previously evolved 
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for the former. One of the key parallels is that both have an asymmetrical structure, as 




subjeci verb phrase 
nucleus coda verb object 
A syllable always has a nucleus, which is defined as a sonority peak, in most cases 
consisting of a vowel, but in some cases, a sonorous consonant. The nucleus may be 
preceded by one or more consonants comprising the onset. It may also be followed by 
one or more consonants comprising the coda. The nucleus and the coda together form a 
unit called the rhyme to the exclusion of the onset. 
The structures illustrated in (1) were inferred on the basis of distinct evidence in 
the fields of phonology and syntax. The asymmetry in the stniciure of sentences was 
inferred from constituency tests of the sort reviewed in chapter two. In the case of 
syllables, the psychological reality of the asymmetry is universally reflected in the 
experience of alliteration (where syllables have identical onsets but different rhymes) 
and rhyming (where syllables have different onsets but identical rhymes). Similar 
effects are not obtained with pairs of syllables that possess patterns of similarity that are 
the mirror image of these combinations (i.e., where the syllables have identical codas 
but different onset-nucleus sections, or vice versa). The asymmetry is also suggested by 
the presence of spoonerism in speech, which are slips o f the tongue such as "dat and 
cog" in place of "cat and dog". These involve exchanging the onsets of a pair of 
syllables, but the analogous situation involving codas does not seem to occur readily, i f 
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ai ail (e.g., "cag and doi"). The implication is thai the nucleus is more lightly bound to 
the coda than to the onset. 
Carsiairs-McCarthy (1999: 162) argues that " [ i ] f we reject the syllabic model for 
syntactic evolution, there is no obvious reason apart from historical accident why this 
subject-object asymmetry should exist". But there doesn't appear to be any obvious 
reason why the onset-coda asymmetry should exist either, so the question that would 
remain is of exactly the same order as the one this manoeuvre is designed to explain. 
Indeed, what is missing under his exapiationist account is any justification that the traits 
in question evolved under selection for phonology. It may be that the curious 
asymmetry of syllables is a vestige of representations that were themselves co-opted 
from yet another domain. 
Aside from the asymmetry in (1), Carstairs-McCarthy (1999: I48f0 lists a 
number of other parallels between syllables and sentences. The central ones are 
summarised in (2) below. 
2. a. Nuclei are obligatory in syllables and verbs are obligatory in sentences. 
b. The phonemes that can fill onsets and codas are drawn from a similar set 
. (consonants), which does not include phonemes that generally fill the nucleus 
(vowels and sonorous consonants), and in the kind of sentences that Carstairs-
McCarthy appears to have in mind, the elements appearing before and after the 
nucleus-like position are also drawn from a similar set (essentially noun 
phrases), while the nucleus-like position is filled by elements of a different kind 
(verbs). 
c. Onsets have a "privileged" status compared to codas that subjects also possess 
in sentences. 
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Carstairs-McCarthy (1999: 149) observes that in some languages, codas are not 
permitted on syllables, but that no such constraint is placed on onsets in any language. 
This, he says, gives onsets a privileged status in the syllable. As for the correspondence 
with sentences, he says "the onset-like position is ... privileged in that, unlike the coda-
like position, it occurs in all languages, and most sentences contain it ." The claim that 
there are languages that disallow coda-like positions (direct objects) in sentences is 
unreferenced, and 1 have been unable to find any evidence in support of it. A second 
reason he says onsets are privileged is because the phonemes that appear at troughs in 
sonority could in principle be analysed as part of the coda of one syllable or as part of 
the onset of the next, but are instead universally grouped with the onset. However, the 
"privilege" that onsets have over codas in determining syllable boundaries has no 
obvious analogue in sentences - at least, none that Carstairs-McCarthy makes explicit. 
The other aspect of privilege (quoted above) was that "most sentences contain [the 
onset-like position]". On many accounts, clausal subjects are indeed obligatory,**** but 
the same is not true of onsets. I f onsets and subjects are each "privileged" in some 
sense, they appear to be so for an essentially disjoint set of reasons.'" Referring to both 
as "privileged" invites a comparison that does not appear to hold up under scrutiny. 
As Carstairs-McCarthy notes, there are at least four ways to account for the 
similarities between syllables and sentences. First, the similarities may be coincidental, 
the properties in question having arisen independently. Second, syntactic 
representations may have influenced phonology. Third, phonological representations 
may have influenced syntax. And fourth, both syntactic and phonological 
representations may have co-opted representations that evolved in a third and as-yet 
unidentified domain. 
**° I presem an allcmaiivc explanation for the obligatoriness of subjects in chapter five as one of the 
consequences derived from the theory presented there. 
This is at least true for the reasons Carsiairs-McCarthy (1999) cites for assigning Ihem this status 
(according to my reading of his work), but there may ycl be homologous privileges that have so far 
escaped attention. 
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His case for eliminating the first option involves arguing that the parallels 
between syllables and sentences are too close to have arisen by chance and, since he 
does not see how the traits in question could be adaptive, he argues that convergent 
evolution could not explain them either. Of the remaining options, he argues for the 
priority of phonological representations on the basis that it meshes well with the broader 
theory of language evolution he presents, in which phonological developments play a 
central role. 
Drawing on a broad range of evidence, Carstairs-McCanhy (1999) argues that a 
cascade of evolutionary events was triggered by the lowering of the larynx in the vocal 
tract. The newfound capacity to produce a larger range of speech sounds, coupled with a 
pre-existing disposition (discemable in language trained apes) to assign distinct 
meanings to distinct signs (synonymy avoidance) led, under this account, to a 
proliferation of new meanings being acquired. 
There are immediate difficulties with this account. The number of distinct 
phonemes in a language is not a good indicator of vocabulary size since a modern 
language wil l possess only a very small set of them. The phonetic alphabet used in the 
New Oxford English Dictionary for instance, consists of only 23 vowels (including 
diphthongs and triphthongs) and 25 consonants, which is sufficient to encode the 
pronunciations of all of its 350,000 entries (with the exception of some words of foreign 
origin). This is a far greater number of lexemes than wil l typically be found in an 
English speaker's vocabulary, but average vocabulary size is still several orders of 
magnitude larger than the number of phonemes in any human language. This is because 
it is not so much the number of phonemes in a language, but the combinatorial 
possibilities that arise from being able to string them together into distinct words that is 
important. This ability to create meaningful signals by combining meaningless ones in 
different ways is called the duality of patterning. Having more speech sounds would 
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clearly increase the combinatorial possibilities, but the importance of the number of 
phonemes pales in comparison with the effect of the duality of patterning. 
If an increase in vocabulary size conferred a selective advantage, then lifting a 
constraint on its enlargement would allow natural selection to take its course. I f we 
assume for the sake of argument that the relevant constraint was indeed the limitation 
on the number of distinct speech sounds that could be produced, then the lowering of 
the larynx could have been the enabling condition. However, the enormous vocabularies 
possessed by modem humans are much larger than we appear to need. In this respect, 
we can sympathise with Premack's (1986: 133) conclusion that '*[h]uman language is an 
embarrassment for evolutionary theory because it is vastly more powerful than one can 
account for in terms of selective fitness." Carslairs-McCarthy (1999: 132) does not 
attempt to provide an adaptive explanation for vocabulary expansion, instead arguing 
that synonymy avoidance drove it once the restriction imposed by vocal tract anatomy 
was lifted: 
In the partnership between meaning and sound, sound may sometimes take the 
lead, so as to stimulate the discovery of new meanings. I am not suggesting that, 
as language evolved, exiralinguistic meanings were accumulated arbitrarily. We 
need to distinguish between the pressure for vocabulary expansion to take place 
and the directions in which this expansion might proceed. There is plenty of 
scope in this scenario for cognitive, social, cultural and technological factors to 
exert an influence ... Al l I am suggesting is that, thanks to inherited synonymy-
avoidance principles, the capacity for a much larger .repertoire of distinct 
vocalizations introduced a new kind of pressure for this expansion to take place. 
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Carstairs-McCarthy does not explain why synonymy avoidance would require the 
spoken modality to drive vocabulary expansion rather than language expressed in 
another modality such as hand gestures. Indeed, the evidence cited by Carstairs-
McCarthy that led him to conclude that non-human primates also use synonymy-
avoidance principles is actually based on non-verbal communication in chimpanzees. 
The main source of evidence for his exaptaiionist claims is structural parallels, 
but as Botha (2003) observes, Carstairs-McCarthy does not present his claims within a 
restrictive theory of exaptation that .cleariy specifies the conditions under which we 
should attribute the status of exaptation to a trait. The question of whether structural 
parallels are sufficient for this purpose and how close they would have to be for 
something to warrant the label 'exaptation' are not adequately addressed. 
By contrast, an optimality approach would test exaptaiion claims in a very 
specific way, namely by testing whether the properties in question are optimal for the 
functions they are hypothesized to have served in the past rather than those they serve in 
the present. 
A key feature of Carstairs-McCarthy's approach is to enumerate various 
conceivable language systems to illustrate how things could have been different had 
evolution taken a different course. In this respect, his work resembles an optimality 
approach since enumerations of this sort are essentially what is required when 
reconstructing a plausible strategy set, which the reader will recall from chapter three is 
the set of imagined variants that are in the neighbourhood of the observed type on the 
fitness landscape. However, Carstairs-McCarthy uses these enumerations to different 
ends, namely to illustrate that certain properties of language, which seem to be 
intrinsically important are not in fact necessary for serving certain functions. 
Although Carstairs-McCarthy's (1999) work tends to raise more questions than 
it answers, the questions it raises are nevertheless interesting. 
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4.2,4 Compositionality 
Kirby (2001) uses computational models to explore the effect of language learning 
under conditions that impose strict limits on the amount of linguistic data to which 
simulated agents are exposed. The model involves the transmission of linguistic 
knowledge from simulated parents to simulated children and demonstrates that i f data 
available for reconstructing the language of the teacher are limited, languages become 
optimised over many generations for transmission fidelity, with the best language 
systems being those that can be most reliably reconstructed under the constraints 
imposed by the "learning bottleneck". The optimal languages are compositional, 
meaning that their expressions have discemable parts that can be syntactically combined 
in different ways to generate expressions.'*" In a compositional language, the number of 
symbols that can be combined to make expressions is much smaller than the number of 
possible expressions, but in a non-compositional language, the number of symbols 
required is as many as there are possible expressions. A compositional language is 
therefore more likely to be transmitted faithfully from generation to generation than a 
non-compositional one because it reduces the burden on the language learner. 
To consider a real example, consider the large set of distinct terms used to 
identify baby animals, a selection of which are summarised in (3). The problem with 
having a distinct vocabulary item for each type of these becomes paniculariy apparent 
for the animals we rarely discuss such as leverets (baby hares) and elvers (baby eels). A 
compositional way of referring to the young of a species S would be to apply the 
template "baby S'* and this is indeed the solution that many of us wil l fall back on when 
unable to summon one of the more obscure lerms."^ "* 
Similar results have been obtained in a computational model by Batali (2000) and a mathematical 
model by Nowak, Komarova and Niyogi (2001). 
The same situation arises for colleciivc terms such as herd, flock, shoal, colony, gaggle, pride and so 
on, that could otherwise be referred to using the compositional template "group of S". 
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3. Terms for baby animals and their compositional equivalents 
ANIMAL ACTUAL TERM COMPOSITIONAL TERM 
cat kitten baby cat 
dog puppy baby dog 
cow calf baby cow 
sheep lamb baby sheep 
goat kid baby goat 
kangaroo joey baby kangaroo 
duck duckling baby duck 
goose gosling baby goose 
swan cygnet baby swan 
hare leveret baby hare 
eel elver baby eel 
The learning bottleneck makes rare terms particulariy difficult to learn. However, 
possessing a compositional language comes at the cost of having to produce longer 
expressions, incorporating this cost into his model, Kirby (2001) found that short non-
compositional expressions emerged for the meanings that were most frequently used, 
while less frequent meanings were expressed compositionally. This accords well with 
the observation that irregularity and frequency of use are indeed highly correlated in 
natural languages. 
Like de Boer's (1997) model discussed in section 4.1.2, Kirby's (2001) model is 
intended to show that natural selection in the genetic domain is unnecessary to explain 
the optimaliiy of properties of language (in this case, of compositional syntax). But, as 
with de Boer's model, it is easy to imagine the model's language learners being 
different in some way that would make it impossible for them to acquire compositional 
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languages. In the model, ihey are equipped with an induction algorithm that associates 
meanings with expressions. Part of this algorithm involves a procedure to make 
generalisations over expression-forming rules, which has the effect of replacing non-
compositional rules with compositional ones. Clearly, i f the agents lacked this aspect of 
the algorithm, compositional languages would fail to emerge. Therefore, i f there is a 
genetic difference such that variants possessing a certain allele had the generalisation 
algorithm and variants without it didn't, then we would be justified in referring to this 
allele as a gene for compositional syntax and one which may have been genetically 
selected for this capacity. The observation that a compositional language only emerges 
after a period of cultural evolution would not make it any less a phenoiypic effect of this 
gene. 
That compositional languages appear to be optimal for transmission fidelity 
provides strong support that they have been selected for this function in cultural 
evolution. This follows from the logic of the optimality diagnostic, which is just as 
applicable in the cultural domain as it is in the genetic domain. However, we cannot 
conclude that since it is optimised under cultural selection that it is not also optimal 
under genetic selection. 
4.3 Summary 
The purpose of this chapter was to review the methods used in studies of the evolution 
of language and position the concerns of the current thesis within the context of other 
kinds of inquiries in this area, such as those concerned with dating the origin of 
language, the evolution of the performance systems, the social functions of language, 
the evolution of the linguistic brain, and the evolution of the critical period for language 
acquisition. It also examined a number of studies concerned with the evolution of 
syntactic properties specifically. 
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From a methodological point of view, the studies differed both with respect to 
the types of evolutionary explanations proposed and the types of evidence that were 
utilised. The studies included claims about exapiation, concomiiancy and cultural 
evolution as well as the selective functions of the imhs they examined. The evidence 
used to support these claims drew on sources such as the fossil record, comparisons 
between related species, neuroanatomical studies, observations of the modem uses of 
traits, and in some cases oplimaliiy considerations, typically in the studies involving 
computational and mathematical modelling. 
None of the studies reviewed discuss optimality as a diagnostic of selective 
function directly, but questions of design opiimality are nevertheless lurking in many of 
them, even i f not actually surfacing explicitly. For instance, in dating the emergence of 
spoken language, optimality considerations are central to Lieberman's reasoning. In this 
case, it was the 5H/?-optimality of the design from the point of view of the associated 
choking hazard that was used to argue in favour of a counterbalancing benefit. 
Claims about exaptation can also be couched in terms of optimality, considering 
that a claim about any given exaptation event can be decomposed into two distinct 
claims, as in (3). 
3. a. Trait T was originally selected for function F. 
b. Trait T currently serves function F'. 
Claims of the type in (3b) can be readily verified from present-day observations while 
claims of the form (3a) are indistinguishable from those about the selective function of 
an adaptation and hence, as with other claims about selective functions, lead to 
predictions about optimality. The situation would initially appear more complex i f what 
is being claimed is that an exaptation event was followed by some adaptive 
142 
modifications that enhanced the new function, but whatever differences exist between 
the original trait and the modified variant cannot have any bearing on what was exapled, 
so exaptaiion claims needn't make reference to them. 
Optimality considerations also arise in connection with learning, development 
and cultural evolution, the final stales of each of these processes being obtained through 
optimisations. The optimality diagnostic can also be used to lest which functions these 
optimising processes are optimising, but as discussed in connection with both de Boer's 
(1997) work on the evolution of vowel systems, and Kirby's (2001) work on the 
evolution of compositional syntax, evidence of optimality in these domains does not 
mean that an optimisation in the genetic domain has not also occurred. 
Computational models are a very useful tool for assessing optimality claims 
allowing researchers to explore the complex effects of model parameters on 
evolutionary processes. For a more thorough review of computational methods used in 
language evolution studies, see Turner (2002). 
This chapter also touched on some of the empirical concerns of the remainder of 
this thesis. The issue of large vocabulary sizes arose in reviewing Carstairs-McCarthy 
(1999) and the pressures that a large vocabulary places on neural resources plays a 
central role in chapter five. In chapter five, a theory is developed about the role of 
closed-class items which may also motivate aspects of what, in Bickerton's (1990) 
terms, would be the transition from protolanguage to fu l l syntax. And in chapter six, the 
representation of sequences (discussed here in connection with Lieberman (1985, 
1991)) has a central role to play in explaining the emergence of nested phrase structure. 
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5 
Closed-class items and the lexicon 
There are many thousands of distinct words in the vocabulary of a typical adult. We 
should therefore expect the representation of the lexicon to place a significant demand 
on metabolic and other kinds of neural resources that could otherwise be utilised for 
other purposes. This cost was presumably offset for our ancestors by some benefit 
associated with having a large vocabulary, but regardless of what that benefit was (a 
question that wi l l not be addressed here), we should expect there to be a strong selection 
pressure to make lexical representations as efficient as possible. The pressure for 
streamlined lexical entries may introduce costs associated with the loss of redundancy, 
which as Chomsky (1995: 29) notes, may help "to compensate for injury and defect". In 
the absence of such costs, we should expect the optimal lexicon to be essentially just a 
repository of exceptions, something we should also expect on Minimalist assumptions 
(Chomsky, 1995). This chapter examines how the existence of closed-class vocabulary 
items could have improved the efficiency of lexical representations and applies the 
optimality diagnostic outlined in chapter three to assess whether closed classes were 
indeed selected for this role. 
5.1 Closed-class items as an adaptation 
In chapter three, I argued that plausible candidates for the selective function of a given 
trait would be those for which it exhibits improbable local optimality along available 
dimensions of variation. In the present context, the trait in question is closed-class items 
and hence the only dimensions of variation that need be examined are those affecting 
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their existence. If the currently instantiated characteristic is improbably optimal in terms 
of a given candidate function that varies over these dimensions, then we would not be 
able to rule it out as having a role in selection. 
I wil l apply the optimality diagnostic of chapter three to two candidate functions. 
The first function follows predictably from the discussion up to this point and relates the 
strategy set to the level of redundancy in represenlaiions of syntactic features, with the 
optimal strategies being those in which redundancy is minimised. I wil l then turn to a 
second function which concerns the level of redundancy in representations of meaning, 
the optimal strategies being those in which no two lexical entries share the same 
meaning. 
5.1.1 Redundancy in representations of syntactic distributions 
Recall from chapter two (§2.3) that word classes are most clearly differentiated on the 
basis of their syntactic distributions rather than semantic criteria. In this sense, a set of 
words can be judged to form a grammatical class i f one member can be substituted for 
any other in sentences without altering their grammaticality status. In these terms, the 
question of how a lexeme's category is encoded in its lexical entry reduces to one of 
how its syntactic distribution is encoded. 
In principle, this information could be encoded in a variety of different ways. It 
may be that each lexeme encodes its own syntactic distribution independently of every 
other and that it is only because some encode similar or identical distributions that we 
take them to form a class. Alternatively, each member of a class might instead derive its 
membership via a reference to a single instance of the information that describes the 
syntactic distribution of the class as a whole.**^ Radford (1988: 63) argues for the latter 
view on leamability grounds: 
•'^  The difference between ihese two possibiliiies is noi withoui consequences. Under the latter view, it 
ought to be possible to consiruci a taxonomy of categories such that they are neatly nested inside one 
another rather than freely intersecting, the latter being a possibility if categories simply derive from 
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[ l ] f every word had its own utterly idiosyncratic set of linguistic properties, then 
the task of acquiring competence in a language would be an impossible one 
(within the constraints that the child operates under). By contrast, i f words are 
grouped into a small finite set of categories, and i f phonological, morphological, 
syntactic and semantic rules are all category-based, then the child's acquisition 
task is enormously simplified. 
This is because the language learner who assumes that words belong to 
categories can generalise syntactic knowledge acquired about one word to every other 
member of the class to which it belongs. This means that the full syntactic behaviour of 
a class of words can be determined without having to observe every member of that 
class in every allowable context. 
The category-based view would also be preferred on Minimalist grounds since, 
by offloading the distributional information repeated in every lexical entry to a separate 
category representation, the system would eliminate redundancy. At first glance, this 
theoretical manoeuvre would appear to require positing an additional and qualitatively 
different kind of representation that pairs a category label with associated information 
about its syntactic distribution in a kind of lookup table, but this is not necessary. A l l 
that is required is that the distributional information be offloaded to a separate 
representation, but representations of the required type are already among the theoretical 
apparatus available. The separate representation could simply be a further lexical entry 
that has an association with lexical entries belonging to the class in question. For 
instance, the distributional information for the class of nouns could be offloaded to the 
lexical entry for a closed-class item that heads a functional projection encapsulating 
feature specifications. It is not clear that this is necessarily the case, but it is not possible to explore the 
details of this prediction here. 
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noun phrases, the distribution of noun phrases thereby being determined indirectly by 
the distribution of the encapsulating projection. The diagram in (1) summarises the 
various theoretical positions described. 
I . 
The syntactic disiribulion 
of a class is... 
. .redundantly encoded .. .non-redundanily encoded 
in the lexical entries of in a single representation 
each of its members from which its members 
separately. derive their behaviour. 
These category 
representations are... 
.just other lexical .. .not just other 
entries. lexical entries. 
The relative parsimony of the lexical entry theory of category representations 
compared with its alternative is also evident in the way in which each theory must deal 
with subdivisions within a grammatical class between sets of words that have 
overlapping but non-identical syntactic distributions. There are, for instance, 
subdivisions within the class of nouns such as between those that are countable and 
uncountable and within the class of verbs between those that are transitive and 
intransitive, as well as many other such distinctions. Verbs in particular have many 
subtypes. If each subclass has a separate entry in something akin to a lookup table for 
categories (as required by a non-lexical theory), then some of the information contained 
in these entries would be redundantly repealed. This would be the information that gives 
each subclass its characteristically verb-like properties such as the ability to take tense 
and agreement morphology - properties that hold true for every type of verb. This 
redundancy could of course be offloaded to a further representation in a further lookup 
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table for categories of categories and so on ad infinitum, but the conceptual problems 
with this solution should be fairly evident. By contrast, under the lexical entry theory, 
this redundancy could be avoided simply by positing a lexical entry for the head of a 
further encapsulating projection that groups subclasses within a broader class. This is 
consistent with the view - adopted within the Minimalist tradition and theories ancestral 
to it (e.g., Abney, 1987; Grimshaw, 2005; Larson, 1988) - that there are layers of 
functional projections stacked inside one another.**^ This structure has been postulated 
for reasons that are independent of the present concerns about the evolutionary role of 
these encapsulating projections, but the fact that this structure could be used to 
minimise redundancy in representations of distributional information suggests an 
answer to the evolutionary question that I wil l now elaborate in detail. 
Selection against redundancy in representations of syntactic distributions is 
plausibly relevant for explaining the existence of closed-class items. By encapsulating 
lexical items, projections headed by closed-class items mediate grammatical relations so 
that fewer syntactic features need to be represented for each open-class entry in the 
lexicon. For instance, learning that a noun is associated with determiners could allow a 
noun, encapsulated within a determiner phrase, to be used wherever a determiner phrase 
can be used, including the subject or object of a sentence and so forth without having to 
learn and encode this distributional information separately for each noun, the 
information instead being encoded in the lexical entries of the small number of 
determiners. 
The introduction of entries for closed-class items into the lexicon must introduce 
a certain amount of cost, but so long as the number of closed-class items is small, their 
cost would presumably be more than offset by the reduction in the amount of 
•'^  For some detailed proposals wiihin a Minimalisi framework, sec Rizzi (1997). 
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information thai needs lo be encoded in the entries for the very many more open-class 
items. 
For closed-class items to be of any use in this way, it would have to be the case 
that there is a positive correlation between the amount of information a lexical entry 
contains and the number of distinct syntactic environments it can appear in (i.e., the 
items it can be in construction with and checked against).'** The simplest hypothesis that 
could be made along these lines is that this syntactic behaviour is determined by a set of 
formal features contained in a lexical entry, with the inclusion of each formal feature 
contributing to its representational cost.**' 
With these points explicit, it is possible to specify precisely the conditions under 
which the existence of a certain number of closed-class mediating items in the lexicon 
would be an advantage. Take / to be the number of formal features needed to represent 
the distribution of a lexical item of a given category (let's call this the base category). I f 
there are b members in the base category and / features are needed lo encode their 
distribution, then the total cost of representing this information separately for every 
member would be the product fb. If all of the features of the base items are instead 
redistributed to a set of m items of a closed-class mediating category (where m is 
constant), then each of the mediating items wil l contain those / features and the base 
items will contain none. However, given that the association between mediating and 
base items also has to be encoded in lexical entries, I wil l assume an additional feature 
contained in both mediating and base items is required to achieve this. Hence, each 
mediating item wil l possess / + I features and each item in the base category wil l 
•***A negative correlaiion could conceivably result from having lexical items list ail of the environments 
they cannot appear in. 
The term format feaiiire is used here in approximately the sense that it is used within Minimalist syntax 
and various other syntactic formalisms - a sense that is not entirely compatible with usage in other 
contexts. Within Minimalist syntax, features can ihemsclves have secondary properties (e.g., checked or 
unchecked, strong or weak) and they can move independently of the Ihings that they are features of. This 
latter quality is particularly unlike the notion of a 'feature* as applied to ordinary objects. There are no 
known processes that could for instance, move the colour of a shirt without the shirt moving, or the shape 
of a ball without the ball, or the size of a house without the house, etc. 
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possess just one, the one that associates it with items of the mediating category (the 
equivalent of a reference to a lookup table). In this case, the number of features required 
to represent all members of the base and mediating categories combined would be b + 
niif + 1). For large values of b, it wil l always be the case that b + mif + 1) is less than jb 
as illustrated in (2). Hence, a lexicon that has mediating items wil l be more economical 





Number of items of base category {b) 
To illustrate, suppose there are 1000 nouns to represent and that only two formal 
features are required to represent all of the syntactic environments nouns can appear in. 
If this information is stored separately for each noun, then a total of 2000 features 
would need to be represented. If, on the other hand, these two formal features were not 
contained in the lexical entries of every noun, but were contained within the lexical 
entry for a single mediating item that encapsulates nouns, then although a small amount 
of complexity wi l l be introduced to have features that link nouns and the mediating item 
(one for each noun and one for the mediating element), the total number of features that 
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would be required wil l be only 1003 (each of the thousand nouns having one feature and 
the mediating item having three). This would clearly be an enormous saving.''* 
I wil l provide a more comprehensive discussion about why there is typically 
more than one mediating item for each open class as I refine the proposal in the 
following section, but it is worth pointing out at this point that having a small number of 
them does not lead to a dramatic departure from opiimality. In the above example for 
instance, i f there are ten items in the mediating category then they would each have to 
possess three features bringing the total number to 1030, which is still much closer to 
the optimum than the 2000 that would be required i f the same features had to be 
represented for each noun. 
5.1.2 Redundancy in representations of meaning 
In the space of conceivable variants in the neighbourhood of the lexicon that has 
actually evolved, there are various imaginable lexicons that lack the closed-class items 
that we actually observe in language. One variety, already discussed, is those in which 
lexical entries of the same class all redundantly encode the same distributional 
information independently. Let's call this type the Redundant Distribution Lexicon and 
contrast it with the Observed Lexicon. Another conceivable alternative to the Observed 
Lexicon is one in which redundancy in distributional information is not offloaded to 
closed-class items, but which still achieves minimal redundancy in representations of 
syntactic distributions at the cost of disallowing items to be used in more than a single 
syntactic position. For a language with a lexicon like this to be as expressive as one with 
the Observed Lexicon, unique lexical entries would be required for each of the syntactic 
positions in which a given meaning is to be expressed. For instance, if the meaning that 
a noun expresses needs to be used in both subject and object positions, then two distinct 
•**The reasoning applied in the above paragraphs is similar to that applied to 'normalize' relational 
databases within computer science. This process eliminates redundancy in an analogous way and thereby 
reduces the amount of memory that databases consume as well as making it more manageable to update 
the information they contain. 
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nouns with the same meaning would be required - one for use in each position.''^ This 
method would simply shift the problem of redundancy from representations of syntactic 
distributions to representations of meaning, hence we could call i i the Redundant 
Meaning Lexicon. Both kinds of redundancy would be more costly compared to an 
equivalent lexicon in which distributional infonnaiion is non-redundantly encoded in 
closed-class items, as I wi l l argue is the case with the Observed Lexicon. 
If a closed-class item that encapsulates noun phrases has to encode the fact ihat 
it can appear in both subject and object positions, then there would have to be some way 
of representing the equivalent of an exclusive-or operator in its lexical entry. An 
unstructured set of formal features is not sufficient to represent this or any kind of 
optionality so the equivalent of logical formulae along the lines of (3) would have to be 
used. In (3), it is simplistically assumed, for the sake of illustration, that the determiner 
the encapsulates noun phrases (checking the N feature) allowing them to appear in 
cither the subject or object position (checking either the S or O feature). 
3. the: iSXORO)ANDN 
There are various conceivable variations on how to represent a formula like this. Two 
distinct logical operators needn't be employed since AND and XOR can both be 
expressed in terms of the NOR operator (or alternatively in terms of the NAND 
operator), or in the streamlined notation of boundary logic (Meguire, 2003) as 
illustrated in the following table.^° 
•''This option appears to be realised for pronouns in English giving us pairs such as / versus me, we 
versus us. and so on, but the morphological form of these words is not conclusive evidence that they have 
separate lexical entries. If they arc listed as separate lexical entries, then this raises the question of why 
they are exceptions to the rule that you can't have two words wiUi exactly the same meaning. If they are 
derived from the same lexical entry, then we have to explain how it is that they can be realised in such 
different forms. 
SO 
In boundary logic, concatenation is the equivalent of the OR operator so that the formula "p q" means 
"p OR c f . Brackets negate the truth value of their contents so that "(p q)" means "NOT {p OR q)". 
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4. Some possible ways of representing syntactic distributions as feature formulae 
in terms of NOR Boundary Logic 
p AND q (p NOR p) NOR (q NOR q) ({p) (q)) 
p XOR q ((p NOR iq NOR q)) NOR ((p NOR p) NOR q)) NOR (p (q)) ((/?) ^) 
((p NOR (q NOR ?^)) NOR ((p NOR p) NOR ^ )) 
It should not escape attention that formulae like those in (3) and (4) have a kind 
of syntax themselves, relying on hierarchical representations, the linear order of 
symbols, or both. Hence, these representations are essentially just as complex as the 
grammatical properties that we are trying to explain. Rewrite rules as well as lexical 
representations of the kind used in various other descriptive frameworks such as Lexical 
Functional Grammar (Bresnan, 2001), Head-Driven Phrase Structure Grammar (Pollard 
& Sag, 1994) and Link Grammar (Sleator & Temperley, 1991) suffer the same 
shortcomings, as does the Minimalist notation of Stabler (1997). Using such 
representations leads to an infinite regress for theories that seek to explain properties 
like hierarchy and linear order in terms of the content of lexical entries. 
If we pursue the possibility that featural information in lexical entries is encoded 
more simply, consisting of just an unordered set of features, then mutual exclusivity -
and indeed optionality in general - could not be encoded. With a Redundant Meaning 
Lexicon, this problem would be overcome by having several distinct lexical entries with 
the same meaning so that one could be used in each syntactic position that it needed to 
be used in. For instance, there would be distinct words for *dog' when used as a subject 
Boundary logic is a more lypographically convenieni noiational variant of the laws offonn algebra 
devised by Spencer-Brown (1969). 
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versus an object, and so on. However, a lexicon with an open/closed class distinction 
could confine this kind of duplication lo the relatively small number of closed-class 
items. For instance, the apparent ability for all nouns to appear in both subject and 
object positions would be achieved by having one closed-class item performing the 
mediating role in the subject position and another performing the role in the object 
position. The information contained in the formula in (4) could be encoded in terms of 
the unordered sets of features of two separate lexical entries for the word the as in (5), 
one having a subject feature and the other an object feature. 
5. the,: { S , N ) 
ther. {O, N} 
In many languages, articles have a different case form depending on whether they 
appear in the subject or object position. The German equivalent of (5) is illustrated in 
(6) with the masculine definite article. 
6. den (S ,N) 
den: {O, N) 
Hence, one of the consequences of stipulating that no optionality be encoded in lexical 
entries is that we predict the existence of something consistent with case-marking. This 
appears to be an extremely promising result. 
Under this view, the existence of closed-class items in the lexicon allows the 
open class items to be free of redundancy in representations of meaning while still 
permitting a given meaning to be expressed in more than one syntactic position. Hence 
the introduction of closed-class items eliminates the redundancy that would characterise 
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a Redundant Meaning Lexicon. As discussed in the previous section, the introduction of 
closed-class items also represents an optimal solution to the problem of redundancy in 
representations of distributional information, hence also avoids the problem of a 
Redundant Distribution Lexicon. The existence of closed-class items optimises two 
distinct functions, but these are not necessarily competing explanations for their 
existence. Demonstrating that a property is improbably optimal for a given function 
does not mean it was necessarily selected for that function alone. The following sections 
elaborate on the optimality questions in more detail. 
5.2 Applying the optimality diagnostic 
In chapter three, I introduced a diagnostic test, adapted from Parker and Maynard Smith 
(1990), for identifying adaptive functions in terms of optimality. This involved (a) 
identifying the strategy set, (b) identifying a function over the strategy set for which the 
trait is optimal among the possible choices (where the optimaliiy is of the 'improbable' 
variety), and (c) relating this function to fitness. I will now apply these considerations to 
refine and evaluate the candidate functions outlined above. 
I f it turns out that the trait that has actually evolved is not the optimal possibility 
in the strategy set for a proposed function, it could be for several reasons. It may be that 
the function wasn't actually relevant for its selection, that the function is not an 
independent component of fitness (because the trait cannot be altered without 
compromising other functions that it has or that concomitant traits have), that none of 
the values that are more optimal than the observed trait value should have been included 
in the strategy set because they are not actually physically attainable, or that natural 
selection has not yet had sufficient time to ascend to the optimal value. I f it turns out, on 
the other hand, that the observed trait is the optimal possibility in the strategy set for the 
proposed function, then we have grounds to reject such alternatives. 
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5.2.1 The strategy set 
Up to this point, I have left imprecise the question of what kind of variation would 
physically account for the presence or absence of closed-class items in language. If the 
use of closed-class items was selected for in our ancestors, then the innovation may not 
have been the capacity to represent them as such, but rather the tendency to analyse 
input during language acquisition as though it contains them (and perhaps a particular 
set of them). This predisposition is most dramatically evident in studies of the rapid 
transition from pidgin languages, which lack such items and which develop among 
communities of adults lacking a common language, to creole languages, which possess 
them and which are spoken by the children and subsequent generations who were 
exposed to the original pidgin (Bickerton, 1977; KegL et al., 1999). The implication is 
that during language acquisition, modem humans analyse sentences as containing 
closed-class items even when these items are not explicit in the input. 
We know that certain variations are at least physically attainable since the 
capacity to acquire closed-class items without explicit teaching varies throughout the 
lifetime of an individual, being greatly enhanced during infancy but diminishing by 
adolescence and mostly disappearing by adulthood. This justifies including, in the 
strategy set, weak through to strong predispositions for infants to analyse input as 
containing closed-class items. That closed-class vocabulary items appear later than 
open-class items in ontogenesis is also some evidence that they appeared later in 
phylogenesis. During language development, infants go through a stage of producing 
what Brown (1973) called telegraphic speech, in which closed-class elements are 
omitted despite the fact that they occur with very high frequency in the infant's 
linguistic environment. Brown and his colleagues even found a tendency for infants to 
omit them in tasks requiring immediate repetition. In a typical example, one of Brown 
and Fraser's (1963) subjects (aged 28'/2 months) was prompted to repeat the sentence / 
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am drawing a dog and responded with / draw dog. Examples like this suggest that 
infants in the telegraphic stage are sensitive to closed-class items, but have not yet 
mastered them. As discussed in chapter four (§4.1.6), Bickenon (1990) draws parallels 
between the language of infants in the telegraphic stage, pidgin speakers, adults who 
were deprived of language as children and language-trained apes. He equates these with 
a hypothesised stage of protolanguage and argues that language in this mode is distinct 
from the capacity for fully syntactic language observing that only the latter has a critical 
period as attested in adult language learning by the relative difficulty with which the 
closed-class items of a second language can be acquired compared with the open-class 
items. The same consideration would also account for why closed-class categories are 
indeed closed in one's native language. Despite appearing more frequently in the 
linguistic environment, closed-class items are nevertheless attained later than the 
earliest open-class items in language acquisition. This could be because their use is 
dependent on the foundation laid by protolanguage or perhaps because feature 
representations for closed-class items are more complex than those for open-class items. 
I wi l l lake the variation in the strategy set to encompass only the learning 
dispositions. Variation in representational properties would only be relevant i f lexical 
entries of closed-class items are qualitatively unlike those o f open-class items. 
Observational evidence doesn't appear to require making such a claim so it would be 
gratuitous to make it. In applying the optimality diagnostic, 1 wil l assume that the 
syntactic distribution of a lexical entry is encoded as a set of formal features along the 
lines discussed in section 5.1.2 such that there is no optionality and such that it must be 
possible to check all of its features in the position where it is used in a sentence. 
5.2.2 Optimality 
Redundancy is presumably costly except to the extent that it helps "to compensate 
against injury and defect" as Chomsky (1995: 29) notes. A completely non-redundant 
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solution would be to have only a single closed-class item for each syntactic context that 
members of a class can appear in. This would maximise the ratio of vocabulary size to 
the number of features that need to be represented for all but very low values for 
vocabulary size. Having more than one closed-class item for each syntactic context 
would cause a departure from optimality, though only amounting to a small perturbation 
away from the optimum (as discussed in §5.1.1). By contrast, an absence of closed 
classes would have catastrophic consequences for redundancy. 
Given that the strategy set contains only two kinds of solutions - one in which 
closed classes are acquired by the language learner and one in which they are not - we 
could be forgiven for mshing to the conclusion that the optimum does not exhibit the 
necessary improbability to meet the demands of the optimality diagnostic. If there were 
many more solutions to choose from, then we might be more confident that it was not 
by chance that a solution arose that is optimal for this function. But it would be a 
mistake to conclude that the two categories are equally probable. It depends on the 
proportion of language acquisition devices in the space of all language acquisition 
devices possessing the particular algorithmic properties that enable them to acquire 
closed-class items. I would think there are far fewer ways of structuring a language 
acquisition device that acquires closed classes than there are of structuring a language 
acquisition device that fails to do so. There are also many conceivable ways in which 
closed classes could be acquired without conferring any benefit in terms of redundancy 
minimisation. The theory'predicts a number of very specific predictions along these 
lines which correspond with observations beautifully. These are examined in the 
following section. 
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5.3 Some consequences of the theory 
5.3.1 Language variation and parameter-setting 
Within Minimalist syntax, Chomsky (1995) adopts the view that syntactic parameter-
setting amounts to determining the formal features of closed-class items (see §2.3 of 
chapter two). By contrast, the learning of open-class items appears to have little 
relevance for grammar as attested by the ability to recognise the well-formedness of 
'Jabberwocky' sentences in which none of the open-class items are real words (e.g., 
'Twas brillig and the siithy toves did gyre and gimble in the wabe). Furthermore, i f all 
parametric variation is associated with the lexicon, then this explains why the infant 
does not set contradictory parameters when exposed to bilingual input. 
This state of affairs is exactly what we should predict i f closed classes evolved 
to minimise lexical redundancy. It follows trivially that closed classes will be the locus 
of parametric variation simply because they take most of the featural complexity away 
from the open classes. Hence, considerations of representational optimaliiy are 
sufficient to account for it without any additional theoretical motivations. 
The relative complexity of open and closed classes would also explain why the 
latter are more difficult to learn, but would not help to explain why the ability to acquire 
them degrades after the critical period. 
5.3.2 Case ttieory 
As discussed in section 5.1.2, a consequence of eliminating optionality in individual 
lexical entries is that the appearance of optionality has to be achieved by selecting 
between different lexical items that allow different structural options to be realised. 
Hence, we could have a number of different nouns in the lexicon with the same 
meaning, one for each syntactic context in which that meaning needs to be expressed 
(subject, object and so on). As discussed earlier, this would lead to massive redundancy 
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in semantic representations, which could be eliminated if the lexicon instead made use 
of a small number of closed-class items-to mediate nouns. Distinct closed-class items 
would be needed in each context in which nouns appear. Hence, considerations of 
representational optimality also appear to derive the property of grammatical case, 
which, given the tenuous link between structural cases and semantic/pragmatic 
considerations, has traditionally been extremely difficult to reconcile with functional 
considerations. 
5.3.3 Agreement 
For a pair of open classes to be brought into a systematic relation with one another, the 
interface between them will have to reach a convergence point where they are 
connected via a single feature type that unifies all of the subcategories of both of the 
categories involved. The noun contained in the subject of a sentence for instance is 
associated with the verb regardless of whether the noun is singular or plural, or 
countable or uncountable, and whether the verb is transitive or intransitive and so on. 
However, the convergence point needn't be strictly at a phrasal boundary. The elements 
on either side of the convergence point would only be guaranteed to be constituents i f 
the convergence point appears between a specifier and the intermediate projection to 
which it is attached. But i f the convergence point appears between the head and the 
complement of the phrase, the element on one side wil l not be a constituent, consisting 
of the specifier and head of the phrase to the exclusion of the complement. If an 
inflected verb like eats originates as a structure that has a functional projection headed 
by a closed-class item associated with the third person singular agreement feature and a 
complement phrase headed by the verb eat, then a convergence point would occur 
between the head and its complement. This is illustrated in the English examples below. 
In these examples, any of the forms that appear on one side of the point indicated with 
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>< can freely co-occur with any of the forms on the other side, which is what makes it a 
convergence point. 
7. a. Those men eat [(Those men) 3pl >< eat] 
b. That man eats [(That man) 3s >< eat] 
8. a. Those men have eaten [(Those men) 3pl >< have eaienj 
b. That man has eaten [(That man) 3s >< have eaten] 
9. a. Those men are eating [(Those men) 3pl >< be eating] 
b. That man is eating [(That man) 3s >< be eating] 
In terms of the optimality functions discussed in the current chapter, it makes no 
difference whether convergence points occur at the boundary between specifiers and 
heads or at the boundary between heads and complements. Under this analysis, 
agreement occurs not because it is functional, but simply because it can, and for 
predominantly right branching structures, there are many more opportunities for 
convergence to occur between head and complement than between specifier and head, 
so in such structures agreement is not only possible, but likely. This should be true for 
the interface between any pair of meaningful elements and we also readily observe it in 
the concord between adjectives and nouns in many languages. 
Note that there are other convergence points in the examples in (7-9) between 
the number morphology on the noun and the noun stem and between the participle 
morphology of the verb and the verb stem. The point to note about this is that there isn't 
always an open-class item enclosed between convergence points. This is unexpected i f 
the role of closed-class items is purely to mediate open-class items. An additional 
motivation must therefore exist to permit this. This may be to modulate frequently-used 
meanings. The domain that appears between the convergence point at the noun and the 
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convergence at the verb is concerned with encoding the number feature of the noun and 
the tense feature of the verb, both of which have meanings. Likewise for the participial 
forms which encode meaning about the temporal structure of the event or state indicated 
by the verb. We should not expect to find instances of domains that are entirely 
composed of closed-class items that do not modulate meanings. 
5.3.4 The timing of t/?e acquisition of open and dosed classes 
As mentioned eariier, there is a difference in the age at which open and closed classes 
enter the productive vocabulary of infants. Despite being the most frequently occurring 
items in the linguistic input provided by adults, closed classes are nevertheless not the 
first items to be acquired, infants first proceeding through a stage of 'telegraphic 
speech' (as discussed in §2.2.1). However, i f we recall the graph in (2), this is exactly 
what we should expect, since the introduction of closed-class items will only confer an 
advantage once the number of open-class items exceeds a certain threshold from which 
point the advantage they confer grows steadily more and more significant as vocabulary 
size increases. This is a rather unexpected consequence of the optimisation of the 
lexicon and a very encouraging finding. 
A precise quantification of the vocabulary size at which we should expect this to 
occur wi l l depend on how we assign values to the variables in (2), but can be estimated 
within certain limits. A lexicon with mediating items wil l only be more efficient than an 
equally expressive variant i f the number of closed-class items that are needed to mediate 
all of the kinds of syntactic dependencies that need to be expressed is at least smaller 
than the number of open-class items that are present in the lexicon. According to 
Fenson, Dale, Reznick, Bates and Thai (1994), the average vocabulary size reached by 
24 months is approximately 300 words with closed-class items gradually emerging in 
productive vocabularies from around this age, being more or less complete by between 
27 and 48 months (Brown, 1973). This would be consistent with a language requiring 
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approximately 200-300 closed-class items and appears to be reasonably close to the 
actual number o f closed-class items we observe. 
5 . 3 . 5 Tense and obligatory subjects 
Nearly all verbs have at least one noun phrase argument, so it would make sense on 
economy grounds to liberate individual verbs from the responsibility of licensing a 
position for it to occupy, leaving it to an encapsulating projection like Tense instead. 
This may be the motivation for the subject position and may explain why subjects are 
obligatory even for the few verbs like those in (10), which lack arguments of the type 
that can occupy the subject position. The requirement thai clauses have subjects is 
fulfilled in such cases by using semantically null 'dummy' subjects (// and there in 
English). 
10. a. // rains/snows/hails a lot in winter. 
b. There seems/appears to be a problem with the veal. 
c. n is amazing that you survived. 
The requirement that all clauses have subjects is called the Extended Projection 
Principle. Subjects are only overtly required when the clause has finite tense as in (1 la) 
but may also be present though unpronounced in non-fmite subordinate clauses such as 
the bracketed portion of ( I lb). 
11. a. He helped her. 
b. Hci tried [u> PROi to help her]. 
The tense element that clauses require may be the means by which the subject position 
is licensed and which would account for its existence as well, its use in conveying 
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temporal meaning being secondary. Indeed, there are languages such as Wintu in which 
the Tense' element does not have a temporal meaning, but is instead used to indicate 
whether the information being imparted was observed directly or acquired second hand 
(Sapir, 1921). 
The details of how syntactic features may be used to license positions wil l be 
elaborated in much more detail in chapter six (§6.3.3). 
5 . 3 . 6 Closed-class items with identical distributions 
Some closed classes (like determiners in English) have several members, but i f 
redundancy is the sole concern, we should predict that there are no two closed-class 
items that have exactly the same syntactic distribution in the sense that one could be 
exchanged for the other without affecting the grammaticality status of the sentences in 
which they appear. The fact that the pair of determiners this and that appear lo be freely 
interchangeable (not semanlically, but grammatically) suggests that redundancy is not 
the only concern. They are interchangeable in most contexts such as (12), but perhaps 
not all contexts as the contrast in (13) suggests. 
12. a. I wil l give her this sock, 
b. I wi l l give her that sock. 
13. a. I wil l give her this or that sock, 
b. ?I wil l give her that or this sock. 
To the extent that there are closed-class Items with identical distributions, the 
explanation may be that once a system like this has emerged, these items may as well be 
co-opted to make semantic distinctions that are most frequently needed and since a 
lexicon containing one extra closed-class item of a certain category wil l be more costly 
by only one item, the additional cost would not undo the massive savings associated 
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with reducing ihe redundancy of all ihe members of the open class with which the 
encapsulating items are associated. In short, we should expect that where there is a 
choice of mediators, it is motivated by pressures for semantic compositionality of the 
kind examined by Kirby (2001). However, the fact that there is not always a choice and 
that mediators do not always have meanings suggests that semantic compositionaliiy 
cannot on its own account for the existence of closed-class items. I f there are 
completely meaningless closed-class items, we shouldn't expect lo find that they can be 
exchanged with one another lo modulate meaning in the way that this and that can. The 
only place they could exist then, would be at convergence points. Interestingly, there 
appears to be some support for this. The complementiser that in a sentence like (14) 
cannot be substituted for anything else. I l can be omitted, but without changing the 
meaning. 
14. I believe (that) com grows in Illinois. 
A similar case can be made for the meaninglessness of the inflections indicating verbal 
agreement, which are entirely predictable from the combination of number, person 
and/or gender features of the subject (depending on the agreement system of the 
language). 
5 . 3 . 7 Measuring the information content of iexicai entries 
Up until this point, I have omitted a precise discussion of how to measure the 
information content of a lexical entry. The number of bits that are required to represent 
a feature wi l l depend on how many features we wish to distinguish. A lexicon that 
makes use of only four features wil l require at least two bits to encode each of the four 
different values (00, 01, 10, I i ) . Three bits would allow eight values to be encoded 
(000, 001, 010, 0! I , 100, 101, i 10, M I ) and so on. Taking this into account, we should 
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not simply assume thai a lexicon in which entries have fewer features is necessarily 
more economical than one with more features. It will also depend on the number of 
features that are distinguished. For instance, an entry with two features in a lexicon that 
has only four feature types wil l require two bits to encode each feature meaning a total 
of four (e.g., {00, 10)) which is just as many as would be required to represent an entry 
with only one feature in a lexicon with 16 feature types (e.g., {0010)). In general, // bits 
are required to represent 2" distinct types. 
The measurement becomes more complicated i f we discard the assumption that 
each feature is encoded with a bit-string of the same length. Shorter codes can be 
assigned to the most frequently occurring symbols as in Morse Code where the letter E 
(the most frequently occurring character in English) is represented as a single while 
the less common Q is encoded as the longer string " — . Likewise, the brain might 
reserve the most parsimonious neural representations for its most frequently utilised 
codes. 
A second, interesting possibility is that the same features are reused for different 
classes, much as two different homes in different places may have exactly the same 
local phone number, which is nevertheless distinguished via distinct area codes. This 
kind of solution would predict that the lexicon be organised such that all members of an 
open class wi l l tend to be represented in a localised area of the brain - an area for each 
type of noun, verb and adjective with perhaps also distinct areas for each distinct 
language that a person speaks as well. The *area code' would effectively translate the 
local code into a longer bit string so that the individual lexical entries can also be 
distinguished in a context global to the lexicon. 
These comments are of course extremely speculative, but are intended to point 
to areas of future research. 
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5.4 Competing explanations 
It is difficult to imagine a language without closed-class items so it is tempting lo think 
that they exist because they are somehow necessary to express cenain kinds of concepts, 
but most closed-class items appear to have very loose associations with meanings and 
there is no obvious reason why these notions couldn't also be expressed using open-
class items. To take an example of closed-class items that have very little semantic 
content, consider case markers. Nominative and accusative case markings on nouns 
indicate specific thematic roles with respect to the verb in simple active sentences, but 
not in other sentences as illustrated in (15) and (16). 
15. a. A/e bit the dog. 
b. He was bitten by the dog. 
16. a. She remembers him biting the dog. 
b. The dog bit him. 
He can refer to the person who did the biting as in (15a) or the person who was bitten as 
in (15b). Him can also lake both roles, referring to the person who was biting (16a), or 
who was bitten (16b). 
Other closed-class items have meanings, but the meanings can be expressed in 
other ways. Instead of past tense for instance, speakers could use an open-class element 
like the adverb yesterday to indicate that an event occurred in the past. Note also that 
the biting event described in (16a) is understood to have occurred in the past despite 
there being no overt past tense marking on either verb. It is easy to verify that other 
open-class alternatives are available (or could be invented) to encode the meanings 
associated with aspect, number, definiteness, and all of the other closed classes. There is 
therefore no general reason why they would be necessary in a language that is 
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expressive as ours though they may be an efficient way of encoding frequently utilised 
semantics. But i f this is true, then we would struggle to motivate things like structural 
case, which as we saw in (15) and (16) has no consistent interpretation with respect to 
argument roles. Other words seem to be virtually devoid of semantic content too. The 
complementiser that serves a purely grammatical function in introducing declarative 
sentences and can often be omitted. This kind of evidence is at odds with an account 
that would seek to explain the existence of closed classes primarily in terms of semantic 
considerations. 
5.5 Summary 
This chapter attempted to provide an adaptive explanation for the open/closed class 
distinction. In sum, large vocabulary sizes were assumed lo apply a strong pressure for 
non-redundant lexical representations. Distributional information that would otherwise 
have to be redundantly encoded in each distinct lexical entry can be offloaded onto a 
small, closed class of items used to mediate syntactic dependencies between the very 
much larger number of open-class items. This is why the closed-class items contain 
most of the information that constitutes a person's grammatical knowledge. The theory 
also predicts the existence of case, agreement and the extended projection principle as 
concomitant traits. For so many grammatical properties that have so far resisted 
convincing evolutionary explanations to fall out of this theory is a very promising 
result. It also follows from the theory that during language acquisition, the earliest 
closed-class items wil l not be acquired until an initial body of open-class items is 
already present in an infant's vocabulary. This is consistent with what appears to occur 
in language acquisition (Brown, 1973). 
This chapter has illustrated how the optimality diagnostic can be applied. 
Predictions of optimality follow from claims about selective functions and can be tested 
in accordance with the scientific method. In this case, i f it turned out that closed-class 
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items had properties that make them suboptimal for the hypothesised function of 
economising lexical representations, then the theory would either have to be discarded 
or modified. As we learn more about how lexical entries are represented in the brain, 
further opportunities to test the detail of the theory wil l arise. Regardless of whether the 
predictions of the theory continue to be confirmed, the value of the optimality 
diagnostic in allowing such'claims to be tested is undeniable. 
Many questions arise about the path evolution could have taken from a language 
lacking closed-class items to one possessing them such that each stage conferred an 
advantage to the mutants at the frontier of the innovations. One possibility is that the 
first mutants began analysing input as though it contained unpronounced closed-class 
items, which conferred an advantage without leading to a difference in the actual spoken 
form of the language. Speakers would have benefited by having a superior encoding of 
basically the same thing, giving them spare capacity lo use on larger vocabularies or 
other things. 
h is argued here that what was central to the advantage of closed-class items was 
the elimination of redundancy, but Chomsky (1995) has argued that redundancy is 
actually useful, and so we should expect evolution to favour it, Chomsky also argues 
that the computational system is surprisingly free of redundancy. Hence, we can 
construct the syllogism in (17). 
17. Premise I. If natural selection favours redundancy so as to "compensate against 
injury and defect", and 
Premise 2. The computational system lacks this redundancy, then 
Conclusion. We should expect the computational system to be vulnerable to 
injury and defect. 
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Logically, there are three different positions one could take on this issue. First, one 
could accept both premises, thereby concluding that the language faculty (narrowly 
construed in terms of the computational system) is vulnerable to injury and defect. This 
would lead to predictions that ought to be readily observable. Second, one could reject 
the second premise and hold that it does in fact possess redundancy, from which one 
would predict that the language faculty is robust in the face of injury and defect. Or 
third, one could hold that it is non-redundant, but reject the premise that redundancy is 
always necessary to create a robust system. The robustness of the language faculty can 
only be evaluated in a fairly arbitrary way, but language disorders are certainly not 
common. This suggests that one or other of the above premises is doubtful. 
With respect to redundancy, the lexicon is peculiar in the sense that its size 
appears to be much larger than can easily be accounted for in terms of survival needs. 
Human memory capacity for other things such as faces, songs and events is also much 
larger than we might expect. These are deeper questions for further research. 
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Phrase structure and sequences 
In the previous chapter, the opiimality diagnostic was applied to hypotheses of selective 
functions, the rationale being that we can filter out implausible hypotheses by 
demanding that we consider only functions that are optimally satisfied by the trait under 
investigation. In such cases, inquiry begins with an observed trait for which a functional 
explanation is then sought. In other cases, we wish to inquire into the nature of a 
complex biological system rather than, or in addition to, its selective functions. In the 
process, we formulate hypotheses about the existence of properties that have not yet 
been directly observed, hypotheses which could also arguably be filtered by applying 
optimality considerations. This would work by demanding that the only properties 
postulated in our models are those that are optimal for fitness-related functions with the 
effect that hypotheses about unobserved details could be made less arbitrarily. As a 
guiding principle, this is almost certainly fallible, amounting only to a heuristic, but one 
which would allow us to focus inquiry into areas that we should expect to be the most 
fertile in terms of generating explanatory theories. This bears a strong resemblance to 
Chomsky's (1995, 1999, 2000a) Minimalist Program with its emphasis on perfection 
and economy, but is distinct from i i insofar as the perfection that is assumed to exist is 
assumed, under the present approach, to relate to selective fitness, thus further 
restricting the scope of plausible theories to those that are compatible with an 
evolutionary account. This chapter presents a case study in reasoning of this kind, 
exploring both the selective functions of constituent structure representations as well as 
their nature. 
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There is another important difference between the previous and current chapters 
with respect to the explanatory role of the oplimaliiy diagnostic. Considerations of 
optimality can be informative about the selection pressures that shaped a trait in 
ancestors regardless of whether or not the selection pressures are still present. A trait 
that has been co-opted for a new function wil l still bear the hallmarks of its previous 
roles. Therefore, demonstrating that a trait is optimal for a function other than the one it 
currently serves is one source of evidence that an exaptation event has taken place. 
In this chapter, I will provide some evidence that suggests nested phrase 
structure could have arisen under selection for functions relating to the representation 
and manipulation of sequences, functions which were plausibly relevant for other 
cognitive tasks before and after the emergence of language. Representations of 
sequences are presumably implicated in many cognitive systems including those 
governing motor control, planning, musical competence, and episodic memory. It is 
conceivable, though not necessary, that some of these systems depend on shared 
mechanisms, either in the sense of a shared system dedicated to processing sequences of 
various types, or in the sense of the same kinds of neural structures appearing in each of 
these different subsystems under the influence of the same genes. The alternative is that 
sequence representations evolved independently in each subsystem. This chapter 
therefore also bears on the question of whether the sequence representations used by the 
language system arose independently of other aspects of cognition. 
By asking what would constitute an evolutionarily optimal design for sequence 
representations, the current chapter leads the reader to a theory of the representation of 
constituent structure, from which a long list of grammatical phenomena follow 
naturally. In particular, it would appear that movement, far from being a separate 
innovation, is inherent to the representation of constituent structure itself. The nature of 
the command relation and feature checking are also discussed in light of these 
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developments, leading to further refinements. The interplay between case and theta 
roles also gains a natural explanation. 
6.1 The optimal representation of sequences 
In this section, a number of methods for representing sequences are examined in 
abstract terms. These methods are taken to constitute the major types contained in the 
strategy set over which evolution may have operated during the evolution of sequence 
representations. The methods are compared using a number of different criteria of 
optimality, but the discussion remains neutral about whether these sequences could be 
related to language or other cognitive systems. 
6.1.1 Proposal 1: Indexing 
A simple approach to representing a sequence of tokens would be to assign each an 
index marking its absolute order. If the index corresponds to a natural number, 
insertions into the sequence could only be achieved at the expense of having to re-index 
every token that appears after the insertion point. I f the index was a real number instead 
of a natural number, a new item inserted between say tokens 5 and 6 could be assigned a 
value like 5.5 and no re-indexing would be required, but as more and more tokens are 
inserted, nearby indices would end up being more and more alike which would make 
them more vulnerable to noise-induced error. This is the familiar pitfall of analogue as 
opposed to digital representations. 
6.1.2 Proposal 2 : Pairs 
There are other ways to represent a sequence that don't have these shortcomings. The 
linear order could be represented in relative rather than absolute terms using a set L of 
ordered pairs (a, P) with the interpretation that token a immediately precedes token p. 
Call the set L the linearization set. To insert token y into the sequence between tokens a 
and P, the new linearization set L' would contain the two pairs (a, y) and (y, P) not 
included in the original set L and would not include (a, p) which was in L. The 
differences between the two sets are captured in (1) where M is the subset of pairs that 
are unaffected by the insertion. 
1. a- L = ( ( a , P ) l u i W 
b. / : ' = | ( a , Y ) , ( y , p ) l u M 
The pair (a, P) would not be included in L' because although a still precedes p, it no 
longer immediately precedes it. Alternatively, we could choose to interpret pairs in 
terms of simple precedence without the immediacy requirement, in which case (a, P) 
could remain in the set. This would remove the overhead of an operation to remove the 
pair but at the expense of creating redundancy since the precedence of a and p can be 
inferred from the inclusion of (a, y) and (y, p). 
These kinds of representations are digital and never require potentially costly re-
indexing operations when tokens are inserted. However, i f we assume that the 
operations that add and remove pairs are also costly, then a preferable representation 
would allow an insertion to be made by adding only a single term to the linearization set 
without introducing redundancy. A representation that meets these criteria is described 
in what follows. 
6.1,3 Proposal 3: Triples 
Consider a set L of. triples of the form (a, p, 8) where a and p are tokens with the 
interpretation that a precedes p (it may or may not also immediately precede it) and S is 
a relation that specifies which of the two tokens 'dominates' the other. Let dominance 
be a transitive relation such that i f a dominates p and p dominates y, then a also 
dominates y. Let us also stipulate that dominance is used lo infer linear order such that 
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whatever order holds between the dominating token a and the dominated token p wil l 
also hold between a and everything p dominates in tum.^' 
The relation S can be either right domination (written A'), or !eft domination 
(written 7'). Relations of precedence and dominance are most cleariy illustrated in tree 
diagrams with each triple in L drawn as a diagonal arc connecting the dominating token 
at the top to the dominated token at the bottom. The symbols used for the ordering 
relations are intended to suggest the slant of arcs. For instance, the triple {P, Q, \ ) would 
be drawn as in (2a), while the triple {P, Q, 1) would be drawn as in (2b). 
Note that in both graphs, token P is drawn preceding token Q. By contrast, the 
triples (g , P, \) and (Q, P, f ) would be drawn with Q preceding P. 
Let us now look at how insertions would be handled in terms of a set of such 
triples. Consider how a token R could be inserted so that it appears between P and Q in 
the examples in (2). For reasons to be made clear, this would be achieved for (2a) by 
adding the triple (/?, g , /) and for (2b) by adding (P, /?, \ ) . The resulting graphs are 
depicted in (3) with labels indicating which arc corresponds to each triple. 





'^ An equivalent ordering relation could be devised by imerpreiing the triple (a, p, 6) to mean that a 
dominates P and that the value of 6 determines whether it also precedes it. A triple is simply a device for 
simultaneously representing the relations of both precedence and dominance. 
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Let us now look at how the set {(P, Q, \ ) , (/?, 2 , / ) } , illustrated in (3a), specifies 
an ordering of the tokens P, Q and R. The triple {P, Q, \) tells us that P precedes not 
only Q but every token that Q dominates. The triple (/?, Q, / ) tells us that Q dominates 
R. Hence, we can infer that P precedes both Q and R. The triple (R, Q, /) also tells us 
that R precedes Q. Hence we have an ordering for all three tokens, which is P < R < Q. 
The graph in (3b) represents the set {(P, Q, /), (P, R, \ ) | , which produces the same 
ordering as in (3a). 
This kind of representation allows an insertion to be made anywhere in the 
sequence including the beginning and end by adding only a.single element to the 
linearization set and this is possible without introducing any redundancy so that the set 
wil l only need to contain n-I elements to represent a complete ordering of n tokens. 
However, not all possible sets of triples would produce a linear ordering of tokens. Only 
those that do should be considered well-formed linearization sets. In practice, it may be 
easier to check for conformity to certain constraints that wil l always imply 
linearizability than to check for linearizability itself. The following constraints would 
serve this purpose. 
4. a. Non-circularity constraint 
For all tokens a and p, i f a dominates P, then P does not dominate a. 
b. Single parent constraint 
A tree has exactly one token (called the root) that is not dominated by any other 
token. For every token in the tree aside from the root, there is exactly one other 
token that immediately dominates it. In other words, for all tokens a, i f a is not 
the root, there is always exactly one distinct token P such that L contains either 
(P, a, /) or (P, a, \ ) , and i f a is the root there are no such tokens p. 
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c. Binary branching constraint 
Each token can immediately dominate up to two other tokens - one to the left 
and one to the right. In other words, for all tokens a, there is at most one token P 
such that L contains (a, p, /) and at most one token y, such that L contains (a, y, 
\ ) . 
This method of representing sequences allows insertions to be made by adding a 
single term to the linearization set without introducing redundancy. An additional and 
rather surprising property of this representation is that it also allows constituent 
structure to be represented in the sequence without introducing any additional notation. 
The maximal projection of a head represented by a given token could be defined as the 
subsequence that includes this token and all of the tokens it dominates, the constituent 
dominated to the left being the specifier and the constituent dominated to the right being 
the complement. Hence, the linearization set {(7, K, / ) , (/C, L, \)) with the structure (5) 
could equally be drawn with the equivalent X-Bar structure in (6). 
6. 
K 






Brody (2000) also rejects representations of the kind in (6) in favour of the kind 
in (5), but for reasons independent of present considerations. His justification is purely 
that (5) captures all of the facts that (6) captures, only more elegantly.^^ 
It isn't immediately obvious how to treat adjunction under this notation, but the 
approach of Kayne (1994) suggests at least one possible strategy. Under his theory, the 
distinction between specifiers and adjuncts is eliminated, specifiers being adjoined to 
generate a multi-segment category as in (7) where the category K" has two segments. 
As discussed in chapter two (§2.4.1.2), Kayne's (1994) Linear Correspondence Axiom 
(LCA) derives a linear ordering of a tree's terminal nodes (leaves) from the command 
relation. Under Kayne's analysis, further adjunction to the same phrase is prohibited, 
effectively ruling out structures such as (8), and thereby deriving the assumption that a 
phrase can have at most one specifier. Kayne then invokes a proliferation of further 
functional projections to generate further specifier positions for the attachment of 
constituents at higher levels, an approach also adopted by Brody (2000). 
7. 
J " K' 
" Brody (2000) looks at many of the consequences of adopting this notation that won't be relevant here. 




Under Kayne's definition of command, a specifier of a phrase wil l always 
command its head and complement, while the head of a phrase wil l always command 
everything within its complement (though strictly speaking, not the maximal projection 
that is the complement itselQ- In short, this means that all of the terminals in a specifier 
wil l precede the head, which is a terminal, and the head will precede all of the terminals 
in the complement. Considering how this maps onto the austere representation in (5), 
we can see that each triple in the linearization set effectively corresponds to a command 
relation with J commanding K and K commanding L, and i f we take this relation to be 
transitive, we can derive from these facts that J also commands L. 
Although Chomsky (1995) adopts a variation on Kayne's Linear 
Correspondence Axiom in his theory of bare phrase structure, he not only maintains the 
distinction between adjuncts and specifiers, but also permits a phrase to have multiple 
specifiers. Chomsky's position is hence more difficult to reconcile with the current 
representations. For now, it is sufficient to conclude that, at least to a first 
approximation, constituent structure can be represented in terms of triples. 
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6-1-4 Proposal 4: Pairs reconsidered 
I now revisit a variant of Proposal 2 and show how it too can allow constituent structure 
to be represented. 
Proposal 2 is in some ways simpler than Proposal 3 and in some ways more 
complex. It is simpler insofar as it uses pairs instead of triples. It is more complex 
insofar as it appears to require more operations to be performed on the linearization set 
to insert an item. The following revises the proposal so that no terms need be removed 
from L when inserting tokens. Insertions wil l however lead to redundancy in the 
linearization set from the point of view of information about linear order, but I will 
argue that this information is non-redundant under another analysis. 
An immediate consequence of using pairs instead of triples is that a term cannot 
by itself encode both precedence and dominance simultaneously. The pair (a, p) could 
be interpreted as a precedence relation or as a dominance relation but cannot be used to 
specify both relations independently. I f both relations are to be preserved, then another 
mechanism is required to infer whichever relation is not explicit in the interpretation of 
the pair. 
This can be achieved in the following way. Firstly, let us interpret the pair (a, p) 
with the meaning a precedes and is adjacent (in the graph theoretical sense) to p. 
Secondly, let us redefine dominance relations in terms of three tokens a, P, y that are all 
adjacent to one another in a graph, such that the middle one (in terms of linear order) 
dominates the other two. In other words, i f the linearization set contains the subset {(a, 
P), (ct, y), (P, y )} . then p dominates both a and y and no dominance relation holds 
between a and y. Under this interpretation, three adjacent tokens can be drawn as a 




b. {(T , ,T2 ) , (T, ,T3X (T2 .T3)1 
From ihe new definiiion of dominance, we can infer that, while there is no dominance 
relation between T| and T3, both of these tokens are dominated by T2. Lei the other 
properties of dominance as defined earlier apply as well so that dominance remains a 
transitive relation and continues to be relevant for linear ordering such that i f a 
dominates p, then whatever order holds between a and p wil l also hold between a and 
everything P dominates in turn. 
Further structure can be added to (9a) by introducing more triangles. So for 
example, we can build on this structure to produce the structures in (10) or ( I I ) . 
10. a. 
T4 
b. {(T, , T2), (T,, T3), (T2, T3), ( T 4 , T3), (T4. T5), (T3, T5)l 
11. a. T, 
b- {(T, , T2), (T,, T3) , (T2, T3) , (T2, T4 ) , (T2, Ts), (T4, T5)) 
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The point of interest here is that the structures in (10) and (11) resemble those in (2) 
repealed below, which you will recall were represented in the terms of Proposal 3 using 
the triples (P, Q, \) and (P, Q, / ) . 
Indeed, the tokens of Proposal 3 are, in effect, higher level descriptions of the triangles 
of ihe current proposal. Let us call the individual tokens that compose triangles micro 
tokens to distinguish them from triangles themselves, which correspond to the tokens of 
Proposal 3, and which we'll call macro tokens. Note that under Proposal 3, macro 
tokens were linked by arcs, but under Proposal 4, macro tokens are linked by virtue of 
sharing a common vertex such as T3 in (lOa). 
Let us now look at how insertions would be handled in terms of triangles. In (3a) 
a token R is inserted between P and Q. An analogous representation that uses triangles 
is illustrated in (12a) corresponding to the linearization set in (I2b) and the linear 




I (T , ,T2) , (T,,T3), (T2,T3), 
( T 4 , T 3 ) , ( T 4 , T 5 ) , ( T 3 , T 5 ) , 
(T6,T4), (Te,T^l (T,.m 
T, < T2 < Tfi < T4 < T7 < T3 < T5 
Similariy, the triangle representation of (3b) is given in (13). 
13. a. 
{(T , ,T2) , (T , ,T3) , (T2, T3), 
(T2,T4), (T2,T5), (T4,T5), 
(Tfi, T3), (Tfi,T7), (T3, T7)) 
T, < T 2 < T 6 < T 3 < T 7 < T 4 < T 5 
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While micro tokens are ordered, the concept of linear order as it applies to 
triangles remains undefined. If triangles are to be equated with the tokens of Proposal 3, 
then the order of triangles would have to be P < /? < Q in both (12) and (13). This is 
achieved here and in general i f we take the order of triangles to be defined by the 
relative order of the micro tokens that constitute their top vertices (indicated in bold in 
(12c) and (13c)). 
It should be obvious that, as with Proposal 3, a triangle can always be inserted 
between any two macro tokens without requiring any terms to be removed from the 
linearization set. Although a pair-based representation using triangles wil l contain 
redundant information about linear order at the level of micro-tokens, this information is 
required to represent dominance relations. Viewed from the level of macro tokens, no 
redundancy is necessary since it is possible to represent any of the possible structural 
arrangements of n triangles simply by representing those n triangles. This is because the 
linear order and dominance relations that hold between triangles are completely 
determined by which vertices they share. 
The constraints on allowable structures that were proposed in (4) can now be 
restated in terms of the triangle-based representation as in (14). The binary branching 
constraint of (4c) is replaced here with (14c) which expresses the same generalisation 
more simply as a constraint on the intersection of triangle vertices. 
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14. a. Non-circularity constraint 
For all micro tokens a and P, i f a dominates P, then P does not dominate a. 
b. Single parent constraint 
There must be exactly one micro token in the structure that is not dominated by 
any other. Every other micro token must be directly dominated by exactly one 
parent. 
c. Triangle constraint 
Every micro token must be a vertex o f at least one triangle. I f it is a vertex of 
more than one, it must be the top vertex of exactly one of them. 
As we have seen, this pair-based representation appears to be ideally suited to 
representing sequences when insertion operations are carried out on them while 
remaining extremely simple. A sequence can be represented merely as a set of ordered 
pairs. By incorporating a derived concept of dominance in addition to precedence, the 
representation allows insertion operations to be carried out without requiring items be 
removed from the linearization set and without introducing redundancy. A side-effect of 
this is that it allows constituent structure to be represented without requiring any 
additional representational apparatus. 
The question of why insertion operations should have been important in the 
evolution of sequence representations is unclear. Some alternative metrics for 
evaluating the optimality of sequence representations are pursued in the following 
section. A number of very interesting consequences of using a pair-based representation 
for syntactic structures wi l l then be considered, shedding light on movement 
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phenomena, the nature of feature representations and the interplay between case and 
iheta theory. 
6.2 Alternative metrics 
Aside from the cost of insertion operations, we could look at deletions or other 
operations that might need to be carried out on sequence representations or at 
processing costs associated with querying the linearization set to find the next token in 
the sequence. 
6.2.1 Optimal representations for deletion operations 
If, instead of inserting, we delete a token from a sequence, then this would lead, under 
an indexing scheme along the lines of proposal 1, to index values being non-
consecutive. I f the system requires that they be consecutive, every token after the 
deletion point would have to be re-indexed, but sequential order would still be 
adequately represented i f no re-indexing were performed. 
Under a simple pair-based representation like that in proposal 2, deleting a token 
R that appears between P and Q would require three operations (the same number as is 
required for an insertion), but in this case, the pairs (P, R) and (/?, Q) would be deleted 
from, rather than added to the linearization set, and the pair {P, Q) would be added 
rather than deleted. 
Under a representation using triples, deleting token R would require only a 
single operation in the case where R does not dominate either P or g as in (15), but 
otherwise reduces to the pair-based case with two deletions and an addition as in (16). 
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15. rnQM^^rOrf^]-^ {{P,QA)] 
[deletion of (/?, 2 , / ) ] 
16. { ( ^ 7 ^ , { ^ T Q T ^ ] i(P. 0-\)\ 
[deletion of (P, \) and (/?, g , \ ) ; addition of (P, g , \)] 
Under the modified pair-based representation of proposal 4, a triangle 
corresponds to the tokens of proposal 3 and can be removed with analogous costs. 
The four proposals rank for deletion essentially as they do for insertions except 
under an indexing scheme when deletion is potentially very economical while insertions 
are potentially extremely costly. We should nevertheless expect insertions to be more 
important than deletions for the simple reason that there must logically be more of ihem 
since for something to be deleted at all, it must first be inserted. 
6.2.2 Optimal representations for spelling out a linear 
sequence 
Under an'index-based representation, spelling out the tokens in a linear sequence wil l 
involve determining which token has the lowest index above an ever increasing 
threshold. Alternatively, index values could be represented in terms of activation levels 
in a conneclionist model such that the earlier tokens, having greater activation, are able 
to inhibit subsequent ones until they are spelled out.^ "* 
With a pair-based representation, determining the token that immediately 
follows token A in the sequence involves finding the token ,v such that the linearization 
set contains the pair (A, x). 
For the triples representation, determining the next token in the sequence is 
much more complicated. To find the token that immediately follows token A requires 
traversing the tree structure in the following way. First, traverse the right child of A i f 
For an early conneclionisi model that produces serial behaviour in this way see Rumclhart and Norman 
(1982). 
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one exists. Token B is the right child of A i f the linearization set contains a triple of the 
form {A, B, \ ) . I f there is no such token B, we must then check to see i f A is immediately 
dominated to the right by a token C which would be the case i f the linearization set 
contains (A, C, / ) . I f no B exists, but C does, then C is the token that immediately 
follows A. On the other hand, i f B exists and B does not have a left child, then B is the 
token that immediately fo l lows^ . If B has a left child, it wi l l precede it and hence can 
potentially be the token thai immediately follows A. If B s> left child has a left child in 
turn, then it wi l l appear even earlier in the sequence, but wil l still follow A like 
everything dominated by 6. Hence, we musi traverse the tree via the left descendants of 
B until we find a token B' that does not have a left child. This wil l be the token that 
immediately follows ^4. This traversal is schematised below. 
17. 
(A .C . / ) 
(A. B.\) 
The processing involved in spelling out the tokens in sequence would appear to 
be most costly for a representation based on triples (and for the analogous triangle-
based representations) and less costly using the pair-based and index-based 
representations. This means that i f these alternatives were available during the evolution 
of sequence representations, the triple and triangle representations, which allow 
constituent structure to be represented, would not have emerged under selection for 
minimising the processing cost of spelling out tokens in linear order. It is clear that 
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constituent structure is represented in the case of human language and that its tokens are 
linearized, so there is nothing in the above that provides evidence that processing costs 
of the kind examined were instrumental in selecting these representational mechanisms. 
6.2,3 Optimal representations for representing constituent 
structure 
The ability to represent nested constituent structure may have been relevant in and of 
itself in the selection of the representations that support it, either instead of or in 
addition to selection for the ability to make efficient insertions into sequences. Without 
knowing more about how either of these functions could have conferred a selective 
advantage, there is very little to decide the issue without pursuing the question further, 
but by using optimality considerations, we have dramatically narrowed the scope of 
inquiry into the nature and function of constituent structure representations. Further 
evidence is necessary to decide between the remaining hypotheses. 
Given that we are defining the object we would like to inquire about in 
functional terms (i.e., as the thing that represents constituent structure), it is 
unsurprising that it would serve the function it is defined in terms of optimally. Indeed, 
anything is optimal at being itself. A mountain is a perfect implementation of a 
rhouniain and a rock is a perfect implementation of a rock, h is only by relating 
properties of living things to functions that are within a narrow range of functions that 
can be specified in advance (such as those thai relate to fitness advantages), that 
attributions of function can avoid being post hoc (Dawkins, 1991). That something is 
improbably optimal for a function other than simply being itself is something that 
should count in favour of the insertion hypothesis, even i f it is uncertain why this 
function would be so important during the evolution of the representational mechanisms 
involved. However, this hypothesis would look much more favourable i f independent 
evidence could be found for the reality of triangle-based representations. Consequences 
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of the triangle-based representation are examined in greater detail in the following 
section where very suggestive evidence of this sort is indeed presented. 
6.3 Some consequences and further refinements 
This section examines some syntactic properties that appear to be derivable from 
triangle-based representations, providing support for their existence. 
6.3.1 Movement as by-product 
Consider the sentences in (18) below, 
18. a. The dog bit the man. 
b. The man was bitten. 
In both of these sentences, the man is interpreted as the person who was bitten despite 
appearing in different structural relationships with respect to the relevant verb. To 
explain this, some part of the syntactic description should encode this. In generative 
approaches to grammar, this and many other examples like it are traditionally explained 
in terms of movement as discussed in chapter two (§2.4.3). the idea being that the man 
originates in the object position in the derivations of both sentences, this position being 
where it receives its interpretation as an argument of the verb. Subsequent steps in the 
derivation of (18b) cause it to move to the subject position. The relationship between 
the base and landing sites of a movement operation is encoded in what is called a chain, 
which is often represented (in modem formulations) simply as a pair of positions (e.g., 
Chomsky, 1995: 252). Pairs are of course the basis of triangle representations so chains 
can be represented without requiring any revision. This is a rather su-iking result since it 
unifies the representation of chains/movement with the representation of constituent 
structure itself. 
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The structures in (19) illustrate the relevant aspects of the sentences in (18) 
though many of the details are left imprecise. In (19a) the man appears in the direct 
object position and is linked to bit by the pairs (Targ2, Tobj) and (Tobj, Tacc)- I adopt the 
usual assumptions that a passive verb is unable to assign accusative case to its object 
meaning that, in (19b), the second of these pairs wi l l be blocked for bitten. The effect of 
this is that the argument has to be attached to an earlier case assigning position. In this 
instance, it is attached to the subject position where it receives nominative case. It is 
linked to was using the pairs (Targ2, Tsub) and (Tsub. Tr,om)- The chain is encoded in (I9b) 
by including the pair (Targ2, Tobj')- Since no triangle is created by including this pair in 
the linearization set, it has no consequences for dominance relations within the structure 





Although constituent structure and movement chains can both be represented 
using pairs, it is not clear that there are any implications for whether a derivational or 
representational approach is to be preferred. Recall from chapter two (§2.5) that, within 
Minimalist Syntax, the property that a moved constituent always commands its base-
generated position can be derived from the nature of the Move operator. However, a 
representational approach must specify this explicitly as a well-formedness condition on 
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chains. If such a condition is placed on pairs that are interpreted as chains, then it would 
be instructive to see whether- it also holds of the pairs that are implicated in the 
representation of constituent structure itself and indeed, for a triangle given by the set 
((a, p), (a, y), (p, y)) , a command relation will hold between tokens of each pair. This 
leads to some suggestions pursued in the following section. 
6.3.2 The status of the command relation 
Up until this point, we have seen that dependencies traditionally described as arising 
through movement can be unified with phrase structure itself under a modified pair-
based representation in which dominance relations are inferred from the existence of 
other pairs that we can interpret as forming triangles. However, nothing in this picture 
yet provides any motivation for the restriction that moved constituents must command 
their base positions. This is because there is nothing preventing dependencies existing 
between constituents that are not in a command relation. Given that the austere 
representation of phrase structure collapses the distinction between maximal and 
minimal projections, there are consequences for what phrase markers can be said to 
dominate others and hence some clarification of the notion of command is necessary. I 
wi l l return to this question shortly, but irrespective of this, i f we translated the austere 
representation in (20) back to the traditional tree structure notation, the dependency 
between X and Y would not satisfy the definition of command regardless of whether 




The inclusion of the pair (X, Y) in the linearization set does not lead to a violation of 
any of the constraints in (14). Hence, some other mechanism is required to rule out the 
possibility of forming such dependencies. 
This is achieved by treating the command relation as a primitive rather than 
derived relation. Instead of interpreting each pair (a, p) in the linearization set in terms 
of precedence, it wil l now be defined as representing an instance of the command 
relation such that a commands p. This wil l nevertheless imply precedence following 
Kayne (1994). A new definition of command is provided in (21) in terms of pairs and 
dominance. 
21. a commands P i f f 
((a, P) G L) V 
3y ((a, y) G L/^(y commands P)) v 
3y (a commands y A -i{y dominates a) A (y dominates P) 
Command relations are partly defined in terms of dominance, and dominance can be 
derived either by the transitivity of the dominance relation or by stipulating the triangle 
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rule discussed earlier and restated in terms of command in (22).^'' In words, this rule 
says that for a linearization set containing the pair (a, P), a dominance relation will hold 
between a and p i f and only i f there is no intervening y such that a commands y and y 
commands p. 
22. i f ( a , P)e Lthen 
(a dominates P v p dominates a) i f f -iBy (a commands y A y commands P) 
This is a slightly more general version of the rule informally introduced earlier, in 
which dominance relations were inferred from pairs that formed closed loops of 
dependencies between sets of three tokens. The rule in (22) is more general in that it 
applies to closed loops of any size. The eariier rule allowed us to infer the dominance 
relations that hold in triangle structures as in (9), repeated below. 
9. 
T, T3 
b. { ( T , , T 2 ) , ( T , , T 3 ) , ( T 2 , T 3 ) ) 
Using the new rule in (22), we can derive exactly the same dominance relations as 
follows. First, we can infer the facts in (23) from the linearization set. 
23. a. Either Ti dominates T2 or T2 dominates T|. 
b. Either T2 dominates T3 or T3 dominates T j . 
c. There is no dominance relation between T| and T3. 
^ Since (he definition of command refers to dominance and the definilion of dominance refers 10 
command, these are recursive definitions. Al the most fundamental level, ihey both ultimately derive from 
the simplest type of command relation, which is represented by a pair in the linearization set. 
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These facts rule out the structures in (24) as a way of representing these three 
dependencies, thus leaving either the triangle structure of (9a) or an upside-down 
version of i l as the only alternatives, the latter being ruled-oui in turn by condition 
(14c), which says that no token can be dominated by more than one parent. 
24. a. T , 








Making command a primitive relation was motivated by the inability to rule out 
structures such as (20). By redefining pairs as instances of the command relation and 
generalising the rule for inferring dominance relations, we find that no dependency 
linking X and Y can now exist in this structure without i l having consequences for 
dominance. The lack of an intervening token that X commands and which in turn 
commands Y means that a dominance relation must necessarily hold between X and Y, 
but no such tree can be constructed without violating the single parent constraint of 
(14b) since it would result in either X or Y having more than one parent. 
To show that these changes do not also rule out the formation of legitimate pairs, 
consider the tree in (25). 
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25. 
Apart from the pairs implied by the triangles already in place in (25), other pairs could 
be added to encode long-distance dependencies without having any consequences for 
dominance. These are listed in (26). The addition of certain other pairs would have 
consequences for dominance that lead to violations of the single parent constraint 
(14b). These are listed in (27). The only other pairs that could be added are the mirror 
images of those already accounted for, each of which would violate the constraints in 
(14) i f inserted. 
26. (W, V), (W, Y), (W, Z), (U, Y), (U, Z) 
27. (W, T) , (X, V), (X, T), (X, Y), (X, Z), (T, Y), (T, Z) 
In this example and in general, no pairs are ruled out that would be required to account 
for the long-distance dependencies implicated in phenomena such as movement, 
anaphoric binding and the scope of quantifiers. 
The use of command as a primitive relation is not new. Frank and Kuminiak 
(2000) showed that the command relation can be used to define a subclass of the tree 
structures that can be defined using precedence and dominance relations, and that this 
subclass approximates the class that are permitted within X-Bar theory, thus deriving 
many of its constraints. 
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Within the Minimalist syntax of Chomsky (1995), the constraint that a moved 
constituent must command its base-generated position derives from the nature of the 
Move operator. However, the observation that the command relation is also relevant for 
binding and scope phenomena suggests that either these phenomena also involve 
movement in some subtle way or that the command relation actually derives from a 
more general feature of the computational system. The idea that the command relation 
would be implicated in distinct phenomena for unrelated reasons should be abhorrent to 
the Minimalist. 
The prominence of the command relation is achieved under the current proposal 
by treating it as the primitive in terms of which all legitimate linguistic structures can be 
specified, the pairs in a linearization set being instances of the simplest type of 
command relation. 
6 . 3 , 3 Feature checking 
In chapter five (§5.1.2), I argued that the syntactic representations contained in lexical 
entries are free from both oplionality and structure, and hence that syntactic properties 
can be encoded as an unordered set of features. Under this view, the appearance of 
optionality arises purely from lexical choice and no distinction of the kind advocated by 
Stabler (1997) need be made between 'selecting' and 'licensing' features, nor would 
features need to be lineariy ordered in lexical entries as they are in his formalism (see 
§2.5 of chapter two). The syntactic distribution of a lexical item is then determined by a 
set of features which can be checked against each other to establish dependencies. To 
indicate which features can be checked against one another, we can represent features as 
being either positively or negatively specified. A treatment of the role of formal features 
in a triangle-based representation follows. Comparisons with Stabler's (1997) notation 
wil l serve to illustrate their formal equivalence. 
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Siabler's noiation is equivalent lo the austere representations of tree structures 
that collapse the distinction between maximal and minimal projections for simple 
phrases as in (28), but if multiple specifiers are permitted within the same phrase as in 
(29a), the austere representation requires positing a further token to mediate the 
dependency, hence the introduction of the token /?'in (29b). 
28. a. Stabler's notation b. austere notation 
Q 
29. a. Stabler's notation b. austere notation 
The triangle-based tree representations corresponding to (28b) and (29b) are as in (30a) 
and (30b) respectively. 
198 
30. 
Each vertex of a triangle is associated with a micro token of a specified type with its 
own lexical entry. For instance, the tokens in (30a) could be specified with the feature 
sets given in (31) to give the desired structure. Each pair is licensed by the association 
of a positively specified feature of one token with the corresponding negatively 
specified feature of the token it commands. For instance, the bottom left token /?/, of the 
P triangle contains the +P feature that links to the -P feature of qt to form the pair (/?/., 
31. PL {+P,+PLR) 
PR {-P2,-PLR} 
qr l -Q,+Q2) 
qt ( - P , + Q L R , + Q , + P 2 ) 
qR i - R , - Q 2 , - Q L R , + R 2 } 
i + R L R , + R ) 
KR { - R 2 , - R L R ) 
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In chapter two (§2.5), we saw how we could derive the sentence Some linguist speaks 
every language using Stabler's formalism. I wil l now demonstrate how the same 
structural facts can be captured using a pair-based representation. In Stabler's 
derivation, the lexical items featuring in the derivation were specified as in (32) with the 
convention that the items lacking phonetic content are enclosed within brackets. The 








=n d -case 
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(linguist) < (some) 
(every) (language) speaks 
every language 
The lexical entries for the triangle-based representation require that each of the lexical 
items listed in (32) be split into two to represent the bottom two vertices of each 
triangle. The resulting feature sets are listed in (34). Except for the token at the root of 
the tree, the lop vertex of each triangle is always shared with another, so only one token 
in the tree wi l l be unaccounted for once we have split each of the items in (32) into iwo 
parts. The root token is here assigned the label (C)R suggesting its role as the right hand 
vertex of an incomplete triangle representing a non-overt complementiser. 
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34. every^L {+DLR, +ARG,+D) 
every R {-N, -D2, -DLR, -CASE, +N2) 
some^ i+DLR, +ARG, +D) 
someR { - N , -D2, -DLR, -CASE, +N2) 
langiiaget {+NLR, +N) 
languageR {-N2, -NLR1 
linguistL l + N L R , + N ) 
lingitistR {-N2, - N L R } 
speaksL {+TVLR, +TV) 
speaksR {-D, -ARC, -TV2, -TVLR, +D2} 
(ext)L {-ARC, +CASE, +VLR, +V) 
(ext)R | _ T V , - V 2 , - V L R , +TV2) 
(Tk {-D, +TLR, +T, +CASE, +D2) 
(T)R { - V , - T 2 , - T L R , +V2) 
(C)R i - T , +T2) 
The tree structure corresponding to (33) is given in (35) with dominance determined by 





D / A R G 
DLR -
language 
N L R 
Since the tree structure in (33) contains a verb phrase with two specifiers, an additional 
macro token was also needed in (34) and (35). This is labelled (ext) to be suggestive of 
its function in assigning a iheta role to an argument that is external to the verb phrase. 
Chomsky (1995: ch4) also postulates a distinct functional projection for assigning an 
external thematic role which he denotes vP. Splitting the verb into two macro tokens in 
this way also allows us to capture the active/passive distinction of transitive verbs since 
the external role is not assigned to the subject when a verb like speak is passivised. The 
(ext) token would then be missing in the structure of a passive sentence and, i f this 
token is also associated with the CASE feature that is checked with the object, then its 
absence in passive structures wi l l also explain why passive verbs are unable to assign 
structural case lo their objects and hence why the object must 'move' to the subject 
position to check its case features. 
There were two instances of movement in the derivation of (33), one involving 
the overt movement of the subject and the other involving the covert movement of the 
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object. The long-distance dependencies associated with both are also represented in (35) 
with dashed lines. The subject is assigned case from a local token checking the CASE 
feature while its theta role (ARC feature) is checked by a remote token internal to the 
verb phrase as i f having undergone movement. The object on the other hand, has its 
CASE feature checked remotely and its ARC feature checked locally capturing the 
effect of covert movement in Stabler's derivation. The spirit of the overt/covert 
distinction is therefore also preserved. 
Many of the tokens in (34) have identical feature content, suggesting that they 
may not actually have distinct lexical entries. For instance, the left tokens of every and 
some contain the same features. This is also true of their right tokens. 
36. everyt I so/net I+DLR, +ARG, +D) 
everyti I somen { -N, -D2, -DLR, -CASE, +N21 
As discussed in chapter five, this kind of redundancy, particularly i f found in the lexical 
entries for the very many open class items, would be extremely cosily. Therefore, it 
seems more likely that only one or the other of the left and right micro tokens is actually 
associated with the semantic and phonetic content of a macro token. For all of the nouns 
and verbs in the example in (34), the left token has fewer features. This would make 
economic sense i f it is the left rather than the right token that is unique for every open 
class item. I f the right hand tokens are not unique for each member of an open class, 
then no redundancy would necessarily result by offloading most of the feature content 
to them. One consequence of this would be that right hand tokens would mediate a 
greater number of dependencies compared to left hand tokens thus producing structures 
that are predominantly right-branching. The causal link might however be in the 
opposite direction, with whatever is motivating consistent branching to the right (in 
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English at least) being responsible for the lighter feature content of left hand tokens. 
This is an open question. 
6,3.4 Lexical features and linearization sets 
In this section, I wil l demonstrate that i f each token in a sequence has a set of features 
associated with it, then the linear order of the tokens is the only other piece of 
information required to establish the contents of the linearization set. To see why this is 
the case, we have to make the method of translating from one type of representation to 
the other explicit. Consider the two ways that the A features in (37) could be checked 
against each other. 
37.. The man whom she punched died. 
+ A - A a. + A 
b. + A + A - A 
- A 
In principle, there are two ways to link these features, as in (37a) or as in (37b). But in 
all English constructions that involve this potential ambiguity, the dependencies never 
cross. Regardless of how many feature pairs are nested inside each other, the features 
form pairs like an onion skin with the outermost features forming a pair, then the next 
two outermost features forming a pair and so on down to the innermost features. Given 
this regularity, one can always translate between linearly ordered feature sets and pair-
based representations. The onion skin regularity can be formalised as in (38). 
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38. The onion skin algorithm 
Start at the token whose feature set contains the positive feature, setting the 
feature counter to I . Scan each token one by one, working rightwards. For each 
feature set encountered that contains a feature of the same type, increase the 
counter i f the feature is positively specified, or decrease it i f it is negatively 
specified. The negatively specified feature that reduces the counter to zero wil l 
belong to the matching token. A pair linking these two tokens wil l therefore 
need to exist in the linearization set. 
6 - J . 5 Theta roles and case assignment 
The spirit of Siabler's distinction between selecting and licensing features is also 
preserved in the distinction between features contained in the left and right tokens of a 
triangle. The left token will carry the ARC feature necessary for determining the theta 
role of a determiner phrase for instance, while the right token wil l contain its CASE 
feature as schematised in (39). 
39. 
T H E T A C A S E 
What this means is that arguments that are traditionally analysed as having 
undergone overt movement wil l necessarily have long-distance theta dependencies and 
local case dependencies, which derives the observation that movement is always 
leftwards and the fact that a constituent appearing in the base-generated position can 
receive the same theia role as a constituent that has undergone ^movement'. Covert 
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movement wil l be the opposite with long-distance case dependencies and local iheta 
dependencies. 
The interplay between case and theta roles is a natural by-product of the 
symmetry of triangular structure and needn't have a functional motivation that is 
distinct from it. It is a concomitant trait in the sense defined in chapter three (§3.1.1). 
The ability to explain independent evidence like the case/theta interaction is an 
extremely promising result and strongly suggests that pair-based representations capture 
something fundamental about syntactic structure. 
6.4 Summary 
Optimality considerations can be used to constrain inquiry into the nature as well as the 
evolutionary functions of a trait, the logic being that we have much more reason to 
expect to encounter a trait that can be related to fitness than one that can't be. By 
focussing inquiry on hypotheses that are compatible with evolutionary concerns, we can 
expect to increase our chances of discovering explanatory theories. But i f we pursue this 
further by focussing not only on hypotheses that relate an unobserved trait to fitness, but 
more narrowly on those that do so in such a way that the trait represents an optimal 
solution to a fitness-related problem, we can expect to find ourselves exploring the most 
fertile region in the space of possible hypotheses. 
In the present case, the central hypothesis grew out of the observation that 
sequence representations that were optimal for performing insertion operations would 
also be capable of capturing the basic facts o f constituency. Exploring this hypothesis in 
more detail led to the surprising conclusion that a representation that was optimal for 
performing insertion operations would also be capable of capturing long-distance 
dependencies like those that are traditionally analysed in terms of the movement of 
constituents in derivations. 
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This result presents a challenge to Chomsky's (1995, 1999, 2000a) view that 
movement is a kind of imperfection motivated by constraints external to the 
computational system: 
Speculations about [movement] invoked considerations of language use: 
facilitation of parsing on certain assumptions, the separation of theme-rheme 
structures from base-determined semantic (9) relations, and so on. Such 
speculations involve "extraneous" conditions ... imposed on [the computational 
system] by the ways i l interacts with external systems. That is where we would 
hope the source of ^'imperfections" would lie, on minimalist assumptions 
(Chomsky, 1995: 317). 
If movement is intrinsic lo constitueni str\icture representations, a language faculty that 
lacked this phenomenon would not be any simpler or more elegant. Under the present 
analysis, movement is possible, not because the language faculty has been augmented 
with externally motivated mechanisms that enable it, but because i l lacks constraints 
that would prevent i l . ^ ^ 
In terms of the debate over derivational versus representational approaches to 
Minimalism (briefly reviewed in §2.5 of chapter 2), the current approach certainly 
comes down on the side of representations, in section 6.3.3, 1 demonstrated that it is 
possible to apply the representational approach developed here to phenomena that are 
usually captured in terms of derivations. The current approach was compared directly 
with Stabler's (1997) Minimalist formalism, and found to be sufficiently powerful to 
capture all of the same phenomena, but without requiring the four-way distinction he 
made between base, select, licensee and licensor features, and without needing to 
" This point was foreshadowed in chapter three (§3.3.1) in relation to the problem of what does and does 
not require an evolutionary explanation. 
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specify an ordering for the formal features of lexical entries. Following the conclusions 
of chapter five, lexical entries simply contain an unordered set of formal features that 
are either positively or negatively specified. 
Jusi as each lexical entry contains an unstructured set of formal features, the full 
constituent structure of a sentence is represented as an unstructured set of pairs. The use 
of these set-based representations may prove simpler to reconcile with neural 
representations than more traditional approaches. 
If constituent structure representations were exapted, then we might expect to 
find the same representational mechanisms in other systems of the brain that are used 
for sequencing, and i f properties like long-distance dependencies are inherent to these 
representations, then we should expect to find them in these other systems too. We 
should also expect to observe the triangle structure that gives rise to the specifier-head-
complement structure at the level of macro tokens. As reviewed in chapter four (§4.2.3), 
the onset, nucleus and coda of syllables possess an analogous structure to that of the 
specifier, head and complement of phrases. Long-distance dependencies also appear to 
be attested in the phonology of some languages (Carsiairs-McCarthy, 1999: 138f), 
which is at least suggestive that phonology is one such system. 
Not all linearization sets correspond to legitimate trees. Those that are ruled out 
are ruled out by the constraints in (14). These are all motivated to allow the tokens in 
the tree to be linearized. The non-circularity constraint (14a) prevents contradictions 
arising in which one token both precedes and follows another. The single parent 
constraint (14b) is necessary because no order could be specified for unconnected tree 
fragments and no order is guaranteed to be specifiable for tokens dominating different 
parents of the same node. The triangle constraint (14c) is necessary because no order 
could be specified between triangles that share their top vertices. Since all of these 
constraints are motivated by linearization, they all serve the single overarching 
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constraint in (40), although there are a few special cases of structures that would still be 
linearizable without violating these constraints. 
40. The linearization set must specify a consistent linear order for all of the tokens it 
references. 
This constraint requires a definition of precedence, which can be given as in (41) in 
terms of command (21) and dominance (22),. the latter itself also being ultimately 
defined in term of command. 
41 . a precedes p i f f 
a commands P v 3y (y dominates a A - I ( Y dominates P) A y commands P) 
The constraints in (14) can be viewed as a particular solution to satisfying the constraint 
in (40). It may be more computationally tractable to check for conformity to certain 
constraints that wi l l always imply linearizability than lo check for linearizability itself, 
even i f this is at the expense of ruling out a few special cases such as the structure in 
(42) , which violates the single parent constraint. However, it is not easy to build on 
structures like (42) without immediately leading to violations of linearizability. For 
instance, the linear order of tokens A and B cannot be determined in the structure in 
(43) . 
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To put the results of this chapter in perspective, it follows from the constraints in (14) 
alone that that valid linearization sets wil l be those that exhibit the properties listed in 
(44) below. 
44. a. nested constituent structure 
b. the specifier-head-complement structure of phrases 
c. long-distance dependencies that are in a command relation such as those 
implicated in movement, anaphor binding and quantifier scope effects 
d. theta/case interactions 




If inquiry into the evolutionary functions of language universals is to proceed, it must 
do so without the luxury of fossil evidence and, for properties that are unique to human 
communication, without comparative evidence of the kind that Darwin utilised to study 
variation in the finches of the Galapagos Archipelago. Because of this, research in this 
field has to take full advantage of what little evidence is actually available. I have 
argued that optimality considerations are an important source of evidence that has been 
mostly overlooked in studies of language evolution. This led to the development of the 
opiimality diagnostic presented in chapter three, which was applied to two different 
empirical questions in chapters five and six. The methodological and empirical 
contributions arising from this work are summarised in what follows. Some remaining 
issues and future challenges are then discussed. 
7,1 Methodological contributions 
The present thesis is sympathetic to many of the criticisms that have been levelled at 
selectionist accounts of language evolution. Chapter three devoted considerable space to 
these objections, but nevertheless concluded that none of them are in fact fatal. It is 
clear that many researchers hold naive assumptions about the explanatory role of natural 
selection in language evolution, but with these weaknesses highlighted, a more 
principled method for evaluating claims about selective functions was developed, which 
centres on the expectation that natural selection wil l lead to improbable optimaliiy. 
These points are summarised in more detail below. 
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7,1.1 The lack of non-selectionist categories of explanation 
Stephen Jay Gould and others (Gould & Lewontin, 1979; Gould & Vrba, 1982; Gould, 
1991; Lightfoot, 2000; Piatielli-Palmarini, 1989; Uriagereka, 1998) have argued that 
there are other forces that determine the properties of organisms aside from natural 
selection, but almost all of the forces these authors discuss are not mutually exclusive 
alternatives to it at all, but are either the indirect results of natural selection or the 
physical constraints acting on it. The only mutually exclusive alternative to explanations 
in terms of natural selection is genetic drift betv^een different variants of equal fitness. 
Explanations in terms of drift are limited to the emergence of traits that do not alter 
fitness, but in terms of structure, genetic drift increases entropy and thereby leads to the 
deterioration of vestigial traits which have lost their functions and which are therefore 
no longer kept in check by natural selection. To describe genetic drift as a source of 
creativity would be misleading at best. 
Gould and his colleagues have succeeded in raising a number of important 
issues, even i f they have incorrectly presented them as an anti-selectionist critique. 
What they have highlighted instead are that selectionist explanations cannot assume that 
all traits are selected independently of one another (§3.1.1), that their current functions 
are the same as those they were selected for (§3.1.2), that all conceivable variants of a 
trait are physically attainable (§3.1.3), that elegant structures can emerge as a result of 
very simple developmental processes (§3.1.4), and that some properties emerge through 
other kinds of optimisation such as learning (§3.1.5) and cultural evolution (§3.1.6). I 
argued in chapter three that none of these issues, as they apply to a given trait, would 
rule out the possibility that it was refined under genetic selection. More wil l be said 
about the interaction between genetic selection and other optimising processes in 
section 7.3.1. 
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7,1.2 The irrelevance of communicative functions 
If properties of language are adaptations, it is generally assumed they must be 
adaptations for communicative functions. This seems so obvious that it is rarely ( i f 
ever) even acknowledged as an assumption. Hauser et al. (2002: 1574) assume this for 
instance, when they express doubts that the evolution of syntactic universals can be 
exclusively explained in terms of adaptation, noting thai many such constraints have a 
"tenuous connection to communicative efficacy", but even i f a given universal is 
unrelated to communicative efficacy, it could slill be an adaptation for a non-
communicative function. Ii may be an adaptation that improves the efficiency of 
representations or computations for instance. An adaptive change of this kind could 
occur without having any consequences for expressiveness at all, while allowing the 
language facuhy to operate at lower costs with respect to metabolic energy or other 
neural resources. Other properties may relate to communicative efficacy indirectly, 
much as a button on a winter coat contributes to the overall function of keeping its 
wearer warm, but only via the more specific function of fastening it closed, the 
fastening function being much more relevant for explaining its peculiar design 
characteristics. The design of coat buttons has, at best, a *'tenuous connection*' to 
thermal functions. In the case of language, there may be syntactic universals that have a 
*'tenuous connection to communicative efficacy" for much the same reason, having been 
selected for more specific functions which account for their design properties more 
directly. 
Initially, it may seem surprising, but adaptive explanations appear to be much 
more forthcoming i f we drop the assumption that universals have functions that relate 
directly to communication. Chapters five and six explored adaptive hypotheses of this 
kind. In chapter five, I argued that closed-class items exist, not for any communicative 
purpose, but merely because their existence economises the representation of the 
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lexicon. Likewise, in chapter six, I argued that constituent structure representations were 
selected for being able to perform insertions into sequences. 
7.1.3 The irrelevance of design complexity 
At least since Dawkins (1986), the argument from the appearance of design has been 
borrowed from theology and applied to biology as evidence of selection for particular 
functions. To the extent that optimaliry considerations have been used to make such 
arguments, they have been used virtually interchangeably with complexity, but there are 
important differences. While complex adaptations are the best illustrations of the power 
of natural selection, natural selection is also capable of stripping away structure to 
sculpt features, much as it does in development via apoptosis (for instance, in killing of f 
cells to make gaps between fingers in the development of an embryo). The loss of body 
hair and limb structures in exclusively aquatic mammals appears to be an example of 
this. Adaptive changes that reduce complexity (in the sense of removing structure) 
evidently occur, so there is no reason why it couldn't craft features that are non-
redundant and elegant. These structures would not be more complex than those they 
evolved from, but we should nevertheless expect them to be optimal within the space of 
local variation for serving the function for which they were selected. In the case of 
aquatic mammals, what is optimised is presumably the drag associated with swimming, 
which would be less for a smooth and streamlined body. The thermal functions o f hair 
that apply to mammals out of water are largely ineffective under water so are achieved 
by other adaptations such as increased levels of subcutaneous fat (Morris, 1967). 
7.1.4 The optimality diagnostic 
In chapter three, I introduced a diagnostic, adapted from Parker and Maynard Smith 
(1990), for identifying selective functions. This diagnostic dispenses with the notion of 
design complexity, being founded instead on the assumption that natural selection wil l 
produce traits that occupy local optima in the space of possible variants. It follows from 
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this that the only functions that could have been relevant for the selection of a given trait 
are those that describe fitness landscapes that have a local peak at the point the trait 
occupies. 
The reliability of the diagnostic depends on the accuracy with which the local 
space of possible variants, which Parker and Maynard Smith call the strategy set, can be 
determined. It also relies on the ability to relate the hypothesised function to fitness, 
which is what excludes functions from being stipulated in a post hoc way. We should 
also be more confident that a hypothesised function had relevance for selection i f only a 
small proportion of the strategy set exhibits optimalily with respect to it. Because none 
of these things are trivial to determine, uncertainty about any of them will affect the 
confidence we should have in the result of the diagnostic as a whole. The diagnostic 
wil l not therefore always provide a crisp delineation between functions that were and 
were not relevant for selection. Even so, it is adequate for comparing competing 
theories of function and arguing from the best explanation. 
In addition to claims about adaptation, the optimality diagnostic can be used to 
assess claims relating to exaptation by providing evidence that a given trait is 
improbably optimal for survival-related functions that it no longer serves. 
Although the use of optimality as an explicit diagnostic tool is essentially novel 
within studies of language evolution, optimalily considerations have previously been 
used to infer selective functions in other areas of evolutionary biology (Parker & 
Maynard Smith, 1990; Orzack & Sober, 2001). 
7.1,5 A narrower view of perfection for the Minimalist 
Program 
For a gold prospector, the observation that gold deposits are often found in veins of 
quartz suggests a strategy for how one should proceed with the search. Obviously, one 
should focus on rocks rich in quartz. Likewise for a scientist, it is sensible to focus 
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one's search for good theories on those that exhibit a regularity that is often observed to 
hold of good theories generally. This is the logic of the Minimalist Program, which 
arose from the observation that the principles of the computational system appear to be 
^perfect' in some sense. On the basis of this observation, it made sense to direct inquiry 
towards theories that suppose this perfection is a general feature of the computational 
system. 
A prospector needn't know why quartz and gold are found together for his 
strategy to work and the same is true for the Minimalist. However, a strategy may work 
better i f the physical basis of the association is understood. In the case of the prospector, 
this knowledge may allow him to focus his search on the quartz that is most likely to 
have been deposited by processes of the relevant kind. Likewise, it may be possible to 
clarify what type of perfection we should expect to find in the computational system by 
gaining some understanding of why it is there. 
In chapter three (§3,3.1), J argued that the type of 'perfection' that the 
computational system exhibits is entirely compatible with selection for streamlining in 
evolution. Specifically, I challenged Chomsky's (1995) assertion that redundancy is an 
expected property of a biological system by arguing that it wil l only be favoured i f it 
overrides competing design priorities for factors such as efficiency in representations 
and computations. The notion of ^perfection' can of course be interpreted in terms of 
these priorities too, but i f the computational system were perfect according to other 
criteria that happen to be incompatible with filness-relaled functions, then this 
perfection could not have been directly selected for in evolution. Hauser, et al. (2002) 
may be right about the lack of a relationship between properties of grammar and 
communicative functions, but the properties typically cited as evidence of the perfection 
of language (economy principles, etc.) appear to be entirely compatible with natural 
selection for non-communicative functions. If natural selection is indeed the basis of 
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this 'perfection', then the search for explanatory theories should focus only on the kind 
of perfection that is compatible with optimisation under its influence. 
Optimality considerations have been applied in the current thesis in two distinct 
ways. We have seen that they can be used to focus inquiry into selective functions by 
only entertaining functional hypotheses for which the observed trait is optimal. We have 
also seen that optimality considerations can be used to inquire into the nature of 
systems by only proposing the existence of traits that would serve fitness-related 
functions optimally. Chapter five was principally a case study in the former and chapter 
six was principally a case study in the latter, although neither was entirely one or the 
other. 
To contrast the approach of chapter six with inquiry within the Minimalist 
Program, it is instructive to ask what would compel a Minimalist to consider the kind of 
perfection entertained there as a basis of a theory of representations. Without linking 
perfection to natural selection, there is no compulsion to entertain an exaplive 
hypothesis, and hence no particular compulsion to link insertion operations on 
sequences with constituent structure. 
7.2 Empirical contributions 
7.2.1 Closed-class items and the lexicon 
In chapter five, i presented a theory of the selective function associated with closed-
class items, where I argued that they serve to minimise the representational burden of 
the lexicon by eliminating redundancy. This is achieved by offloading what would be 
redundantly repeated feature content contained in the open-class items to the small set 
of closed-class items, which then lake on the role of mediating dependencies between 
the open classes in syntactic configurations. By encapsulating open-class items, closed-
class items also avoid the need to have different words with the same meaning for 
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different syntactic positions within sentences (e.g., having a different word to express a 
given meaning when used as a subject as opposed to an object, etc.). A lexicon that 
reduced redundancy of these kinds would presumably place less of a burden on 
metabolic and other neural resources, which we should expect natural selection to 
favour when all else is equal. Alternative languages are imaginable in which closed 
classes do not exist, or i f they do exist, they exist without serving to mediate 
dependencies between open-class items. These would be suboptimal relative to the 
observed trail. 
A number of interesting findings follow when examining the consequences of 
the theory. In particular, it appears that properties like case, agreement and the 
requirement that sentences have subjects are expected consequences of an optimised 
lexicon, the theory thereby relating these properties to natural selection for the first 
time. It also motivates the view that language variation is confined lo parameters 
associated with closed-class items, in turn explaining why parameter confiicts fail to 
arise in bilingualism. 
7.2.2 Phrase structure and sequences 
In chapter six, I presented a theory of the selective function associated with constituent 
structure, arguing that this was a by-product of selection for performing efficient 
insertion operations into sequences. A number of conceivable sequence representations 
are described to populate a speculative strategy set, each of which is evaluated with 
respect to the efficiency of insertions. These include methods in which order is encoded 
using indexes that encode the absolute order of each token in the sequence, and 
representations that encode relative order using pair- and triple-based representations. 
The optimal representation in the strategy set allows an insertion to be made with a 
single operation and without introducing redundancy. A surprising feature of this 
representation is that it also allows nested constituent structure to be represented. This 
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suggests that constituent structure may have arisen under selection for performing 
efficient insertions into sequences and later co-opted for their use in language. Some 
further consequences of the theory are explored by looking at a lower-level description 
of the same kind of representation in which dominance relations are inferred from pair-
based representations that form triangles. The ability to encode long-distance 
dependencies such as those associated with movement phenomena follows from the use 
of the pairs to encode the structure of dominance and precedence relations in the 
structure meaning that no additional theoretical apparatus is required to account for it. 
The representation of movement phenomena is thereby unified with the representation 
of constituent structure itself - a striking result. Other properties of grammar also follow 
such as the specifier-head-complement structure of phrases, which arises from the way 
triangles can share vertices, and the interaction between case and theta assignment, 
which also arises from the triangular structure. These findings bring together a 
surprising array of phenomena, reinforcing its correctness as the representational basis 
of syntactic structures, while also providing an excellent example of how optimality 
considerations can be useful for constructing hypotheses not just about the evolutionary 
functions of systems, but also their nature. 
7.3 Remaining questions 
7,3.1 Alternative sources of fit 
Kirby (1999) is right to warn us that optimising processes that rest atop the biological 
substrate such as learning, cultural evolution and planning processes can produce a fit 
between traits and functions that is difficult to distinguish from the fit produced by 
natural selection in the genetic domain. To distinguish these sources of optimalily, we 
need to look at what we expect from each. 
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When developmental processes occur under environment conditions that our 
ancestors were never exposed to, such as the zero gravity conditions of orbital space 
flight, we shouldn't necessarily expect the outcomes to be fitness-enhancing from a 
genetic point of view, but in some respects they should be. No environment wil l be 
exactly like those our ancestors were exposed to in detail, but the typical features of the 
environments our ancestors experienced are likely to have left their mark on our design. 
Some aspects of the environment, such as the laws of physics, are completely invariant, 
so a learning or developmental process that relied only on regularities of this kind 
would tend to succeed everywhere. For instance, a learning process that generally seeks 
to associate causes with effects or minimise certain kinds of errors between predictions 
and observations would always tend to produce a fit between traits and functions that 
we should expect to be fitness-enhancing. In such cases, the functions being optimised 
would be of a very general nature, applying as much to life in an orbiting spacecraft as 
to life on the ground. To the extent that more specific functions would be optimised by 
these processes, this is most likely to occur when they are special cases of the more 
general function in the way that the ability to tie a knot in a piece of string is a special 
case of the ability to tie knots generally. 
Under typical circumstances, we should expect the effects of these optimising 
processes to be aligned with genetic fitness since a process that optimised a function 
that was generally maladaptive to perform would tend to be selected out. When looking 
at the evolution of these processes, we therefore need to look at what would constitute 
the optimal optimiser. To apply the optimality diagnostic correctly, we'd have to 
populate the strategy set with variations on the existing optimiser (or concomitant 
mechanisms) rather than the space of solutions the optimiser itself explores. It may of 
course require careful analysis to separate one from the other. 
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Many aspects of our environment are adapted to us rather than the other way 
around. This phenomenon is particularly evident in human artefacts and can be 
understood in terms of cultural evolution. To borrow an example from Gould and 
Lewontin (1979), spectacles were designed for noses rather than the other way around. 
The optimality diagnostic will help identify when an optimising process has occurred, 
but not necessarily which aspect of the system was optimised to fit which. In the case of 
human artefacts like spectacles, we have historical evidence to decide the issue, but this 
is not always available. Deacon (1997), Kirby (1999) and others have raised the 
possibility thai languages, as cultural entities, have also evolved, at least to some extent, 
10 fit the constraints of the language acquisition device rather than the other way around. 
Evidence from creolisation can bear on this issue by telling us which properties are in 
fact present from the very birth of a language and which emerge later. We can also 
expect boih the strategy sets and the functions thai are optimised to be different for 
different optimising processes. For instance, the functions cultural evolution wil l tend to 
optimise are things like transmission fidelity from person to person, and this 
optimisation wil l occur even when the changes are fitness-neutral from a genetic point 
of view. Hence, the functions that are optimised can be used to distinguish one process 
from the other under certain circumstances. The results of the opiimality diagnostic wi l l 
have to be supported by evidence like this before it can be concluded that the source of 
the optimality is genetic evolution rather than something else. 
7.3.2 Optimality and stability 
The view of opiimality presented in this thesis is something of a simplification. I have 
used the term optimum in essentially the sense of what would be called a stable point 
attractor in dynamical systems theory, meaning that all possible solutions in the 
neighbourhood of the optimum will tend to migrate towards it over time and stay there 
once reached, but this assumes that the relevant species is evolving to fit a static niche. 
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In many cases, the environment of one genetic variant will include other genetic 
variants that are co-evolving with it in such a way that they wil l affect each other's 
chances of survival. Competitive interactions between these different variants wil l lead 
to complex evolutionary dynamics such as *arms races' of the kind that occur between 
predators and prey in which each innovation in predaiion is matched with an innovation 
for evading capture in the prey species. This is a runaway process that wil l only 
terminate once fundamental physical limitations are reached or an extinction event 
occurs. In other cases, the interactions between variants will be such that stability wil l 
only arise when certain combinations of variants are present in the system. Maynard 
Smith (1982) labelled these evolutionarily stable strategies. This kind of stability is 
only possible when variants occupy local optima on their respective fitness landscapes, 
but since their fitness landscapes were changing as they co-evolved, each variant wi l l 
come to rest atop a peak that it may never have actually scaled. When applying the 
oplimalily diagnostic to trails for which competitive interactions of this sort are 
relevant, we cannot simply model natural selection as optimising a variant to fit a static 
niche. The dynamics of the whole system will have to be taken into account instead of 
just a part of it, and more sophisticated models of stability wil l need lo be applied. 
Modelling the niche as static is nevertheless appropriate for the purposes of the current 
thesis, since we have no reason to expect that the cost, for one genetic variant, of lexical 
representations or of insertions into sequences would depend on the qualities possessed 
by other genetic variants in its environment. 
In constructing a strategy set, we also need to take into account that optimality 
wil l not always imply stability so that even i f a given solution is the best in the space of 
local variants, nearby solutions may have a tendency to migrate away from it over time. 
Solutions of this kind would be unstable point attractors and we should not expect 
evolution to produce them even i f they are locally optimal. The appreciation of such 
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possibilities would lead to a more sophisticated diagnostic in which the role of 
optimality is replaced by stable attractors of various kinds. 
7,4 New horizons 
Many of the questions that arise in the study of language evolution are not yet cleariy 
formulated. The present work has attempted to apply corrective lenses to at least some 
of these questions, refocusing and recasting them. It also responded to a challenge 
presented by Botha (2003) to provide a restrictive theoretical framework that would 
allow inquiry into this area to proceed with rigor even in the face of severe limitations 
on the evidence available from traditional sources such as the fossil record and 
comparative studies. The result was the optimality diagnostic. 
The optimality diagnostic has been applied to two questions reported in this 
thesis. There are of course, many other aspects of language that it may be useful to 
apply it to. A natural extension would be to look at how opiimality principles can guide 
inquiry into the nature of language acquisition, where it may prove fruitful to examine 
theories in which this process is carried out in an optimal way. Infants may for instance 
attempt to assign features such that they are satisfied as locally as possible, a strategy 
that may be motivated by memory limitations and one which would explain the 'starting 
smair results of Elman (1993), who found that his neuraf networks were best able to 
acquire syntactic structures when the length of visible dependencies was initially highly 
constrained (see §4.1.5). The theory of representations presented in chapter six is also 
explicit in a way that lends itself well to computational implementations which would 
help to clarify many of the details. 
The oplimalily diagnostic is also generalisable to other iraits involving 
behaviour and soft-tissues, which are difficult to study from an evolutionary perspective 
because they don't fossilise. It would also be useful to study species-specific properties 
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which cannot benefit from the comparative method. Candidates would perhaps include 
aspects of musical ability, the capacity for religion and consciousness. 
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The research undertaken during the preparation of this thesis resulted in the following 
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Turner, H. 2002. An introduction to methods for simulating the evolution of language. 
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lachini (Eds.), Scienze della mente. Bologna: It Mulino (in Italian). 
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Chapter 2 
Simulation Methods for the Evolution of 
Language 
Huck Turner 
Liule is known about how language evolved in our species and we don't even 
really know what the alternatives are. Without taking a computational approach, a 
iheorisi can only guess about what is and is not possible and therefore which 
assumptions are and arc not necessary. The present review aims to provide some 
perspective on computational modeling in this area in order to get a sense of what 
approaches are being taken and to categorize and describe the methodologies 
applied. In the second half, some of these models arc then placed in the context of 
relevant theoretical issues to illustrate how they can and cannot be used to inform 
the debate. 
Compuiational models have been applied to many different aspects of the 
evolution of language and in many different ways. The models covered here differ 
with respect to the linguistic subject they attempt to illuminate and the simulation 
methods they enlist for the task. In terms of the linguistic subject, the major models 
fall into a number of categories. Cangelosi and Hamad (in press), Cangelosi and 
Parisi (1998), MacLennan and Burghardt (1994) and Steels and Vogt (1997) have 
modeled the emergence of symbols and simple lexicons, while others have 
concentrated on the emergence of various syntactic properties. These include 
regular compositionaliiy (Batali, 1998; Kirby & Hurford. 1997; Steels, 1998), 
recursion (Batalt, 2000; Christiansen & Devlin. 1997; Kirby, 1999) and syntactic 
selection (Cangelosi, 1999). Steels (1998) has also produced a composite model in 
which both symbols and simple syntax emerge. Others have modeled the self-
organization of sound-systems for communication (De Boer, 1997) and aspects of 
historical change such as the formation of dialects (Livingstone & Fyfe, 1999). 
With some perspective on what issues are being explored, the following section 
will describe the major methodologies being used, explain how they arc 
implemented and provide some examples of their application. 
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26 Simulating ihc Evolulion of Language 
Simulation methods 
All of the models discussed here involve populalions of communicating agcnls. 
What varies between them is the means by which agents come to possess linguistic 
knowledge and these means arc discussed here. Broadly, they include rule-based 
approaches, neural networks including recurrent neural networks, genetic 
algorithms and variants thereof, ecological simulations and robotic language 
games. Some introductory concepts will be covered in this section so it should be 
accessible to readers from a broad range of disciplines. Those familiar with these 
concepts can probably skip many of the details, but may nevertheless gain some 
perspective by following the discussion. 
Rule-Based Inference 
The term 'rule-based inference* is used here to refer to learning methods that 
involve symbolic (as opposed to sub-symbolic) manipulations. An example is 
Kirby's (in press) model of the emergence of stable irregularity in compositional 
syntax in which he uses a rule-based algorithm to induce and invent rules for 
relating meanings (o signals. The following are some examples of the kinds of 
rules that Kirby uses to represent this mapping. 
(1) a. S : (ao, bo) ^ abc 
b. S:(ao,fci)-> abd 
The terms UQ, and b\ arc elements of the meaning to be expressed and the 
strings on the right of the arrow are the signals that are used to express the 
specified meaning components. These rules do not capture the similarities between 
the two mappings so rather than have a single rule for each, Kirby's system 
allempls to generalize. In this process, pairs of non-compositional rules like those 
in (1) are replaced with equally expressive compositional rules like those in (2) 
where .t and y are variables that stand for elements of meaning. 
(2) a. S'.{x,y)-^ A:.xB: y 
b. A : CIQ-^ ab 
c. B .bo-¥ c 
d. B.by^d 
Kirby's model involves the transmission of linguistic knowledge from 
generation to generation in a population of agents. The model demonstrates that 
given a limited number of opportunities for agents to learn the language of their 
parents, the languages that evolve exhibit the appearance of design for minimizing 
errors in transmission from generation to generation by being strongly 
compositional, and with pressure for shorter strings as well, the occurrence of non-
composiiional irregularity becomes stable. Kirby introduces a pressure for shorter 
strings by introducing noise that has the effect of corrupting longer signals more 
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often than shorter ones, but there are plausibly a number of other factors such as 
time constraints or least-effort principles that could create a pressure for shorter 
strings. 
Applying rule-based methods can be very good for testing very specific 
hypotheses. In this case, Kirby's model was designed lo test whether certain 
linguistic properties can emerge as a result of selection pressure on languages 
themselves rather than their speakers, which reinforces some of Deacon's (1997) 
ideas on the subject. More will be said about the theoretical context of this work in 
the second half of this paper and indeed in Kirby and Hurford (this volume). 
Neural Networks 
Artificial neural networks work in a way vaguely analogous to the neural networks 
that constitute nervous tissue. They are made up of a number of nodes (also called 
units or neurons) linked to one another via weighted connections that communicate 
activation levels between them. Each node has an activation level that is 
determined either by an external input or as a function of inputs from other nodes. 
Connection weights can be either excitatory or inhibitory and tuning these weights 
amounts to learning. 
Neural networks arc distributed representations meaning thai memories are 
disu-ibuted over many nodes. This property has the advantage of making them less 
vulnerable to noise and localized lesions than rule-based approaches which rely 
completely on the accuracy of input. Noise or damage will cause a neural network 
to produce categorizations that are less accurate, but which still serve as 
approximate solutions. In other words, the quality of solutions degrades gracefully. 
Graceful degradation is not a typical feature of rule-based systems. For 
example, in Kirby's (in press) model (discussed above), the introduction of noise 
caused longer signals to be corrupted more frequently than shorter ones. This is a 
fact about rule-based systems which is not generally true of neural networks. 
Consider the following pair of incomplete signals: 'p#t' and *el#ph##t'. It is not 
possible to identify the first example because the information available is not 
sufficient lo narrow it down to a single word. It could correspond to any of pat, pel. 
pit, pot or put. Being a longer word, English speakers can narrow the second 
example down to a specific word without any trouble at all presumably because 
their memory of it is distributed. Rule-based systems generally do not degrade 
gracefully so cannot make use of partially specified data. As a consequence, they 
arc just as likely to fail when a small amount of noise is present as they are when a 
large amount is present. 
The capacity to function despite noisy input makes neural networks good 
pattern classifiers, and it is this ability that Hamad (1990) argues is a basic 
prerequisite for symbolic communication. Without it we wouldn't be able to 
distinguish between different symbols or between the different objects and 
concepts they label. 
There are many different neural network architectures, but in models of 
language evolution, the most commonly used variants are multi-layer feed-forward 
neural networks and recurrent neural networks (sec Figure 2.1). 
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HIDDEN UNITS CONTEXT UNITS 
INPUT UNITS 
Figure 2.1 (a) A standard feed-forward neural network with one hidden layer, and 
(b) a recurrent neural network. Dashed arrows indicate sets of trainable connections 
where each unit in one layer is linked to every unit in the other. The solid arrow in 
(b) indicates fixed, one-to-one connections responsible for direct copying of 
activation levels from hidden-layer units to coniexi-iayer units. 
Multi-Layer, Feed-Forward Neural Networks 
As (he name suggests, this network consists o f a number of layers each of which 
feeds its unit activations on to the next. The input layer receives its activation 
values f rom the researcher or from some other system external to the network. This 
input wi l l be a raw encoding of some kind of pattern that, when- fed through the 
network, w i l l gcncralc a classification represented as activations of output layer 
nodes. For instance, a network might be used to generate a classification of speech 
sounds in terms of phonetic features (at the output layer) using an encoding of their 
frequency components as input (at the input layer). 
The interpretation of inputs and outputs is usually pre-specified by the 
researcher, but this is not the case for nodes in hidden layers and for many 
problctm no clear interpretation wi l l be possible even after learning due to the 
distributed nature of the representations. The advantage o f this is that the 
researcher does not have to make unnecessary assumptions about internal 
representations. A disadvantage is that it can make it more difficult to explain how 
a model does what it does and hence more difficult to extrapolate from it to the real 
world. 
The most commonly-used algorithm for learning in feed-forward networks is 
back-propagation (Rumelhart, Hinton & Williams. 1986). In simple terms, it 
involves comparing actual output activation levels to target activation levels (often 
called teaching inputs) to calculate an error value for each output node. The error 
of a node is then propagated backwards through the network to every node in the 
previous layer (from which it has an input) and is apportioned according to the 
relative contribution each made to that error. These errors are then used to modify 
the weights of connections slightly. 
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The neurological and psychological plausibility o f back-propagaiion is doubtful 
for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is not clear that real synapses can transmit error 
backwards. Secondly, we rarely have the opportunity to quantify the errors we 
make by comparing our output behaviors with correct target behaviors provided by 
a teacher. Thirdly, unlike learning in the real world, back-propagation typically 
requires exposure lo a vast number of examples. 
There are other ways Jeaming can be achieved in a feed-forward architecture. 
For instance, connection strengths can be evolved using a genetic algorithm 
(Montana & Davies. 1991). which may or may not be more neurologically 
plausible. For a selectionist account of learning at the neurological level see 
Edelman(l987). 
RecurrentNeural Networks 
Recurrent neural networks (Elman, 1990) are a variation on standard feed-forward 
networks with the ability lo learn temporal sequences. In terms of architecture, the 
only difference between them is that recurrent neural networks have a set o f what 
are called context units which store the previous activation levels of the hidden 
units and feed them back as inputs to the hidden layer at the next time-step (see 
Figure 2.1). 
A significant failing of standard feed-forward nets is that the number of inputs 
that can be presented to the network is fixed, [ f inputs could be presented lo a 
network sequentially then it would be possible to process data such as words and 
sentences that can vary in length. This kind o f scqucnlial processing is achieved 
using recurrent neural networks. Elman (1990). who devised ihem, trained one on 
grammatical sequences of text (generated using a context-free grammar) using the 
next word in the sequence as the target output at each time step. After training, the 
text was presented to the network again and the activation levels in its hidden layer 
were compared at each time step. The hidden representations for each word 
clustered (in terms o f similarity) into established word classes and subclasses and. 
for each, the network was able to estimate the approximate likelihood thai the next 
word was a member. 
Elman (1990) argues that the ability to predict the category of the next word 
indicates a knowledge of syntactic structure, but this is far from obvious. It might 
be fairly easy to predict the class of the next word in some cases, but it should be 
very diff icult in contexts where the next constituent modifies, or is dependent on, 
subsequent constituents. For example, in (3) the word quickly modifies 
disappearing which appears later. 
(3) It was quickly disappearing. 
In fact, there are very few limitations on what can directly follow was in this 
conicxL Various nouns, verbs, adjectives, prepositions, adverbs, determiners, 
degree words, complementizers and infinitival lo are all acceptable. Some of these 
alternatives wi l l occur more frequently than others, but that does not make them 
more grammatical than others. 
Constituents are usually constrained by their preceding context in English, but 
the reverse scenario is the norm in head-final languages such as Japanese where 
30 Simulating (he Evolution of Language 
modifiers precede (he constituents they modify, objcc(s come before verbs and 
instead of prepositions there arc postpositions. At (he very least, this means that 
language processing should be more difficult i f it relics on the ability to make 
predictions from preceding context. 
Batali (1994; 2000) has applied recurrent neural networks to studies o f the 
Baldwin effect and more recently to the evolution o f compositional syntax. 
Christiansen and Devlin (1997) have also applied recurrent neural networks to the 
evolution of consistent branching in linguistic structures. 
Genetic Algorithms 
Genetic algorithms apply natural selection to refine solutions progressively. 
Solutions are encoded as a population of coded strings analogous to chromosomes, 
which are reproduced to a greater or lesser extent according to a fitness function 
calculated with respect to how well each satisfies the constraints of a given 
problem. John Holland (1975) first developed and formalized this approach in the 
1960s. In his original formulation he used strings o f ones and zeros to represent 
chromosomes, but encodings involving larger alphabets (more than just ones and 
zeros), real numbers and irec-likc structures are now also used. There has been a 
proliferation of terminology to describe such variants, but classes that arc widely 
recognized include evolutionary strategies (Schwefel & Rudolph, 1995), genetic 
programming (Koza, 1990) and evolutionary programming (Fogel, Owens & 
Walsh. 1966). 
The fitness function that is used to select the best solutions is analogous to the 
environment of a species in that the solutions that proliferate arc those that best 
satisfy its constraints. The fitness function is not in any sense a description of a 
target solution; it is instead a specification o f constraints that a solution must 
satisfy. The actual form that any solution assumes is no more dircctcd than in the 
biological domain except in examples used in textbooks where fitness functions are 
defined in terms of the similarity to a target form, but these are useful only for 
exposition and arc obviously without any practical value ( i f the target solution is 
already known, there is no need for it to be evolved). Perhaps as a result of such 
expository simplifications, misunderstandings abound about the directedncss of 
evolution in genetic algorithms and they have attracted criticism on this basis (e.g. 
Berwick. 1996). 
Genetic algorithms can be viewed at different levels o f description as 
optimizing, search or learning algorithms. They are optimizing algorithms because 
they arc used to maximize the fitness o f solutions. They are search algorithms 
because optimization is a kind of search - a search for solutions with (near) 
optimal properties. Evolution also resembles operant conditioning insofar as it 
proceeds by penalizing mistakes and rewarding successes - a correspondence 
recognized by Skinner (1966. 1981) - so genetic algorithms can also be used as 
learning algorithms (by optimizing connection weights in a neural network for 
instance). Computational models thai involve both evolution and learning (e.g. 
Cangelosi & Parisi, 1998) are often constructed using different optimization 
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algorithms for Ihe iwo aspects (typically a genetic algorithm for the former and 
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Figure 2.2 The crossover procedure. Two parents are combined (o produce two 
offspring. 
As in the biological example, genetic algorithms involve selection, 
recombination and mutation. The selection procedure scores each string within the 
population according to what is called the objective function, which it uses to 
determine its fitness relative to others. Strings are then duplicated with a 
probability dependent on their fitness to produce a new population. The 
recombination (or crossover) procedure males pairs of strings by randomly 
choosing a crossover point and producing two offspring each sharing features o f 
both parents (as in Figure 2.2). The usefulness o f the crossover procedure w i l l 
depend on the genotype encoding and the problem domain. As in biology, 
crossover is not strictly necessary for evolution, but organisms that reproduce this 
way tend to evolve more rapidly than those that reproduce asexually. 
The mutation procedure acts with a very low probability to alter features 
randomly within the genotype. As in biology, mutations are usually deleterious but 
occasionally produce better solutions than can be generated through crossover 
alone. To determine a setting for the mutation rate, the need for variation in the 
population (preventing premature convergence) must be balanced with the need lo 
prevent degrading the population by inu-oducing too many mutants. 
In the genetic algorithm literature, individual digits within a genotype encoding 
arc called genes or features. For many problems to which genetic algorithms are 
applied, this use o f gene conflicts with biological usage where genes are (often by 
definition) regarded as the unit o f selection^ (i.e. the thing that is replicating). 
' Back-propagation is sometimes referred to as 'gradient descent learning' - an elusion to an 
emor landscape (not unlike a fitness landscape) on which learning is viewed as the descent 
of a solution (i.e. the set of u'eighis in a net wort:) to progressively lower points (representing 
lower error) on the landsca^. 
^ That genes arc the unit of selection is ihe consensus view in biology, yet many researchers 
will (in the same breath) equate genes with cistrons (a length of chromosome coding for 
exactly one protein molecule). Dawkins (1989) shows that the one will not always 
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Dawkins (1989:28) for instance, defines a gene as "...any portion of chromosomal 
material that potentially lasts for enough generations to serve as a unit of natural 
selection". He argues thai a section of chromosome counts as a gene i f it leads to 
the organism being selected over others for possessing certain trails and i f it is 
unlikely to be disrupted by crossover or mutation and thus likely to be passed on to 
its offspring. A section of chromosome has a higher likelihood o f being split up by 
the crossover procedure i f it is very long. Consequently, genes tend to be 
contiguous or closely-packed segments that are relatively short. This definition 
corresponds to the concept of a building block in the genetic algorithm literature 
while the biological counterpart of a digit in the genotype encoding is probably a 
codon or an individual nucleotide. 
In models of language evolution, genetic algorithms have been used to evolve 
weights in populations o f neural networks in the ecological simulations of 
Cangclosi and Parisi (1998), described below, and in Batali's (1994) study of the 
Baldwin effect where he used them to evolve weights in recurrent neural networks. 
Ecological Simulations 
A similar approach to genetic algorithms involves simulating an environment with 
which evolving agents interact. This kind of approach was developed by Parisi, 
Cecconi and Nolf i (1990) who used it to evolve neural network agents whose 
reproductive success was dependent on their ability to interact with a simulated 
world. 
This kind of approach has been applied to modeling the evolution o f language 
by MacLennan and Burghardt (1994) and more recently by Cangelosi and Parisi 
(1998). Cangelosi and Parisi (1998) evolved linguistic agents in a simulated 
environment containing edible and poisonous mushrooms that agents could eat and 
observe and about which they could communicate. The agents were essentially 
standard multi-layer feed-forward neural networks with some inputs dedicated to 
perceptual qualities of the environment and some outputs dedicated to the agent's 
motor response. The agents evolved to perceive qualities that helped them to 
distinguish between edible and poisonous mushrooms and thereby produce the 
appropriate behaviors approaching and avoiding respectively. In addition to the 
perceptual inputs and motor outputs, each agent possessed some inputs and outputs 
dedicated to linguistic signaling, but the form and meaning of signals was not pre-
specified allowing for a communication system to emerge spontaneously and with 
respect lo the other categorization tasks that the agents were performing. The 
symbols that the agents used were therefore grounded since ihey derived their 
meaning from interaction with an environment (Hamad. 1990). In this case, 
symbols were grounded, not to the real world, but lo a simulated one. Nevertheless, 
this kind of model allows the researcher to avoid dictating the interpretation of 
linguistic signals which is enough to observe certain kinds of self-organization in 
an emerging communication system. 
correspond to the other by illuminating cases where segments of chromosome act as a unit 
of selection, but are longer than an individual cistron. 
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Ecological approaches have been used to model both biological and cultural 
aspects o f the evolution o f language usually by using a genetic algorithm for the 
evolution aspect and learning via back-propagalion for cultural transmission during 
which parents leach offspring labels for different perceptual inputs. It should be 
clear from the previous section that there is nothing necessary about this 
distinction. Genetic algorithms and back-propagation are both optimizing 
algorithms and so either could be used for learning. 
Robot Communication 
As in ecological simulations, a major motivation of robotic approaches is in the 
modeling of communication systems that have symbols grounded in an 
environment with which agents interact. However, what makes the robotic 
approach different is that robots have a material embodiment with their 
communication systems grounded in a physical environment (albeit a controlled 
laboratory setting) to which agents have access via cameras and other sensors. 
The robotic approach has been applied to various aspects o f language. Steels 
and Vogt (1997) have used it to simulate the emergence of grounded symbols. 
Steels (1998; this volume) has used it to simulate the beginnings of syntax and De 
Boer (1997; this volume) has used it to simulate the evolution of sound systems for 
communication. 
Comparison on Issues 
This section is about how computational models are being used to inform the 
debate on some of the major issues within the field. For each of these issues, it is 
instructive to ask how producing a computational model can inform the debate. 
This question wi l l come up again and again. 
Innateness 
A central concern in the language evolution literature is to understand the extent to 
which processes governing linguistic competence and performance are innately 
specified and computational models have been used to inform this debate in a 
number o f ways. In some cases, they arc being used to demonstrate that certain 
aspects of syntax are leamable without requiring a model to have prior (i.e. 
innately specified) knowledge o f them (e.g. Baiali. 1994. 1998; Elman, 1990). This 
won't always be a profitable approach because the biological evolution that 
debatably gave rise lo innate knowledge can be viewed as a kind o f learning too. 
So to say thai something is leamable does not in itself help to distinguish between 
Ihe relevant hypoiheses. After al l . i f an agent in a computational model could learn 
to build a nesi, it would not demonstrate that birds in the natural world are not 
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hatched with this ability. This has consequences for researchers on both sides of 
the issue. For nativisls, it is only possible to form a Icamability argument about 
language i f constraints such as on the basis of the limited data available lo the 
child and without negative feedback are placed on the learning procedure. By the 
same token, a model that seeks to refute this claim must demonstrate learning with 
these conditions in place since biological evolution has operated without them. 
Negative feedback, for instance, is provided in the form o f the environment culling 
genes for certain kinds of traits from the gene-pool. So while demonstrating that a 
language can be learnt using an unconstrained learning procedure does not help to 
inform the debate, demonstrating leamability under the conditions that a child does 
would. 
Evolution is more likely to converge on good design features if related designs 
have sufficient plasticity to enable them to emulate these features (ihis is ihe 
Baldwin effect). Phenotypic plasticity can result from the ability to learn, but is not 
restricted to learning. Muscle development, callus formation and skin tanning are 
also examples where exposure to certain kinds of environmental stimuli trigger 
changes in the phenotypc. Phenotypic plasticity in a population means that the 
fitness of closely-related individuals wi l l tend to be more correlated. This 
effectively means that a peak in the fitness landscape wi l l have a broader base 
making it easier to find by sampling the space of variations. The perils of trial and 
error and of missed opportunities wi l l mean Uiat individuals with innate knowledge 
of some useful skill wi l l always have an advantage over those that can only acquire 
the skil l through learning. Given this, one should expect adaptive abilities that are 
Icamable in one generation to become easier lo Icam in subsequent generations 
(see Baiali (1994) for a model incorporating this idea). Following this argument to 
its logical conclusion, we might expect natural selection to continue to shape 
neural structures or biases to facilitate the leaming of adaptive abilities until such a 
point that these neural dispositions effectively embody the ability or until the cost 
involved in terms of growth and maintenance o f these neural structures exactly 
offsets the gain in fitness that they confer. There appears to be a continuum here 
over which evolution might have traversed from the ability to learn, to biased 
leaming, to innate knowledge. 
Bates, Elman, Johnson, Karmiloff-Smith, Parisi and Plunketi (1998) have 
suggested one reason why this kind of adaptive pathway might be implausible. 
They have expressed their incredulity about the possibility that linguistic and other 
knowledge could be genetically encoded by saying "it is difficult to understand 
how lO'"* synaptic connections in the human brain could be controlled by a genome 
with approximately 10^ genes."^ This appears to be a surprising failure of 
imagination for these authors given the frequent use of expressions such as 'infinite 
use f rom finite means' in the linguistics literature. To understand how information 
about lO'** connections could be compressed to this extent one could further appeal 
to the general finding from chaos theory that complexity (even apparent 
randomness) can arise from the interplay of a few simple components (e.g. 
Recent news from the human genome project indicates that the tme number of genes is 
much less than even this number. The cum:ni estimate is in the order of 3.5 x lO' which is 
around a third of the Bates ct al. (1998) estimate. 
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Kauffman. 1995). So why should we expect the complexity of the human genetic 
endowment lo be of the same order as the structures they code for? As Dawkins 
(1991) has stressed, DNA is not a blueprint for the mature organism. A more 
appropriate analogy, he says, is that of a recipe. 
A recipe in a cookery book is not, in any sense, a blueprint for the cake thai 
will finally emerge from the oven ... a recipe is not a scale-model, not a 
description of a finished cake, not in any sense a poini-for-poini 
representation. It is a set of insimciions which, if obeyed in the right order, 
will result in a cake. (Dawkins, 1991:295) 
I f DNA is not a blueprint, we should not expect the complexity of its 
instructions to be o f the same order as the complexity o f the resulting form, but it 
isn't obvious that the neural structures embodying linguistic knowledge are 
complex anyway. While the complexity of language data has been cited as 
evidence against its Icamability - the generalizations required being too deep to 
uncover by general-purpose learning mechanisms and the data available lo the 
child too unreliable, linguists who offer such arguments do not generally believe 
that ihc menial siruciures constituting linguistic knowledge are themselves 
complex. The trend in generative linguistics especially over the past twenty years 
has been to unify the features of universal grammar under fewer and fewer 
principles. Perhaps as a consequence o f ihis success, the computational system o f 
human language is assumed to be extremely elegant. For instance, Uriagercka 
(1998) compares its elegance to the growth functions that give rise to patterns in 
peacock feathers and flower corollas. 
Deacon (1997: 329) has also argued that the Baldwin effect would be unlikely 
to operate in the linguistic context because languages change too rapidly. A skill 
has to confer an advantage with enough regularity for selection to act and i f that 
advantage is only a consequence of conforming lo arbitrary conventions then as 
languages vary so would the selection pressure and with a pace thai would be far 
too rapid with respect to the biological lime-scales required for genetic 
assimilation. Yet we do observe stability in cross-linguistic universals over at least 
historical time-scales (Uriagereka, 1998:460 which is at least more than we should 
expect i f languages can vary freely. This suggests lhat variation is constrained 
either by an innate endowment or by properties of universals that make 
convergence toward ihem highly likely in the process o f language change. Even i f 
innate knowledge of language is not a cause of this stability, i f the knowledge is 
adaptive and the stability is enough to allow ihc Baldwin effect to lake hold; it is 
likely to be a result of it. 
Adaptive benefit 
The extent to which properties of language are adaptive is another major area of 
contention. Uriagereka (1998)', argues that grammar may have evolved not as an 
" This view is typically aiiributed lo Chomsky although he has never put a clear version of it 
in print. 
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adaptation, but as a particular kind of exaptation* or perhaps as a spand^el^ Part of 
the reason for this view is that the 'language faculty' seems to be too elegant to 
have been crafted like this (principles don't appear to follow from multiple 
determinants and they don't appear to exhibit the mcssiness that is characteristic o f 
adapted structures). Another reason involves personal incredulity about functional 
explanations of any linguistic constraint that disallows semantically intcrpretablc 
sentences. Take the following example from Uriagererka (1998:65): 
(3) *Whal have you discovered the faci that English is?' 
Uriagercka (1998:50) expresses his incredulity thus: "What's the evolutionary 
advantage o f having |a constraint), i f it disallows the communication (in those 
terms) o f a perfectly fine thought?" 
Firstly, *in those lerms' is an important qualification here because this thought 
certainly can be expressed by other means. Secondly, even i f this constraint is 
maladaptive in some ways then this would not be unusual for an adaptation. C/Jko 
(1995) makes this point in relation to the anatomy of the vocal tract: 
...unlike mammals that maintain separate pathways for breathing and feeding, 
thus enabling them to breathe and drink al the same time, adull humans are at 
a much higher risk for having food enter their respiratory systems: indeed, 
many thousands die each year from choking ... The risk of choking to which 
we arc exposed results from our larynx being located quite low in the throat. 
This low position permits us to use the large cavity above the larynx formed 
by the throat and mouih (supralaryngal tract) as a sound fil ter. . . Wc thus see 
an interesting tradc-ofT in the evolution of the throat and mouth, with safety 
and efficiency in eating and breathing sacrificed lo a significant extent for the 
sake of speaking. (Cziko, 1995) 
Some univcrsals may be diff icul t lo explain in terms of gradual adaptations, but 
others seem quite adaptive by contrast. Pinker and Bloom (1990) suggest some 
adaptive explanations for case systems, subject-verb agrcemeni and many other 
universals. Genes that facilitate their possessor making use of a given linguistic 
feature might replicate more successfully as a consequence of something as 
arbitrary as the conventionality of the feature within the linguistic community. The 
linguistic system is part of the environment that selects the genes of language 
speakers. 
Deacon (1997) points out thai ihe reverse may also be true - a linguistic system 
could'bc regarded as evolving to fit a niche with the language learner being part of 
^ Gould's (1991) label for what Darwin called preadapiaiion. In Gould s lerms an 
exaptalion is "a feature, now useful lo an organism, ihai did not arise as an adaptation for its 
present role, but was subsequently coopied for its current function." (p.43). 
* Gould and Lewoniin s (1979) label for a feature that exists simply because something like 
it must be present. This is in conu'ast to adaptations which exist because they arc functional 
in terms of reproductive success. Pinker and Bloom (1990) offer the redness of blood as an 
example. 
' Chomsky (1965:228 fn.5) provides another example of an ungrammaiical sentence with an 
unambiguous meaning. 
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the environment that selects its features. "Language operations that can be learned 
quickly and easily by children wil l tend lo get passed on to the next generation 
more effectively and more intact than those that are difficult to learn" (Deacon, 
1997:110). Deacon also argues that the limitation on the amount o f data that a 
language learner can use to reconstruct the language of its community provides 
another kind o f selection pressure which may make certain features o f language 
look maladaptive or 'quirky' i f viewed in terms o f the benefit lo language speakers. 
Chomsky and colleagues reject adaptationist explanations precisely because they 
are incredulous about functional explanations of linguistic properties for which the 
language-learner is benefactor, but " i f . as linguists often point out, grammars 
appear illogical and quirky in their design, it may only be because we are 
comparing ihem lo inappropriate models and judging their design according to 
functional criteria that arc less critical than we think" (Deacon, 1997:1100- The 
perspective afforded by Deacon's language-adaptive view could explain some o f 
this quirkiness while remaining an adaptive explanation of sons. 
I f we accept this view, we should expect the linguistic system lo exhibit the 
appearance of design for minimizing errors in transmission from generation to 
generation. Kirby's (in press) model o f regular compositionalily appears to lend 
itself well to this kind of analysis since a non-compositional language (i.e. one in 
which each meaning is expressed via a unique symbol) would be less likely to be 
transmitted intact than a compositional one in which the same number o f meanings 
can be expressed by combining in various ways, symbols from a smaller set. 
Independent evidence for this view has been provided in a computational model by 
Batali (2000) and a purely mathematical model by Nowak, Komarova & Niyogi 
(2001). 
The learning bottleneck produces a selection pressure against irregularity that is 
particularly strong for low-frequcncy forms. Kirby demonstrated that when a 
pressure is introduced for shorter signals (which places limits on .the extent to 
which they can be regular) the incidence of irregularity becomes stable and this 
strongly agrees with what we sec in natural languages where highly irregular forms 
have a very strong tendency to be also highly frequent (forms o f / o be for instance) 
and regular morphology is associated with forms appearing less frequently. 
The idea that languages ihemsclves evolve rather than (or concurrently with) 
their speakers is not a new one^ but many have ruled out the possibility. Among 
them Uriagereka (I998:33f0, but he does so as a result o f a misunderstanding o f 
the unit of selection in linguistic evolution: 
Is there any meaning to the claim that English is fitter for survival on the 
American plains than the language of the Navajo? If English dominates the 
continent, it docs so because of the strongest army in the world, whose finest 
attribute isn't precisely its verbal brilliance. (Uriagercka, 1998:34) 
He argues that even when language change occurs in the absence of such 
sociological factors, there is no sense in which languages that disappear are less 
wcll-adapicd than those that remain. That much language change appears to be 
* Deacon (1997) reviews the histor>' of this idea. 
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cyclical gives weight to this view. At the very least, it suggests that not all 
language change that occurs in modem times is adaptive. 
It is easy to reach premature conclusions about adaptive explanations i f one 
isn't adhering to the logic of gcne-centrism and Uriagereka is probably right to 
reject an account of language evolution in which the unil o f selection is a language 
for the same reason that modem biologists reject the idea of selection at the level 
o f the individual or the species. The paradox goes away when considering 
individual linguistic features as competing rather than whole languages. 
Another apparent problem has been highlighted at a more fundamental level 
concerning the adaptive advantage of speaking in the first place (e.g. Ackley & 
Littmann, 1994; Batali, unpublished; Cangelosi & Parisi. 1998). The benefii to the 
hearer is taken to be obvious i f communication is about the exchange of 
information, but "fwjhat is the advantage o f producing the signal to the individual 
that produces it? Why should an individual that produces the appropriate signals 
live longer and have more offspring than other individuals lhat fail to do so?" 
(Cangelosi and Parisi. 1998:85). Again, this paradox gets its potency from a 
confusion over the unit of selection and framing the question this way suggests a 
paradox thai simply docs noi exist. Under a modem, gene-centric view o f 
evolution, it is the reproductive success of genes and not individuals lhat is 
relevant, and the former does not always entail the latter. There may be genuine 
questions that need to be answered about the reproductive advantage to a speaker's 
genes, but the wealth of literature on kin selection and evolutionarily stable 
strategies suggest likely explanations lhat make this seem much less paradoxical.^ 
Briefly, i f an individual's behavior increases the likelihood of close kin being 
replicated, and i f that behavior has a genetic basis, then it might sl i l l be selected in 
the gene pool even i f it reduces the reproductive success o f the specific individual 
in question. This is because the kin that benefited are likely lo possess these genes 
as well. For example, genes that promote parental care (such as attending to a 
baby's cries) increase the likelihood o f their own replication even though ihcy are 
at the expense of the parent as an individual, because the parental care genes are 
likely to be inherited in the crying baby. Incidentally, for an infant, crying appears 
to be an instance where communication does benefit the 'speaker' (hunger and 
other unpleasantness go away with some reliability), so at least in this case, 
explaining ihe reproductive advantage to the signaler's genes is trivial. 
Some aspects of language clearly don't demand an adaptive explanation. For 
instance, convenlionalily can arise without any selection pressure at all. A feature 
that is neutral with respect to fitness can become conventionalised across a 
population simply because, given time, every individual wi l l come to have a 
common ancestor. 
Some linguistic universals might not be adaptive while others are. Of those lhat 
are, some may be adaptive in terms o f the benefii lo language users while others 
may be adaptive lo the linguistic systems themselves. Chomsky, Pinker and 
Deacon have adopted muiually exclusive versions of what are csseniially 
compatible hypotheses. 
Sec Dawkins (1989) for an accessible introduction that is alsoa primary text in ihis field. 
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We should expect that the interdictions between biological and cultural 
evolution to be complex. A biologically evolved language acquisition device 
would be a central feature of the environment to which a culturally evolving 
language is exposed and as such would be the primary determinant in the selection 
of linguistic features. At the same time, stable features o f a linguistic system may 
be assimilated into the genome of its speakers. Computational models o f these 
processes wi l l help us to understand the dynamics of adaptive interactions, but i f 
no adaptive process is ever simulated for the emergence of a given feature then this 
wi l l be one for Chomsky. 
Of course, demonstrating the emergence of syntax in a broad sense, is not the 
same as demonstrating the emergence of the particular kind of syntax that linguists 
call universal grammar, and while the properties of universal grammar are still 
being debated, it wi l l remain something o f a moving target. Nevertheless, 
computational models serve to demonstrate the consequences of a model's 
assumptions and what is possible in principle. 
Conclusion 
Although we can't directly obsen'e the historical emergence of language, we can 
observe the emergence o f modern languages such as Creoles that appear to spring 
from impoverished forms known as pidgins. Pidgins are formed when speakers o f 
a mix o f languages are forced to communicate with one another and they lack 
many of the properties we usually associate with natural languages such as 
recursion, movement and overt morphology. While pidgins lack these features. 
Creoles are full-fledged languages with structures characteristic o f English or any 
other natural language. Given this, it is surprising that the transition from pidgin to 
Creole usually occurs in only a single generation - despite children never being 
exposed to structures that arc as rich as those they actually acquire. Also surprising 
is that Creoles formed independently in distant regions o f the worid seem to share 
many fundamental properties such as a basic SVO word-order. 
Computational models of the evolution of language must be reconciled with 
evidence like this as well as that obtained from a variety of other means. From the 
paleontological record, it is possible to learn about the environmental conditions in 
which our ancestors lived including the kinds o f social requirements that might 
have necessitated language and. by indirect means (like looking at skull shape), it 
is possible to make at least some inferences about brain developments that 
occurred in parallel. Comparisons between this data and our present knowledge of 
the neural anatomy o f humans and our primate relatives allow us to make 
inferences about which parts of the brain are necessary for language. Such 
evidence is problematic for theories that arc diff icul t to relate to such changes. 
Linguistic data concerning language universals and psycholinguislic data about the 
way in which language is acquircd in childhood also constrain the form that any 
theory o f language origins can lake. 
As in any scientific discipline, a theory about the origin of language is stronger 
i f it is falsifiable by virtue of the predictions it makes and, in this case, predictions 
can be made about what should be found in the fossil record, the nature o f 
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language acquisition, the features of modem languages and the differences that 
should be evident in the neural anatomy of human and non-human species. In 
addition, the evolutionary narrative thai a theory proposes should be plausible and 
simulating the process computationally can provide an essential tcsi o f this. 
Subtleties arising from co-evolutionary arms-races, kin selection, the Baldwin 
effect and other processes can be counterintuitive and this is where simulation is 
most useful. Of particular value are the unexpected features ihai emerge from a 
model during simulation that match evidence obtained by other means. 
Arguments f rom personal incredulity arc an ideal target for computational 
modeling because a model need only demonstrate a single possibility to desiroy 
them whether the possibility presented is the correct explanation for the given 
feature or not. Fortunately, for computational modelers, ihis field is filled with 
arguments of this kind. Bales el al. (1998) arc incredulous about the possibility thai 
linguistic knowledge is encoded in the genome. Chomsky (1972) is incredulous 
about the possibility that natural selection can provide a meaningful explanation of 
the emergence of universal grammar. Uriagcreka (1998) is incredulous about the 
possibility thai language change is adaptive. There are probably others. Of course, 
in each case, a failure to demonstrate a possibility wi l l give weight lo the given 
position. 
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situaia nel contesto e gli siudi suH'interazione sociale nei luoghi di 
lavoro come esempi dfi cognizione distribuita. 
Morana Alac sostiene che non si pud srudiare la cultura senza 
considerare la mente e il cervello. IlJustra diversi approcci che 
studiano il rapporto tra evoluzione e cultura. Individua nella crea-
tivita il tratto specific© della cognizione umana che ie nuove teorie 
evoluzionistiche della cultura dovrebbero spiegare. 
Angelo Cangelosi e Huck Turner 
L'emergere del Ifnguaggio 
1, II llnguagglo come slstema complesso 
In diverse parti di questo volume e stato piu volte discusso 
come la mente sia un sistema complesso, gli organismi biologici 
siano sistemi complessi e iJ cei^ello sia a sua volta complesso. II 
linguaggio dipende da tutti quesci sistemi, e di conseguenza ne 
condivide i vari livelli di complessita. Questa complessitS ^ spiega-
ta dal fatto che il sistema linguistico e caratterizzato da una serie di 
dementi che interagiscono tra loro in maniera distribuita, autono-
ma e non lineare. II processo di interazione e auto-organizzazione 
di queste componenti porta all'emergenza di strutture linguistiche 
e compprtamenti complessi, come la sintassi e la comunicazione 
linguistica tra gruppi di individui. 
Le componenti di base del sistema linguistico appartengono a 
una varieta di domini. Alcune sono abilita biologiche e adattive, 
altre dipendono da fattori individuali, oltre ancora da fattori socia-
li. componenti biologiche che contribuiScono alio sviluppo del 
sistema linguistico dipendono prevalentemente dal nostro cervel-
lo. Ad esempio, e il nostro sistema neurale che gestisce i meccani-
smi di apprendimento, come ad esempio un'elevata plasticita neurale 
nel periodo critico di acquisizione del linguaggio. Diversi ./fl//or/ 
adattivi ed evoluzionisti nanno una diretta relazione con il lin-
5uaggio, e possono spiegare ad esempio il yalore adattivo di abilita 
inguistiche e I'origine delle lingue. Tra le ability individuali che 
contribuiscono alio sviluppo di comportamenti linguistici vi sono 
la capacita di percepire il mondo esterno, di produrre e percepire 
suoni, di formare categoric e di creare collegamenti astratti e logici 
// lavoro dei due auton'd stato resopossibile grazie al supporto di UK Engineering 




ira queste categoric e conservarli in memoria [Hamad 1987]. Per 
esempio, questi fattori individuaJi concribuiranno prevaJentemen-
te alio sviluppo di abilita linguistiche come un sistema di comuni-
cazione vocaJe, la capacita di creare significati, e di organizzare 
una propria base di conoscenza. Tra i fattori sociali che influenza-
no if linguaggio vi sono la tendenza alia formazione di legami 
familiari e di gruppo, e la necessity di comunicare con i compo-
nenti del gruppo e aU'esterno del gruppo. Questo porta, ad esem-
pio, a] processo di apprendimento e trasmissione del linguaggio, e 
alia differenziazione tra linguaggi e dialetti in diversi gruppi so-
ciali, 
Tutte queste componenti di base del sistema linguistico sono 
organizzate in maniera distribuita, interagiscono tra Idro in manie-
ra non lineare a gerarchica, e sono soggette a un processo di auto-
organizzazione. II concetto di organizzazione distribuita significa 
che non vi e alcuna componente che ha un ruolo di supervisore 
centrale con diretto controllo su ogni altro elemento. Ciascuna 
abilita (percettiva, cognitiva, sociale, adattiva) fornisce uii contri-
buto parziale al sistema linguistico globale. II linguaggio e un 
sistema basato su processi di intej^ azione non lineare. In un sistema 
lineare, le dinamiche del sistema sono additive, cioe il suo compor-
lamento globale e il semplice risultato della somma dei contriouti 
di ciascun componente. Invece, in un sistema hon lineare, il risul-
tato finale ha sempre qualcosa in piu delJa semplice somma degli 
elementi. Questo rende impossibile predire il contributo specifico 
di un solo componente in isolamento. Quando in un esperimento 
di psicoHnguistica si studia una specifica facolta linguistica in 
isolamento, si rischia di perdere di vista il contributo che altri 
componenti hanno sull'abilita oggetto di studio. Per questo e 
importante che i risultati sperimentali siano interpretati tenendo 
cento delle interazioni non lineari tra Tabilita osservaia in labora-
torio e il ruolo di altri comportamenti inerenti al hnguaggio. 
D linguaggio e un sistema gerarchico con differenti livelli che 
dipendono uno daH'altro. Infatti, le abilita lingiiistico-comunicati-
ve sono organizzate dal basso verso I'alto, dove i comportamenti 
del livello inferiore, come ad esempio le abilita fonetiche, avranno 
influenza su quelle di livelli superiori, come il livello semantico-
lessicale. Per. via di quest'organizzazione gerarchica, il sistema 
funziona secondo principi di auto-organizzazione. Esso e in grado 
di trovare, in maniera autonoma, stati di equilibrio stabile in cui 
Tinterazione dei diversi elementi individuali, sociali, neurali e adattivi 
produce comporramenti funzionaJmente ottimali, come e appunto 
la nostra facolta linguistico-comunicativa. 
f 
(OA 
II risultato del processo di auto-organizzazione e chiamato 
emergentCy perche imprevedibile e non facilmente spiegabile. Nel-
lo studio del linguaggio, e possibile osservare Temergere di diverse 
proprieta e abilita. A livello individuale, durante il processo di 
acquisizione del lingiiaggio nel bambino/a emergono gradualmen-
te una serie di complesse abilita linguistico-comunicative, come 
Tacquisizione del lessico, I'apprendimento di conoscenze sintattiche 
e lo sviluppo di competenze comunicative. A livello sociale ed 
evoluzionista, il processo di origine ed evoluzione del linguaggio 
pud essere considerate un processo emergente. Infatti, I'auto-
organizzazione di processi adattivi, sociali e neurali deve aver 
portato alia graduale emergenza di facolta sociocomunicative, ba-
sata su abilita vocali o gestuali, e su abilita cognitivo-linguistiche 
sempre piia complesse. 
2. La simulazlone del llnguagglo 
Abbiamo appena definite il linguaggio come un sisiema com-
)lesso. In particolare, abbiamo spiegato che il comportamento 
inguistico e basato su diversi livelli di conoscenza (fonetico, lessicale-
semantico, sintattico, pragmatico) che interagiscono in maniera 
nen lineare tra lore, e che le abilita linguistiche sono in completa 
interdipendenza con altre capacita cognitive e sensomotorie, come 
percezione, categorizzazione, problem solving. Tutto questo ha 
implicazioni per il tipo di metodo che uno puo usare per studiare 
rapprendimenio e I'evoluzione del linguaggio. II classico metodo 
analitico delle scienze naturali, come quello basato su esperimenti 
di laboratorioin biologia o sulie deduzioni logiche in matematica; 
e ottimale per I'anaHsi (cioe decomposizione) di un sistema nei 
suoi componenti di base. Ma non e possibile utilizzare tale metodo 
con i sistemi complessi non lineari, come e appunto il linguaggio, 
perch^ questi sono per defmizione non linearmenie decomponibili. 
E possibile applicare metodi sperimentali analitici quancfo si stu-
dia una caratteristica limitata del linguaggio (ad esempio, esperi-
menti di laboratorio suUa morfologia deUa forma passata dei ver-
bi), ma non quando si vogliono studiare gli aspetti di interazione 
tra livelli e tra comportamenti (ad esempio, evoluzione di varie 
abilita linguistico-comunicative). Per studiare il linguaggio e ne-
cessario ricorrere all'alternativa dei metodi sintetici hasati sulk 
simulazione al calcolatore [Cangelosi 1998; Steels 1997]. I metodi 
sinteiici, come Tuso di reti neurali artificiali, algoritmi genetici, e 
le recniche di Vita Artificiale, permettono di studiare fenomeni 
\ 
linguistici complessi perche usano un approccio cosTtuttivo. m 
gencre, i l modcllo computazionalc simula le componcnii di base 
del sistema, come le parole, significati, sintassi, pragmatica, c le 
regole di interazione tra questi elementi, come ad esempio i pro-
cessi percettivi uditivi, e la fondazione di simboli {symbol grounding) 
che verra discussa in dettaglio piii avanti, per arrivare a studiare 
i'emergenza di comportamenti e abilita linguistiche. Nel caso del-
lo studio dell'acquisizione del linguaggio ci sono diversi metodi 
computazionali, come le reti neurali artificiali che simulano i l 
processo di apprendimento di diverse abilita linguistiche (cfr. Di 
Ferdinando in questo volume). Nello studio dell'evoluzione del 
Imguaggio, metodi come gli algoritmi genetici permettono di si-
mulate i l processo daru'iniano di selezione naturale. 
La simulazione e Tuso di metodi sintetici non sono qui propo-
sti come in alternativa ai classici metodi sperimentali. Al contrario, 
le simulazioni sono un nuovo strumento scientifico che si aggiunge 
ai metodi di ricerca tradizionali e permette di superarne alcuni 
limiti. Infatti, lo scopo principale delle simulazioni al calcolatore e 
quello di esprimere una teoria in termini operativi, cioe di istruzio-
ni per un programma al calcolatore. Questo permette di creare 
una specie di laboratorio sperimentale virtuale [Parisi 2001] con i l 
quale e possibile investigare la cberenza e validita interna di una 
leoria, la plausibilita delle sue assunzioni teoriche, ecc. L'esecu-
zione di esperimenti simulativi servira aUa generazione di nuove 
predizioni empiriche, che possono successivamente essere verifi-
caie anche tramite metodologie sperimentah. 
Nei successivi paragrafi presenteremo esempi di modelli simu-
lativi per I'acquisizione del linguaggio e per lo studio dell'origine 
e dell'evoluzione del linguaggio. Per i modelli che saranno breve-
incnte descritti, verra posto I'accento sul tipo di ipotesi generate 
dal modello e sulla corrispondenza con dati empirici. I l lettore 
interessato a una piu dettagliata rassegna critica di tali modelli puo 
leggere i l lavoro di Christiansen e Chater [1999] sui modelli 
connessionisti dell'apprendimento linguistico e di Cangelosi e Parisi 
[in stampa] per I'analisi dei modelli simulativi di evoluzione del 
linguaggio. 
2.1. M'^AM simulativi di flcqiiisi7ione del linguagglQ. Grari 
parte dei modelli simulativi che studiano I'apprendimento del 
inguaggio e basato sul connessionismo, cioe sulle reti neurali 
artificiah (cfr. Di Ferdinando in questo volume). Questo perche 
l approccio connessionista permette di simulare I'organizzazione e 
processi subsimbolici e con modelli ispirati al funzionamento del 
cervello [Parisi 1989; Rumelhart e McClelland 1986a]. 
I primi modelli connessionisti del linguaggio si sono concen-
trati sullo studio della lettura. Per esempio, uno tra i primi e piu 
conosciuti modelli c quello della lettura di Seidenberg e McClelland 
[1989]. Essi hanno addestrato una rete neurale per la lettura fone-
tica di parole inglesi. Nel modello e simulata la situazione in cui 
una sequenza di lettere (rappresentazione grafemica in input della 
parola) c riconosciuta come parola che viene letta (rappresentazio-
ne fonetica in uscita). Nella fase di test alia fine dell'apprendimen-
lo, I'errore a livello delle unita ortografichc c stato considcrato 
come una misura della prova di decisione lessicale, mentre I'errore 
a livello delle unita fonologiche c stato considerato come ima 
misura della prova di lettura e denominazione. Lavorando su quc-
sti dati, Seidenberg e McClelland [ibidem] hanno mostrato che i l 
modello c in accordo con molti dati psicologici sull'elaborazione 
dei diversi tipi di stimoli linguistici. Per esempio, le parole regolari 
come «gave» erano pronunciate piu velocemente rispetto a quelle 
con eccezioni fonetiche come «have». Gli autori hanno analizzato 
la loro simulazione anche per le impHcazioni che essa ha su model-
li teorici generali della lettura. In contrapposizione con i l modello 
dclla Icitura a due vie [Coltherart 1986], con una prima via lessicale 
diretta di analisi fonetica, usata per le parole a pronuncia regolare, 
e una seconda via grafemico-fonetica, usata per le parole irregolari 
e le non-parole, Seidenberg e McGelland [1989] usano un model-
lo con un singolo meccanismo. Infatti, la rete usa un solo strato 
comune di unita nascoste per le parole regolari, irregolari e per le 
non-parole. Le reti usano una rappresentazione distribuita che 
impedisce la formazione di unita nascoste lessicali. Un'estensione 
di questo modello e stata di recente proposta da Zorzi e coUabora-
tori [1998]. In questa nuova simulazione viene mostrato come la 
rete neurale usa le due vie funzionali per la lettura attraverso 
diverse connessioni tra I'input grafemico, le unita nascosic c quel 
le di output fonetico. 
Buona pane dei modelli connessionisti per i l linguaggio ri-
guarda la simulazione di vari aspetti morfosintattici e lessic^i. Per 
esempio, alcuni studiano I'apprendimento di strutture sintattiche 
[Elman 1990] e gli effetti dcll'et^ di acquisizione lessicale [Ellis c 
Lambon-Ralph 2000]. Vari altri lavori si sono focalizzati sulla 
morfologia. In particolare, uno degli aspetti piu estensivamcntc 
studiato e quel o della formazione del tempo passato dei verbi 
{past tense in inglese). I I modello connessionista originario sulla 
^ 
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formazione del passato e quello di Rumelhart, McClelland [1986b]. 
Attraverso I'esperienza di apprendiinento la rete impara un mec-
canismo generale per la formazione del passato dei verbi. Rumelhart 
e McClelland [ihidem] hanno osservato che la prestazione del 
modello durante I'apprendimento riflette alcuni dei fenomeni evo-
lutivi osservati nei bambini durante I'acquisizione della morfologia 
del tempo passaio dei verbi. Per esempio, vi e una fase intermedia 
nella quale vi e una temporanea inversione della curva di appren-
dimento. Per alcuni periodi la rete compie temporaneamente un 
numero maggiore di errori, in particolare producendo errori di 
iper-regolarizzazione. cio^ di attribuzione della forma regolare del 
passato (aggiunta del suffisso -ed) ai verbi con forma irregolare. 
Questo fenomeno, corrispondente a una curva di apprendimento 
a U rovesciata, era stato precedentemente osservato nei bambini 
inglesi. Gli autori hanno usato questa corrispondenza tra modello 
computazionale e dati empirici per sottolineare la bonta del loro 
modello, e per usarlo in cpntr^pposizione ai modelli simbolici 
della mente basati sull'uso di rego e. 
Questo lavoro, e in generale Tapproccio connessionista alio 
studio del linguaggio, sono siati aspramente criticati da Pinker e 
Prince [1988] i quali hanno evidenziato alcuni limiti del modello. 
Per esempio, Pinker e Prince hanno fatto notare che alcune regole 
normaimente usate per la trasformazione del passato non possono 
essere rappresentate dal modello. Inoltre, anche neirinterpreta-
zione evolutiva degli errori, il modello non e capace di usare 
alcune forme di iper-regolarizzazione di verbi irregolari, e Tuso 
temporaneo di passato con tutte e due le forme regolari e irrego-
lari. Usando queste argomentazioni, Pinker e Prince hanno con-
cluso che ii ricorso a sistemi di regole per la spiegazione del 
linguaggio umano e del suo sviluppo e essenziale e non sosiituibile 
da modelli connessionisti. In seguito, alcune di queste critiche al 
modello sono state superate da successivi studi piu sistematici del 
modello del tempo passato [Plunkett e Marchman 1993]. 
2.2. Modelli simulntivi di evoluzione del linpunggio. NeU'ul-
timo decennio vi e stato un crescente interesse verso lo sviluppo di 
modelli computazionali di evoluzione del linguaggio. Questo per-
che si sono sviluppate una serie di metodologie simulative, come 
gli algoritmi genetici, che permettono di studiare process! adattivi 
ed evoluzionisti. Inoltre, data la difficolta di ricorrere a prove 
dirette deU'evoIuzione del linguaggio, I'uso di modelli compu-
tazionali permette di suppUre a tali limiti attraverso metodologie 
ami 
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sintetiche che simulano le condizioni evolutive, sociali, cognitive 
che hanno portato all'emergere del linguaggio. Queste metodologie 
possono essere di notevole utilita se affiancate alio studio delle 
altre prove indirette di evoluzione del linguaggio, come gli studi 
comparati sui sistemi di comunicazione animale [Hauser 1996]. 
Tra i primi lavori che hanno simulato I'evoluzione di abihta 
linguistiche, vi e il modello di Hurford [1991] che simula Tevolu-
zione della capacita di comunicazione hnguistica con durata varia-
bile del periodo di acquisizione del linguaggio. Confrontando 
condizioni variabili di selezione selettiva dipendenti dal compor-
tamento linguistico e dai diversi tipi di relazione genitore-figlio, 
Hurford [ibidem] mostra che in tutte le condizioni si sviluppa un 
periodo critico di acquisizione del linguaggio che finisce verso la 
puberta. Tale periodo, una volta evoluto, rimane presente in ma-
niera stabile. I risultati della simulazione mostrano anche che il 
periodo critico non ha un vantaggio adattivo assoluto, ma il suo 
valore adattivo e il risultato dell'interazione dei fattbri genetici che 
influenzano le caratteristiche dell'organizzazione delle fasi tempo-
. rali della vita. 
A partire da queste simulazioni iniziali di Hurford, e stata 
sviluppata una varieta di' modeili evoluzionisti che haimo investi-
gato diverse, problematiche dell'emergenza del linguaggio. Per 
esempio, alcuni modelli hanno investigate il processo di emergen-
za e auto-organizzazione del lessico, mentre altri ancora hanno 
studiato Tevoluzione della sintassi. 
Tra i modelli che aimulano remergenza di sistemi lessicali, vi 
sono i lavori di Hutchins e Hazelhurst [1995] e Cangelosi e Parisi 
[1998]. In alcuni di questi modelli gli autori si sono focalizzati sui 
process! di auto-organizzazione deOa comunicazione in gruppi di 
organismi artificiali [ad esempio Steels 1997]. Altri lavori sono 
basati sull'auto-organizzazione di un lessico di comunicazione tra 
robot [Steels e Kaplan 1999]. Alcuni modelli di evoluzione lessicale 
studiano il ruolo di reti neurali nell'evoluzione di lessici condivisi, 
sia in situazione di segnali di comunicazione geneticamente deter-
minati [Cangelosi e Parisi 1998], sia con lessici ontogeneticamente 
appresi [Hutchins e Hazeihurst 1995]. Nei modello di Cangelosi e 
Parisi [1998] le reti neurali controUano il comportamento di orga-
nism! che devono comunicare riguardo a fonti di cibo. Poiche i 
pesi delle connessioni delle red non cambiano durante la vita degli 
organismi, i segnali di comunicazione prodotti dagli individui sono 
considerati geneticamente innati. Solo durante il processo di sele-
zione naturale e riproduzione i pesi vengono modificati:per via di 
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nicazione. La stessa rete neurale gestisce non solo il comportamen-
to comunicativo (generazione e comprensione di segnali) ma an-
che il comportamento di classificazione dei tipi di cibo. Gli orga-
nismi devono riconoscere ed evitare i funghi velenosi, ma racco-
gliere quelli commestibili. Tale modello permette di studiare 
I'interazione tra abilita cognitive e facolta linguistiche nella stessa 
rete neurale. Per esempio, Tanalisi dei risultati della simulazione 
mostra la stretta interdipendenza tra categorizzazione e comunica-
zione. Solo dope che gli organismi evolvono Tabilita di discrimi-
nazione tra funghi velenosi e commestibili e possibile che evolva-
no un lessico condiviso, e questa osservazione concorda con Tipo-
tesi di Burling [1993] sulla interdipendenza evoluzionista tra co-
gnizione e linguaggio. Inoltre, la simulazione permette Tanalisi dei 
principi di organizzazione del lessico, come quello del contrasto, 
in base al quale differenze tra segnali corrispondono sempre a 
differenze tra significati, e quello della convenzionalita, cioe che 
per alcuni significati vi e una forma che ci si aspetta sia usata nelJa 
comunita linguistica. 
Un diverso gruppo di modelli simulativi si e focalizzato sul-
i'emergenza delJa sintassi. Alcuni lavori [Kirby 2001] hanno stu-
diato I'emergenza della composizionalita e delle irregolarita 
sintattiche anche in assenza di processi selettivi, altri [Batali 1994] 
si sono focalizzati sul periodo critico di acquisizione della sintassi 
e sull'emergenza della sintassi attraverso processi interattivi di 
negoziazione, e infine i modelli di Cangelosi e Parisi [2001; Cangelosi 
2001] hanno investigate I'evoluzione delle classi di verbi e nomi. 
Tra tutti questi modelli, solo xjuelli di Batali e Cangelosi e Parisi 
utilizzano reti neurali, e permettono di studiare I'interazione tra 
fattori neurali e I'evoluzione della sintassi. Per esempio, nel lavoro 
di Batali [1994] reti neurali ricorrenti sono utilizzate per studiare 
I'emergenza di un periodo criiico per I'acquisizione della sintassi. 
Nella simulazione viene mostrato che se una rete viene inizialmen-
te sottoposta all'apprendimento di una grammatica, e poi e sotto-
posta a un iinguaggio con diversa sintassi, questo provoca una 
difficolta a imparare il nuovo linguaggio. Cioe le reti passano 
attraverso un periodo critico di acquisizione oltre il quale sono 
incapaci di apprendere facilmente nuovi linguaggi. L'autore ha 
interpretato i risultato rifacendosi al concetto della Marchmann 
[1993] secondo cui il periodo critico dell'apprendimento ha I'ef-
fetto di intrappolare la rete nella prima soluzione che ha dovuto 
apprendere. Questa spiegazione e in contrasto con le teorie che 
interpretano il periodo critico come il risultato di processi di 
maturazione di uno.specifico meccanismo di apprendimento dei 
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iinguaggio, come la limitazione iniziale di abilita cognitive sensoriali 
o di memoria che favorisce I'apprendimento seguente di forme 
complesse del linguaggio [Elman 1993]. 
Nel modello dell'evoluzione delle classi sintattiche di verbo e 
nome, Cangelosi e Parisi [2001; Cangelosi 2001] usano un sistema 
di reti neurali e Vita Artificiale per mostrare come vi sia una 
tendenza evoluzionista a evolvere linguaggi composizionali che 
utilizzano regole grammaticali tipo «verbo + nome». In una prima 
simulazione [Cangelosi 2001] il linguaggio sintattico emerge per 
auto-organizzazione. All'inizio dell-evoluzione, tutti gli individui 
partono da una situazione di assenza totale di conoscenza lingui-
stica e devono imparare a comunicare attraverso la combinazione 
di una o due parole. Essi devono comunicare riguardo a diverse 
fonti di cibo. Sebbene vi sia pressione selettiva solo per il compito 
di foraggiamento, e non per le abiliti linguistiche, dopo alcune 
centinaia di generazioni nella popolazione emerge lin Iinguaggio 
condiviso da tutti gli organismi; L'analisi della struttura sintattica 
del linguaggio mostra come vi sia una forte tendenza a far emerge-
re linguaggi basati suU'uso di verbi (ad es., «raggiungere», «evita-
re») e nomi (ad es., nome del colore dei funghi), invece che usare 
parole singole, o regole combinatorie non composizionali. 
In successivi sviluppi di questo modello [Cangelosi e Parisi 
2001], e stata fatta una analisi dettagliata delle fasi di evoluzione 
delle classi sintattiche di verbi e nomi. L'evoluzione di questo 
linguaggio sintattico passa attraverso due stadi, il primo nel quale 
;h organismi imparano a usace solo i nomi, e 11 secondo nel quale 
'uso dei verbi migliora fino a superare la prestazione dei nomi. 
Questo fenomeno riflette le osservazioni sull^acquisizione della 
grammatica nei bambini, dove la classe dei nomi precede sempre 
quella dei verbi [Tomasello e Brook 1999] . L'analisi delle rappre-
sentazioni neurali interne mosira che i verbi vengono rappresenta-
ti in una maniera ottimale rispetto ai nomi.(cfr. par. 3.2). Questa 
migliore organizzazione delle rappresentazioni linguistiche provo-
ca diversi vantaggi adattivi, non solo nei comportamenti linguisti-
ci, ma anche in altre abilita puramente cognitive. 
3. Problem! e questloni nello studio deU'emergere del lin-
guaggio 
Nel paragrafo precedenie abbiamo visto che la simulazione 
>ermette di studiare una varieta di comportamenti linguistici. Con 
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ficiale, e possibile studiare Tinterazione tra i diversi fattori indivi-
duali, neurali, sociali, adattivi che contribuiscono al funzionamen-
to del sistema complesso del linguaggio e all'emergere di abilitd 
linguistiche. Questo permette di investigate alcuni dei problemi e 
questioni di ricerca ancora aperti nello studio dei processi di 
acquisizione linguistica nei bambini, e in quelli di origine ed evo-
luzione della comunicazione. Nei successivi paragrafi discuteremo 
in dettaglio il contributo di modelli simulativi su due specifiche 
questioni di ricerca, e cioe il problema del symbol grounding, e 
quello del controllo neurale del linguaggio. 
3.1. IlpmbJemfl del «symbol grounding». Il linguaggio e un 
sistema basato sull'uso di una serie di simboli (parole). Ciascuno 
di questi simboli ha uno o piu significati (semantica) e piij simboli 
possono essere combinati tra loro con regole grammaticali (sintas-
si) p^r esprimere ulteriori e piu complessi significati. Gli aspetti 
lessicali, semantici e sintattici sonctstrettamente intercorrelati tra 
loro nel processo di formazione del significato, e cioe nella crea-
zione di un legame tra il sistema cognitivo-linguistico dell'indivi-
duo, le sue abDita sensomotorie, e il mondo nel quale questi vive e 
interagisce. Questo processo e normalmente chiamato symbol 
grounding. Esso e facilmente risolvibile in sistemi cognitivi reali 
come il nostro, ma in modelli cognitivi computazionali e spesso 
trascurato e non risolto. Harnad [1990] ha per primo definite il 
problema del symbol grounding nei modeUi computazionali. Un 
modello plausibile della cognizione deve necessariamente include-
re il collegamento autonomo e intrinseco tra simboli e loro referenti. 
Secondo alcuni scienziati cognitivi, come i cognitivisti, la manipo-
lazione dei simboli e un processo autonomo da quello della forma-
zione di significati. Un generico e ipotetico collegamento tra sim-
boli e referenti del mondo reale pud essere ipotizzato nella mente 
del ricercatore e cio e sufficiente perche il sistema sia di per se 
esplicativo della cognizione. Per a tri ricercatori, invece, un mo-
dello deve simulare sia i simboli sia i significati, e i due sistemi 
devono essere intrinsecamente e autonomamente collegati tra loro. 
Per affrontare il problema in maniera piu sistematica e non banale, 
Harnad [ibidem] propone un sistema ibrido subsimbolico/simbo-
lico con una configurazione dal basso verso Talto, nel quale ogni 
componente di base subsimbolica sia funzionalmente collegato al 
livello superiore simbolico. Per integrare i due livelli nel sistema 
cognitive umane Harnad [1987] fa riferimente alia teeria della 
percezione categoriale, che studia Torganizzaziene delle nostre 
i 
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abilita di categerizzazione. Per esempio, quando dobbiamo classi-
ficare un colore, il continuum sensoriale dello spettro di luce e 
suddivise in categerie soggettive distinte di celori (blu, giallo, 
rosso) per via dei due processi della percezione categoriale di 
discriminazione e identificazione. La teoria della percezione cate-
goriale, in contrasto con la Legge di Weber, sostiene che non vi e 
corrispondenza tra (il logaritmo del) la dimensione fisica di uno 
stimelo e la percezione psicologica di esse. Piuttosto, gli individui 
riducono la differenza percettiva psicelegica di oggetti aU'interno 
di una categoria, e accentuano le differenze tra gli elementi di 
categoric diverse. Per esempio, una tonalita di colore giallo-verde, 
la cui distanza dai due colori gialle e verde pud essere equivalente 
da un punto di vista ottico, sara vissuta come percettivamcntc piij 
simile a un altro colore di tonalita gialla una velta che sia stata 
identificata come appartenente alia categoria giallo. 
Nella sua teeria della perceziene categoriale, Haraad [ibidem] 
propone un medello delle abilita cognitive umanc organizzato 
secendo tre processi gerarchici: 1) discriminazione, cioe la capaci-
ta di separarc gli oggetti e di dccidcrnc la somiglianza/differenza 
tra gli oggetti ed eventi, 2) identificazione, cioe la capacita di 
assegnare im nome agli oggetti, e 3) descrizione proposizionale 
degli oggetti, degli eventi e degli stati del monde. Per ciascune di 
questi tre processi esiste una tipelogia di rapprcsentazione menta-
le; a) rappresentazioni iconicbe, ciee trasformazioni mentali analo-
giche delle proiezioni dell'immagine degli oggetti sulla nostra su-
perficie sensoriale; b) rappresentazieni categoriali, che permetto-
no il proccsse di identificaziene degli oggetti attraverso la ferma-
zione di categoric; c) rappresentazioni simbolicbe, basate sulla 
combinaziene dei nomi (simbeli) delle categerie. 
L'origine dei primi due tipi di rappresentazieni e probabil-
mente innata e si 6 evoluta nella nostra specie, come nel case della 
categorizzazione di colori. Comunque, poiche sarebbe impossibile 
evolvere una capacita innata di identificazione di tutte le categoric 
percettive umanc, alcune di queste rappresentazioni vengono ap-
prese. I due tipi di rappresentazieni iconiche e categeriali seno 
ancora sensoriali e non simboliche. II neme dell'oggetto ottenute 
dal precesso di identificazione ha sole un valore tassonomico, non 
ha nulla di simbelico e nen puo esscre manipolato in base a regole 
logico-sintattiche. Perche una rapprcscntaziene categoriale diven-
ti il significato cui un simbolo si riferisce, e necessario che nc sia 
formata una rappresentazione simboUca. Su qucsta rappresenta-
zionc sara poi possibile apphcare le regole di manipolazione di 








guardo a ulteriori relazioni di appartenenza a categorie. Per esem-
pio, a partire dal nome «cavaUo» che e intrinsecamente collegato 
alle rappresentazioni iconiche e categoriali del cavallo (il nome e 
cioe fondato, grounded, suUa realta), e dal nome «sirisce» che e 
ugualmente collegato alia realta, e possibile ottenere una nuova 
descrizione simbolica della categoria zebra, attraverso la proposi-
zione «zebra = cavallo + strisce» [Harnad 1990], I nuovi simboli 
(ad esempio, «zebra») sono creati a partire dalla combinazione 
linguistica di simboli di base («cavallo, strisce»), e hanno la pro-
prieta di acquisire indirettamente il grounding dalle due categorie 
di base. Grazie a questo principio e possibile identificare una 
zebra (o un unicorno) pur non avendola mai vista prima, semplice-
mente da una descrizione verbale di essa. A partire dai simboli 
elementari di una tassonomia di nomi e, in principio, possibile 
generare il resto dei simboli di un linguaggio naturale, inclusi i 
simboli per relazioni logiche come le parole: «no», «e», «tutti», 
«qualche», ecc. Infatti, alcuni dizionari usano un limitaio lessico 
di base per definire tutte le parole in esso contenute. Grazie a 
quesio linguaggio di base, le nuove parole possono ereditare il loro 
coUegamento intrinseco con gli oggetti e gli eventi del mondo 
reale. Con cio e anche possibUe e^rimere concetti astratti senza 
direiti referenti nella realta perceitiva. 
Harnad [ibidem'] ha piu volte proposto i modelli connessionisti 
delle reti neurali come possibili candidati per un sistema ibrido 
connessionista/simbolico nel quale la rete neurale svolga il com-
pito di percezione categoriale e di grounding delle rappresenta-
zioni. I simboli estratti dal modello connessionista sarebbero poi 
manipolabili da sistemi simbolici o da altri sistemi connessionisti 
addestrati a elaborazioni simboliche. Le reti neurali sono un 
naturaie candidate del process© di elaborazione cognitiva di base 
che e la percezione categoriale per via della loro capacita genera-
le di apprendimento e classificazione di pattern sensoriali. Per 
esempio, I'uso di un robot controUato da una rete neurale e un 
buon esempio di come sia possibile avere un modello cognitive 
per I'estrazione di rappresentazioni categoriali e simboliche del 
mondo reale [Harnad 1995], Questa soluzione connessionista e 
stara studiara con diversi modelli di percezione categoriale e 
symbol grounding. 
Il primo modello connessionista della percezione categoriale 
e stato presentato da Harnad e collaboratori [1991] per un com-
pito semplice di ciassificazione e denominazione di linee. Gli 
autori hanno utilizzato una rete neurale per la classificazione di 
8 linee in due categorie di linee lunghe o corte. II criterio in base 
al quale i ricercatori hanno deciso I'appartenenza di ciascuna 
linea alle due classi si basa suUa scelta arbitraria della misura di 
lunghezza corta/lunga. Una rete neurale a tre strati e stata prima 
addestrata al compito di auto-associazione in. maniera da ottene-
re una rappresentazione compressa e distribuita a livello delle 
unita nascoste. A questo punto la rete e stata addestrata a un 
nuovo compito che, oltre alia auto-associazione, prevedeva I'ap-
prendimento tramite backpropagation dell'appropriata etichetta 
di classificazione della linea «lunga» o «corta». Dall'analisi delle 
rappresentazioni interne della rete con compito di denominazio-
ne e stato trovato un chiaro effetto di percezione categoriale, e 
cioe una diminuzione della distanza tra le attivazioni di stimoli di 
una stessa categoria, e un aumento della distanza tra le due 
categorie rispetto alia rappresentazione ottenuta nella rete pre-
cedentemente addestrata al solo compito di auto-associazione. 
Cioe, il compito di classificazione ha modificato la corrisponden-
za tra le distanze fisiche dello stimolo e le distanze (psicologiche 
e neurali) delle rappresentazioni. 
Altri modelli connessionisti hanno studiato in dettaglio il 
processo del symbol grounding e del irasferimento di grounding 
da parole di base a nuove parole, L'esempio dell'apprendimento 
di categorie e nomi di animali (ad esempio, zebra) e stato simu-
late in un.modello connessionista [Cangelosi^/ al. 2000; Riga et 
jj/. 2001]. La rete neurale e stata prima addestrata a categorizzare 
e deneminare immagini di cavalli, di strisce, e di altri animali e 
pattern visivi. Pei la rete e stata addestrata a imparare nuovi 
concetti attraverso la cembinazione dei nemi delle precedenti 
categorie, ceme ad esempio «zebra» = «cavaUo» -^  «strisce». 
L'immagine della zebra non viene mai presentata durante questa 
fase di apprendimente linguistico. Nel a fase di test, la rete vede 
un'immagine di zebra e deve denominarla. Essa e in grado di 
denominare questa figura come «2ebra», mostrando che i! 
grounding dei due nomi di base e stato trasferito al nuovo nome. 
Inoltre, Tanalisi delle rappresentazioni interne di questa rete 
mostra come i meccanismi di percezione categoriale siano alia 
base del symbol grounding e del suo trasferimento a nuove paro-
le. Questi modelli simulativi confermano I'ipotesi di Harnad 
[1987; 1990] sul ruolo della percezione categoriale nell'appren-
dimento di simboli. InoJtre essi propongono un sistema di symbol 
grounding totalmente basato su sistemi connessionisti, dove la 
stessa rete neurale gestisce sia le operazioni subsimboliche di 





3.2. Linguaggio e cervello. II cervello, insieme agli altri fatto-
ri di apprenJimento individual!, comportamenti sociali, e fenome-
ni adattivi, contnbuisce al processo di auto-organizzazione del 
linguaggio e di emergenza di complesse facolta linguistiche. Lo 
studio del controllo neurale del linguaggio e stato, ftnora, preva-
lentemente basato sullo studio di patologie neuropsicolinguistiche 
in pazienti con lesioni cerebrali in aree coinvolte nella funzione 
linguistica. Solo di recente, con lo sviluppo di tecnicbe di 
visualizzazione cerebrale {brain imaging), come PET e fMRI (cfr. 
Chieffi in quesio volume), sono stati effettuati studi sperimentali 
per I'identificazione fine delle strutture neurali funzionabnente 
coinvolte nei controllo del componamento linguistico normale e 
patologico. Per esempio, Martin e collaborator! [1995] hanno 
usato tali metodologie per I'identificazione dei correlati conical! 
di abilita sintattiche. In particolare, questi autori hanno guardato 
al coinvolgimento di strutture corticali motoric per I'elaborazione 
della classe dei verbi (ad esempio, nom! di azioni), e al 
coinvolgimento di aree sensorial! per Tuso di nomi (ad esempio, 
nomi di color!). 
In parallelo con lo sviluppo dHiuove metodologie sperimentali 
di visualizzazione cerebrale, la diffusione dei modeDi di reti neurali 
ha contribuito alio studio dei correlati neurali del linguaggib. 
Sebbene la maggior parte dei classic! lavori connessionisti del 
linguaggio [Christiansen e Chater 1999] non intendano proporre 
modelli .piausibili del cervello, una parte vuole intenzionalmente 
simulare le strutture neurali coinvolte in abilita linguistiche. Per 
esempio, il modello ACTION di Taylor e Taylor [2000] e basato 
sulla diretta simulazione delle diverse region! cerebral! coinvolte 
neU'elaborazione di conoscenze sintattiche. 
Un diverso gruppo di modelli simulativi si propone di studiare 
il comportamento linguisuco, e il suo substrato neurale, in una 
cornice teorica e metodologica piu integrata, in cu! il linguaggio e 
una tra le tante abilita sotto il controllo cfeUo stesso sistema neurale. 
Tale approccio, che usa metodologie di Vita Artificiale, considera 
anche il contesto sociale e adattivo nei quale I'organismo interagisce, 
e che porta all'emergenza di capacita hnguistiche [Cangelosi 1998]. 
Nei paragrafi precedent! sono stati descritti alcun! modell! di Vita 
Artificiale, come quello dell^ emergere per auto-organizzazione delle 
class! dei verbi e nomi [Cangelosi 2001]. Nell'estensione di tale 
modello [Cangelosi e Parisi 2001], viene simulato un linguaggio, 
basato sulJ'uso di verbi e nomi, che e direttamente imposto dal 
ricercatore. Questo permette di focalizzarsi su nuovi aspett! del-
I'evoluzione deUa sintassi, e in particolare sulla differenziazione 
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neurale tra i verbi e ! nomi. GI! organismi hanno il compito di 
imparare a manipolare due oggetti A e B, e cioe rispettivamente 
una barra verticale o una orizzontale. La rete neurale di ogn! 
organismo ha una retina per vedere la posizione dell'oggetto e la 
sua forma, riceve in input segnali propriocettiv! sull'estensione del 
braccio, e pud ascoltare un comando verbale (fig. 1). Gli organi-
smi ricevono dei comandi verbal! tipo «allontanare A», «allonta-
nare B», «awicinare A» e «awicinare B». Ess! devono imparare ad 
associare i verbi allontanare/awicinare all'azione di allontanare/ 
awicinare I'oggetto indicato. Durante la loro vita, gli organismi 
sono esposti a diverse condizion! sperimentali, per esempio situa-
zioni in cui ascoltano il comando verbale (che puo essere o solo il 
verbo, o solo il nome, o il verbo e nome insieme) senza vedere 
Toggetto, o in situazioni dove la rete riceve informazioni sia visive 
che linguistiche. Poiche vi e una pressione selettiva a evolvere gli 
organismi che si'comportano meglio nelle diverse situazioni speri-
mentali (ad esempio, allontanare qualunque oggetto quando viene 
detto il verbo <<allontanare»), dopo alcuhe centinaia di generazioni 
la popolazione di individui avra reti neurali che imparano Telabo-
razione di informazioni linguistiche, visive e motorie. 
L'analis! delle rappresentazioni interne delle reti neurali du-
rante I'esecuzione dei diversi compiti linguistici e motor! permette 
di costruire un modello del controllo neurale di tali compiti. Per 
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tra ricercateri che usane diversi metodi. Gli esempi usati in questo 
saggio, e in gcnere I'approccio interdisciplinare e comparative alio 
studio della mente proposto nel presente volume, rendone 
auspicabile rintegrazione tra metodologie sperimentali e simulative 
per la comprensione dei sistemi complessi in psicologia. 
Roberta Lorenzetti 
La coscienza incarnata 
U tema della definiziene della coscienza e della possibility di 
ricerca scientifica relativamente a essa costituisce oggi uno dei 
punti di intersezione interdisciplinare piu complessi e dibattuti. 
Filosofia della mente e del linguaggie, biologia, matematica, fisica, 
psicelogia e neuroscienze riconescone nella cescienza un tema di 
rilevanza sostanziale. II dibattito si articela, tra altri vari temi, nella 
discussione comparata dei risultati ottenuti negli specifici ambiti 
di ricerca e nella ridefinizione della validita e applicabilita dei 
metodi di indagine al complesso rapporto tra mente e cervello, tra 
processi cognitivi ed esperienza fenomenica, tra I'attivita di com-
jrendere, il soggetto che comprende nel sue sentire individuale e 
a sua capacita di agire neirambiente naturale e sociale. 
Solo tracciare le linee essenziali del dibattite centemporaneo 
(trascurando le linee di evoluzione storica di questo lema) appare 
un compito di vastita pressoche inaffrontabile e necessiterebbe, 
comunque, di pessibilita di espressiene che certamente esulano 
dai limiti cenvenzionah di un capitolo (per una descriziene pano-
ramica si consigliano i seguenti volumi: Benzoni e Coppola [2000]; 
Di Francesco [2000]). Perianto ci limiteremo a offrire alcuni ap-
procci, e punti di vista, che possono costituire spunti di riflessione 
sul tema della cosciehza incarnata (parr. 3, 4, 5). 
Le seguenti parole di Edelman e Tenoni [2000; trad. it. 2000, 
250] propengono una considerazione della coscienza cendivisa 
dairautrice: «La coscienza e un processo fisico radicate nel corpo 
di ogni individuo, che h unico; tale radicamento nel corpo non puo 
mai essere sostituito da una mera descrizione». Cercare «il corpo 
della mente», il corpo della coscienza, costituisce il tentative di 
rendere cento di esperienze comuni, usuali, della nostra vita quo-
tidiaha che trevane neH'owia unitarieta del nostro essere soggetti 
la risposta a domande dotate di significate filosofico e psicologico 
complesso e profonde. Eccone alcune; 
- esperire emozioni, attitudini, pensieri, owero la complessa 
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esempio, e possibile calcolare le distanze euclidee tra le rappresen-
lazioni delle uniia nascoste, per capire come i diversi verbi e nomi 
sono rappresentati nella rete neurale. Maggior! distanze intercate-
goriali (cioe tra le diverse categorie di verbi, e/o di nomi) corri-
spondono a una migliore rappresentazione neurale delle classi 
sintattiche in oggetto. La figura 2 confronta quesie distanze inter-
categoriali per i nomi e per i verbi nei due stran nascosti della rete 
neurale. U primo strato corrisponde alle strutture neurali sensorial! 
piu vicine all'input retinico, mentre il secondo sirato corrisponde 
alle strutture neurali piu vicine alio strato di uscita motorio per il 
movimenco del braccio. Mentre nei primo strato nascosto vi e una 
maggiore differenza tra le classi dei nomi, nei secondo strato piij 
vicino all'output raotorio i verbi sono meglio differenziati. Tali 
risultati sono in accordo con le osservazioni sperimentali di 
visualizzazione cerebrale descritti da Martin et al. [1995], in cui le 
aree corticali motorie sono piij attive con i nomi di azioni, e quelle 
sensorial! con ! nomi di color!.^ 
La similarita tra i dati sperimental! e i dati della simulazione 
permeite di estendere tali modelU computazionali per studiare il 
ruolo di fattori adattivo-evoluzionist! nei controllo neurale del 






sio si e specializzato per ottimizzare la differenza tra verbi diversi. 
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modello e stato osservato che le diverse classi di parole emergono 
in fasi diverse. Durante Tevoluzione,! nomi vengono appresi pri-
ma dei verbi, e cio e correlato al tipo di rappresentazioni interne 
che le reti sviluppano. Inoltre, lo stesso tipo di approccio puo 
essere usato per simulare I'emergenza di strutture funzionalmente 
distinte (moduli) per il controllo di diverse abilita linguistico-
sintattiche. Infatti, simil! modelli di Vita Artificiale sono stati usati 
per lo studio dell'emergere di modularita in reti neurali [Calabretta 
e Parisi 2001]. 
4. Concluslone 
In questo capitolo e stato mostrato come il linguaggio sia un 
sistema complesso, perche diversi fattori individual!, neurali, social! 
e adattivi interagiscono in maniera non lineare e difficilmente 
prevedibile. Questa complessa interazione porta all'emergenza di 
jarticolari strutture linguistiche, come la sintassi, e di uniche abilita 
inguistiche umane, come Tapprendimento del lessico e il symbol 
grounding. 
II metodo della simulazione al calcolatore e di particolare 
aiuto nello studio dei fenomeni emergent! del linguaggio. In parti-
colare, le metodologie sintetiche, c^ome le reti neurali e la Vita 
Artificiale, permeitono di simulare il processo di emergenza di 
abilita linguistiche e quindi di investigare il contributo di ciascun 
fattore e della interazione tra elemenri. Per esempio, in alcune 
simulazioni e stato possibile analizzare in dettaglio I'interazione 
tra il processo di evoluzione e quello di apprendimento, permet-
tendo la comprensione del funzionamento dell*effetto Baldwin di 
assimilazione genetica. Inoltre, altri modelli hanno esplorato il 
meccanismo del symbol grounding e del controllo neurale di abilita 
linguistiche. 
II metodo simulativo non e qui proposto in alternativa ai me-
todi scientific! tradizionali di psicologia e delle scienze naturali. 
Esso e uno strumento complementare di ricerca che insieme agli 
studi empirici permette di generare nuove ipotesi e teorie esplica-
tive dei process! di emergenza di complesse strutture e facolta 
linguistiche. A tuit'oggi, Tintegrazione tra i due approcci metodo-
logici non e stata sempre facile o possibile, perche ! modelli simu-
lativi sono talvolta troppo astratti, o le troppe semplificazioni 
rendono difficil! i confront! diretti tra dati sperimentali e dati della 
simulazione. Inoltre, vi sono separazioni storiche tra discipline e 
tra approcci meiodologic! che rendono difficile la comunicazione 
